

NAA: A1838, 25/1/4/37 PART 2

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Number of pages: 263

Title: France - Relations with Cambodia

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25/1/4/37

OF FOREIGN
INDEXED

OFFICE/POST.....C. R.

25/1/4/37 2S

PART NO. 2

TITLE. FRANCE:- RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA.

88/28614

PREVIOUS PAGE

21

RELATED FILES

PREVIOUS PAPERS

Pl: 1

SUBSEQUENT PAPERS

Part 3.


ARCHIVAL ACTION

DATE COMMENCED _____

27/9/11

DATE FINISHED _____

152/87

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Cleared- Initials and date	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Cleared- Initials and date	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Cleared- Initials and date
1/39 1/54	P.A.	7/12	27/12 [initials]								
	P.A. 22/9/77										
CLOSED											
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 28/8/79  *25/1/4/37 25* </div> <div style="position: absolute; right: 0; top: 0;"> FILE No. 25/1/4/37. PART No. 2. </div>											
SECRET											

FILE NO. 25114/37.
PART NO. 2.

28/8/79

25/1/4/37 28

SECRET

**STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40(5) OF THE ARCHIVES
ACT 1983- INCLUDING DECISION ON ACCESS**

Record Series: A1838	Control symbol: 25/1/4/37 Pt 2
Title: France - Relations with Cambodia	Total number of folios (ie, equivalent separate pages) on the record: 198

1. Decision

After examining this record I have decided to open it for public access except for certain material which is identified below.

2. Basis for decision

I have taken into account:

- the content of the record requested;
- the relevant provisions of the *Archives Act 1983* (the Act);
- policy and guidelines of National Archives of Australia that relate to the access examination of Commonwealth records; and
- information provided by DFAT on which I have relied in formulating my decision.

3. Material withheld

Category of material withheld	Total number of folios per category	List each folio separately by category of material withheld
Partially exempted folios (certain parts of the text have been expunged)	2	58 and 61
Wholly exempted folios	3	2B-2
Folios not within the open access period as defined in s3 (7) of the Act	nil	
Folios withheld pending agency examination and advice	nil	

4. Findings of fact and reasons for decision

A. Findings of fact

Statement of Reasons page no. 1 of 3

In Table A in Annexure 1, I have provided a summary of my findings of fact where I have invoked specific provisions under s 33 of the Act. By invoking these provisions, I have relied on material listed in part 2 above in order to arrive at my decision.

B. Reasons for decision

In Table A in Annexure 1, I have provided the reasons for my decision for each folio exempted and those reasons are derived from the findings of fact.

5. Appeal rights

National Archives undertakes careful examination of a record before making a decision to exempt any part of it. As part of that process, we may consult with other agencies which have expertise on specific national and international matters.


If you do not agree with my decision to exempt information under a provision of s 33 of the Act, you can contact a reference officer in National Archives and seek a further explanation.

If you are still not happy with the decision and within 28 days of receiving it, you can formally appeal by:

- 1) first applying to Archives for an internal reconsideration of my decision; and
- 2) if you still do not agree with the decision, you can apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review.

For more information please read the **National Archives Fact Sheet 12- What to do if we refuse you access**. You can also lodge a complaint with the Commonwealth Ombudsman in relation to the decision.

Decision maker	I.B. Gration
Designation	APS 6
Date	15MAR11



Annexure 1

Table A: Material exempted by folio number and grouped by the application of exemption provisions

Relevant legislative provision invoked under s33 of the Act	Folio number	Findings of fact	Reasons for Decision
S 33(1) (a) – information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.		<p>/ These records contain one or more of the following references:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Information relevant to the capability, sources, objectives, methods, areas of interest or operations of an Australian intelligence agency. The information is still regarded as sensitive. 2. There are real and substantial grounds to conclude that the release of the information would pose a risk to the security and defence of Australia. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The public disclosure of this information would directly compromise the future activities of an Australian intelligence agency and impair its ability to carry out its statutory function. It would therefore be reasonably expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth. 2. The information would lessen the confidence of another government in Australia, thus damaging international relations.

Statement of reasons page no. 3 of 3



SECRET

179

13 part 2

Australian
rchives

DO NOT REMOVE

This acid-free mask contains ⁵~~33~~..... folios (including 1 - a booklet)
with the date range ~~1961-1963~~ 1971-77

The contents of the mask are:

☒ Exempt from public access under
paragraph(s) ~~3.3.11.1.6.2.1~~..... of the *Archives
Act* 1983. You have a statutory right to seek
a review of the exemption.

☐ Not in the open period as defined
by the *Archives Act* 1983.

Date mask applied: 15 MAR 11
~~21 November 1993~~

NAS 1061 (NOV 1991)

1727839

A1838

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RE8.

Department of Foreign Affairs

File Number 25/1/4/37
Part Number 2.

FILE CLOSED

This part opened on 27, 9, 71

This part closed on 10, 7, 81

3.

Subsequent correspondence on Part/File Number

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

198

O.PA90797 MT00
TOR 0357 11.07.81

CONFIDENTIAL

O.PA90797 1700 10.7.81 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6181

RP.
RR JAKARTA/201 KUALA LUMPUR/162 MANILA/107
RR BANGKOK/305 SINGAPORE/262 LONDON/1090
RR WASHINGTON/2274 UN NEW YORK/1137

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA90617 ++

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

SUMMARY: IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE KAMPUCHEAN FACTIONS COULD SURFACE AT THE NEW YORK MEETING. THIS WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL AND I HAVE ASKED THE THAI, PHILIPPINES AND CHINESE AMBASSADORS WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO DISCOURAGE IT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

ACCORDING TO THE THAI AMBASSADOR AND UNITED STATES EMBASSY HERE, THE PROSPECTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL FACTIONS FOR THE FORMATION OF A UNITED FRONT SEEM WORSE THAN EVER. SIHANOUK IS COMPLAINING THAT SON SANN REFUSES TO MEET HIM. SON SANN IS SAYING THAT SIHANOUK HAS REBUFFED FOUR APPROACHES OVER THE LAST FEW MONTHS AND HAS ALSO CHANGED COURSE SEVERAL TIMES, AND THAT IN CONSEQUENCE SON SANN IS DISINCLINED TO PURSUE FURTHER EFFORTS WITH HIM, AT LEAST UNLESS AND UNTIL HE HAS REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE KHMER ROUGE. APPARENTLY, THE KHMER ROUGE FOR THEIR PART HAVE TOUGHENED THEIR STANCE IN NEGOTIATING WITH SON SANN, AS EMERGED PARTICULARLY FROM A RECENT MEETING WITH IENG SARY (WHO WILL APPARENTLY REPRESENT THE KHMER ROUGE AT THE NEW YORK MEETING).

2. THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT SIHANOUK'S SUPPORT AMONG THE EXILES IS SLIPPING: IN PARTICULAR PENN NOUTH HAS DECIDED AFTER LONG REFLECTION TO TRANSFER HIS SUPPORT TO SON SANN, AND HIS DEFECTION MAY INFLUENCE OTHERS.

3. AS TO THE NEW YORK MEETING, SIHANOUK HAS DECIDED NOT TO ATTEND HIMSELF BUT TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE, IN TAM. SON SANN WILL ATTEND. IT IS EXPECTED THAT SIHANOUK'S REPRESENTATIVE WILL CIRCULATE TO THE MEETING A STATEMENT OF HIS VIEWS (PRESUMABLY, IN FAVOUR OF QUIET DIPLOMACY, PLUS HIS OTHER IDEAS) WHICH COULD DIFFER SOMEWHAT FROM THE ASEAN APPROACH. SON SANN HAS SAID THAT IF CRITICISED BY SIHANOUK OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE HE WILL REPLY, AND THERE IS ALSO SOME POSSIBILITY THAT IN SPEAKING TO THE CONFERENCE HE MAY SAY THINGS WHICH DIFFER

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA90797

FROM THE ASEAN APPROACH.

4. ALL THIS (AS THE THAI AMBASSADOR AND I AGREED) COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A MESSY SITUATION IN NEW YORK, IN WHICH THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS WERE EXPOSED TO THE CONFERENCE AND FROM WHICH ONLY HENG SAMRIN AND THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD STAND TO GAIN. THE ASEAN OBJECTIVE HERE THEREFORE MAY BE TO TRY TO PERSUADE SIHANOUK NOT TO PUT VIEWS TO THE CONFERENCE WHICH EXPOSE THESE DIFFERENCES OR WHICH CUT ACROSS THE ASEAN APPROACH, BUT RATHER TO HELP THE CONFERENCE MAKE ITS FULL IMPACT AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE AND OF KEEPING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE WORLD PUBLIC, AS IS ITS INTENTION.

5. FINALLY, THE ASEAN AMBASSADORS SAW THE FRENCH MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS, CHEYSSON, A FEW DAYS AGO WITH A PLEA TO HIM TO ATTEND THE MEETING. HE TOLD THEM THAT HE WAS EXTREMELY SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW, BUT THAT HE HAD HIMSELF A TWO-DAY MEETING OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ON 13 AND 14 JULY, AND, GIVEN THAT THE VIETNAMESE AND USSR WOULD NOT BE PRESENT AT THE NEW YORK MEETING, DID NOT THINK THAT IT COULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY OVER THIS COMMITMENT. AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR O.PA90619, FRANCE IS NOW TO BE REPRESENTED BY ITS PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.

- COMMENT -

6. IN THIS FRENCH APPROACH, THERE IS PROBABLY AN ELEMENT OF WISHING NOT TO COMPROMISE THE POSSIBILITY OF FRANCE'S PLAYING SOME USEFUL ROLE IN FUTURE AS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED, DESPITE WHAT I AM SURE IS STRONG AND GENUINE SUPPORT FOR ASEAN. CHEYSSON RECALLED TO THE ASEAN AMBASSADORS THAT HE HAD BEGUN HIS CAREER AS AN ADVISOR TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND ALSO HIS SERVICE IN JAKARTA, SAYING THAT HE WAS CLOSELY INTERESTED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE REGION AND WOULD LIKE TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE PART IN THEM. WE KNOW THAT THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR RECENTLY CALLED ON THE SOCIALIST PARTY'S SECRETARY-GENERAL JOSPIN, WHICH COULD INDICATE A REVISED FEELER FROM THE VIETNAMESE SIDE TO THE FRENCH, AFTER A PERIOD IN WHICH FRANCO/VIETNAMESE RELATIONS HAVE BEEN STAGNANT.

7. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ON 10 JULY WITH THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINESE AMBASSADORS ON A SOCIAL OCCASION, I PUT THE POINT IN PARA 6 ABOVE, SUGGESTING THAT IN NEW YORK THE CAMBODIAN FACTIONS SHOULD NOT ADVERTISE THEIR DIFFERENCES BUT SHOULD RATHER CONCENTRATE ON THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE AND GETTING A GOOD AGREED RESULT FROM THE CONFERENCE. BOTH AGREED, THE CHINESE SAYING THAT THE DRK WAS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT AND THAT THOUGH THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE FACTIONS WERE NOT GOOD, HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THEY WOULD BE OVERCOME BEFORE THE NEXT UNGA, AND THE PHILIPPINES THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE IN FACT RATHER RELIEVED THAT SIHANOUK WOULD NOT BE IN NEW YORK - THOUGH HE WOULD BE CIRCULA-

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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CONFIDENTIAL

3-0.PA90797

TING A STATEMENT THERE. ACCORDING TO THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR, THE CHINESE ARE BEING GENUINELY HELPFUL AND ARE UNLIKELY TO BE STIMULATING THE STIFFER ATTITUDE OF THE KHMER ROUGE.

... ROWLAND

++ FROM LONDON: REFTEL IS INCORRECT - SHOULD PROBABLY BE 0.PA90619

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
A/PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN DEFENCE
MIN IMM ETH AFF
DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

4-0.PA90797

ACTION: SEA
SA
IO

JBAL
JACC
JBAD
OGBBX

SEC	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU	LA	EX
MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(EANZ)	
ANZ	FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	
FAS(CIC)	RIA	FAS(ECO)	EP	FAS(LT)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		

ANKARA ATHENS BERNE BONN BRUSSELS COLOMBO COPENHAGEN DACCA
DUBLIN GENEVA HANOI HONG KONG ISLAMABAD LISBON MADRID MALTA
MOSCOW NEW DELHI NICOSIA PORT MORESBY RANGOON ROME STOCKHOLM
THE HAGUE VIENNA VIENTIANE

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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O.PA90619 DRHA
TOR 1609 07.07.81

O.PA90619 1700 6.7.81 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6021

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/1133 LONDON/1070 JAKARTA/199
RR BANGKOK/203 MANILA/105 WASHINGTON/2266
RR SINGAPORE/260 KUALA LUMPUR/160

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA90560 O.PA90380

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

GORY (HEAD, SOUTH-EAST ASIA BRANCH, MER, AND CUR

STLY
ACTING AS DIRECTOR, ASIA/OCEANIA) TOLD US 6 JULY THAT SIHANOUK
AND CHEYSSON MET TETE-A-TETE ON 3 JULY, AND THAT SO FAR CHEYSSON
HAD NOT INDICATED WHAT HAD PASSED BETWEEN THEM. SPEAKING TO THE
PRESS AFTER THE MEETING, HOWEVER, SIHANO MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) CONTINUITY OF FRENCH POLICY : "FRANCE SEEKS TO BE OF SERVICE
TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE, AND WILL NOT FAIL TO ACT WHEN THE TIME
COMES":

(B) "NUMEROUS CONVERGENCES" BETWEEN HIS VIEWS AND THOSE OF THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHICH HE WAS PLEASED TO NOTE WAS "NOT OFF ON
A CRUSADE AGAINST ONE OF THE ANTAGONISTS" (CHINA ON THE ONE
SIDE, AND THE USSR AND VIETNAM ON THE OTHER) - NO DOUBT AN
ALLUSION TO US POLICY:

(C) DISAPPROVAL OF KHMER ROUGE OCCUPATION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN SEAT
AT THE UN, AND A PLEA FOR THE "EMPTY CHAIR":

(D) THE UN CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA WILL BE "A FAILURE" BECAUSE
THE KHMER PROBLEM CANNOT BE RESOLVED "WITHOUT THE VIETNAMESE
AND THE SOVIETS":

(E) A UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIAN GROUPS HOSTILE TO VIETNAM COULD
NOT BE FORMED BECAUSE SON SANN REFUSED TO MEET HIM.

2. AS TO THE UN CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, GORY SAID THAT CHEYSSON
WOULD DEFINITELY NOT ATTEND (BECAUSE, HE SAID, THERE WAS NO
POINT IN HIS ATTENDING A CONFERENCE WHICH "EVERYONE KNOWS" WOULD
ACHIEVE NOTHING). FRANCE WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY ANOTHER MINISTER
(POSSIBLY) OR (PROBABLY) A VERY SENIOR OFFICIAL OR SENIOR PUBLIC
FIGURE NOT IN GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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2-0.PA90619

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN DEFENCE
DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA
IO

OGBBX

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU
LA	EX MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	SEA
FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	EUR
FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)
EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		

National Archives of Australia

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→ 25/1/4/37.

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O.PA90380 NASH
TOR 0447 27.06.81

CONFIDENTIAL

O.PA90380 1810 26.6.81 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/5799

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/1129 LONDON/1048 WASHINGTON/2254
RR BANGKOK/301

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.TH4324

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA CONFERENCE

ACCORDING TO NOIVILLE (DIRECTOR ASIA/OCEANIA MER) IT HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED WHO SHOULD ATTEND THE KAMPUCHEA CONFERENCE FOR FRANCE BUT IT IS STILL HOPED THAT 'A FRENCH MINISTER' (BUT POSSIBLY NOT CHEYSSON) WILL GO (REFTEL PARA 6). THE MINISTRY IS ANXIOUS NOT TO DISAPPOINT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, THOUGH AS YOU KNOW IT HAS NO GREAT HOPES OF THE CONFERENCE.

....ROWLAND.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN DEFENCE
MIN IMM ETH AFF
DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

191

2-0.PA90380

ACTION: SA

EUR
IO

JACC
JBAD
JBAL
OGBBX

SEC	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU	LA	EX
MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	SEA	FAS(NSA)	NA
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	FAS(DN)	NUC	DEF	DPR
FAS(IOAME)	FAS(CIC)	RIA	FAS(ECO)	EP	
FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P		
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB				

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COLOMBO	COPENHAGEN	DACCA
DUBLIN	GENEVA	HANOI	HONG KONG	ISLAMABAD	JAKARTA	KUALA LUMPUR	
LISBON	MADRID	MALTA	MANILA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	PEKING
PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	SINGAPORE	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	
VIENNA	VIENTIANE						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

190

O.PA90364 MJDE
TOR 0110 27.06.81

O.PA90364 1655 26.6.81 CLA FIRST

TO.
PP CANBERRA/5783

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 253/6/4/2

R E S T R I C T E D

KAMPUCHEA : ALL BY NHIEK TIOULONG

I AM TO RECEIVE A CALL ON THURSDAY 2 JULY FROM NHIEK TIOULONG OF SIHANOUK'S FUNCINPEK (UNITED NATIONAL FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT NEUTRAL PEACEFUL AND COOPERATIVE CAMBODIA). THE CALL WAS SOUGHT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOR FUNCINPEK WITH THE PURPOSE OF INFORMING ME OF RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT A MEETING OF THE FRONT HELD IN FRANCE THIS WEEK UNDER SIHANOUK'S CHAIRMANSHIP, PRINCIPALLY RELATING TO SIHANOUK'S READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A UNITED ANTI-VIETNAMESE FRONT WITH THE KHMERS ROUGES, (AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT IS REPORTED VERY BRIEFLY IN TODAY'S LE MONDE).

2. GRATEFUL ANY GUIDANCE.

.... ROWLAND.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN DEFENCE
DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

*Mr. Carroll says Dr. Perrineau
has done a reply JF 29/6*
*1/4 Masjetye. me check
with Mr Carroll
that reply goes.*

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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2-O.PA90364

ACTION: SEA
EUR
IO

0GBBX

SEC	DEPSEC-A	DEPSEC-B	DEPSEC-C	PPU
LA	EX MCO	PA	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)
NA	SA FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	FAS(DN)	DEF
DPR	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	EP	FAS(LT)
FAS(MFS)				

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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188

O.PA87029 NASH
TOR 1040 19.03.81

O.PA87029 1816 18.3.81 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/2946

RP.
RR MOSCOW/580 BANGKOK/292 HANOI/194
RR SINGAPORE/240 UN NEW YORK/1087 WASHINGTON/2131
RR NEW DELHI/175 PEKING/285

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA85981

Handwritten signature

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA - FRENCH COMMENT

IN DISCUSSION ON 17 MARCH SCHLUMBERGER (INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER, FOREIGN MINISTRY) HAS LITTLE NEW TO ADD ON THE KAMPUCHEA SITUATION.

2. ON CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR THE 'UNITED FRONT' (O.BK36797), SCHLUMBERGER WAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE PYONGYANG DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID THAT SIHANOUK'S CONTINUING INSISTENCE ON THE 'DISARMAMENT' OF THE KHMER ROUGE WOULD BE THE REAL TEST: IF THAT WERE ACHIEVED, PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT SCHLUMBERGER WAS SCEPTICAL.

3. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY KNEW NO MORE THAN WHAT THEY GLEANED FROM THE PRESS ABOUT PLANS BY SIHANOUK AND OTHERS FOR VISITS TO PARIS (THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT SON SANN HAS RECENTLY BEEN HERE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMBODIAN GROUPS, AND THAT SIHANOUK PLANS TO BE IN PARIS IN MAY OR JUNE). SIMILARLY SCHLUMBERGER HAD NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE TO ADD TO ACCOUNTS YOU ALREADY HAVE OF SIHANOUK'S PRESENT ATTITUDES AND HIS INTENTION TO REVIVE 'UNITED FRONT' NEGOTIATIONS IN NOVEMBER AFTER THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS CONSIDERED KAMPUCHEA.

4. SCHLUMBERGER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CHINESE REACTIONS. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHETHER SIHANOUK VISITED PEKING BEFORE COMING ON TO PARIS, FOLLOWING HIS TALKS IN PYONGYANG. SCHLUMBERGER THOUGHT THAT THE CHINESE WERE BEING WARY IN RESPONDING TO SIHANOUK'S PROPOSALS (COMPARE PARA 7 OF O.PK17888).

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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187

2-0.PA87029

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
J10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

186

3-0. PA87029

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)		NA	
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	FAS(DN)	NUC		DEF	DPR
FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)			FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
JAKARTA	KUALA LUMPUR	LISBON	LONDON	MADRID	MALTA	MANILA	
NICOSIA	PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	
VIENNA	VIENTIANE						

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 25/1/4/37.

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O.PA85981 KPMO
TOR 0632 18.02.81

O.PA85981 1840 17.02.81 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/2040

RP.
RR BANGKOK/290 PEKING/282 HANOI/192
RR MOSCOW/566 KUALA LUMPUR/145 JAKARTA/187
RR TOKYO/591 SINGAPORE/237 MANILA/94

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 255/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA : ''UNITED FRONT''

THE FRENCH WELCOME THE DEVELOPMENT OF A ''UNITED FRONT'', WHICH THEY CONSIDER TO BE AN ASEAN INITIATIVE, BUT THEY ARE DOUBTFUL OF SUCH A FRONT'S STAYING POWER (CONFIDENTIAL).

ON 17 FEBRUARY, SCHLUMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY, INDOCHINA DESK) SAID THAT, WHILE THE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF A CREATION OF A ''UNITED FRONT'' WERE REDOUBTABLE, THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT DIRECTION WERE THE MOST POSITIVE FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS : SIHANOUK WAS IN FAVOUR: THE KHUM ROUGE, IN THE FORM OF KHIEU SAMPHAN, HAD MET SON SANN AND WAS ABOUT TO MEET SIHANOUK : THE CHINESE AND THAIS HAD BOTH EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS BUT POSITIVE SUPPORT. SON SANN WAS THE ONLY ONE NOT TO HAVE MADE ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED ''UNITED FRONT'', BUT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE CHINESE THAT THEY HAD UNOFFICIAL WORD FROM SON SANN THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE FORMULA WHEREBY SIHANOUK WAS TO BE HEAD OF STATE, SONN SANN PRIME MINISTER AND KHIEU SAMPHAN VICE-PRIME MINISTER.

2. RECALLING THAT PEN NOUTH HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN MENTIONED BY SIHANOUK AS A POSSIBLE PRIME MINISTER, WE ASKED SCHLUMBERGER FOR ANY NEWS OF THE FORMER'S ACTIVITIES. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT PEN NOUTH WAS STILL LIVING IN FRANCE BUT WAS NOT POLITICALLY ACTIVE, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE INCLUSION OF HIS NAME HAD PROBABLY ONLY BEEN MADE BY SIHANOUK SO AS TO MAKE THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION APPEAR A LITTLE WIDER. (WE HAVE HAD INTERMITTENT CONTACT WITH ONE OF PEN NOUTH'S SONS WHO HAS RECENTLY MADE NO MENTION OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY HIS FATHER).

3. SPECULATING ON THE MOVES TOWARD A ''UNITED FRONT'', SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THIS WAS, IN THE FRENCH VIEW, AN ASEAN INITIATIVE, BEGUN BECAUSE THE INDOCHINA CONFERENCE IDEA WAS OBVIOUSLY GETTING NO WHERE. (SEE O.PK17438 WHICH SPECULATES THAT THE INDONESIAN EMBASSY IN PYONG YANG MAY HAVE HAD A ROLE TO PLAY.) BY FACILITATING THE SON SANN/KHIEU

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA85981

SAMPHAN MEETING, THE THAIS MIGHT HAVE STIMULATED SIHANOUK INTO JOINING THE MOVE FOR FEAR OF BEING LEFT OUT ALTOGETHER. THE FRENCH FURTHER THOUGHT THAT ASEAN MIGHT HAVE PERSUADED CHINA TO VIEW A 'UNITED FRONT' FAVOURABLE, BECAUSE OF THE EVER-GROWING INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION OF THE KHMER ROUGE.

4. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH VERY MUCH WELCOMED ANY DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS A 'UNITED FRONT', BUT THEY REMAINED VERY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE WILL OF THE THREE MAJOR ACTORS TO STAY UNITED, AND ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE THAI AND CHINESE WERE REALLY PREPARED TO GIVE (ESPECIALLY MATERIAL) SUPPORT TO A FRONT HEADED BY SIHANOUK.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SEA
SA
EUR

JBAC

JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)		NA	FAS(EANZ)	
ANZ	FAS(DN)	DEF	DPR		FAS(IOAME)	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)			FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S					

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA83727 JAMC
TOR 1003 04.12.80

O.PA83727 1736 3.12.80 CL

TO.
RR CANBERRA/0108

RP.
RR HANOI/189 SINGAPORE/229 TOKYO/561
RR PEKING/275 KUALA LUMPUR/138 UN NEW YORK/1062
RR BANGKOK/285 JAKARTA/184 WASHINGTON/2033
RR NEW DELHI/166 MANILA/93

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 275/7/4 REF O.CH929594

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

THE FRENCH AGREE IN GENERAL WITH YOUR ANALYSIS (REFTEL) OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE IN ARRIVING AT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA, BUT THEIR VIEW IS THAT BOTH THE CHINESE AND THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NO/NO SERIOUS INTENTION OF SOFTENING THEIR ATTITUDES TO EACH OTHER ON THIS ISSUE. (CONFIDENTIAL).

2. ON 3 DECEMBER WE OUTLINED YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA TO SCHLUMBERGER (INDOCHINA DESK, MFA) WHO AGREED WITH IT IN GENERAL. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THERE WERE ONLY TWO ACTORS, CHINA AND VIETNAM, THAT COULD CHANGE THE SCRIPT IN KAMPUCHEA, AND NEITHER OF THEM WANTED TO : CHINA BECAUSE IF WAS CONVENCED THAT VIETNAM COULD NOT, IN THE LONG RUN, BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROLONGED WARFARE IN KAMPUCHEA, AND VIETNAM BECAUSE IT BELIEVED THAT, IN THE LONG RUN, INTERNATIONAL OPINION (INCLUDING ASEAN) WOULD COME TO ACCEPT THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME. DURING GISCARD'S OCTOBER VISIT TO CHINA, AND IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS THAT THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN HANOI HAD HAD, THE FRENCH HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT NEITHER CHINA NOR VIETNAM WANTED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, EVEN IF ONE WERE TO PRESENT ITSELF MIRACULOUSLY. IT WAS TRUE, SAID SCHLUMBERGER, THAT THE CHINESE HAD ALLOWED IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL NEED NOT BE TOTAL BEFORE A PROCESS OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT COULD BEGIN, BUT THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT THESE SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY WERE PURELY COSMETIC : THE CHINESE SAW THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE BEING ABSOLUTELY INTRANSIGENT, AND THEY COULD THEREFORE THEMSELVES SOUND MORE ACCOMMODATING.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

182

2-0. PA83722

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ONA

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
SPEC. ADVISER TO P.M
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SEA
SA

JCCAD
JACC

SEC	DEP SEC	CS	PPW	IA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS (SEP)	PSP	FAS (NSA)	NA	FAS (EANZ)			
ANZ	EUR	FAS (DN)	DEF	DPR			
FAS (IOAME)	IO	FAS (ECO)	EP	FAS (LT)			
FAS (MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S				
DIR-ADAR							

RONN BRUSSELS HONG KONG LONDON PORT MORESBY RANGOON

CONFIDENTIAL

→ 25/1/4/37.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA80013 BOMA
TOR 0114 22.08.80

RESTRICTED

O.PA80013 1630 21.8.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6982

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/988 LONDON/233 BONN/1380
RR BRUSSELS/1355 ROME/1078 WASHINGTON/1937
RR BANGKOK/266 PEKING/262

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.BS2936

R E S T R I C T E D

UNGA: KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS

SCHLUMBERGER (INDOCHINA DESK, FOREIGN MINISTRY) CONFIRMED ON 21 AUGUST THAT THE FRENCH WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS QUESTION AT THE FORTHCOMING UNGA, (O.PA79093). WHILE THE FRENCH ARE AWARE THAT MORE MEMBERS OF THE EC SEEM INCLINED THIS YEAR TO ABSTAIN ON THIS QUESTION, SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT FRANCE AT THE LUXEMBOURG MEETING ON 29 AUGUST WOULD NOT BE TRYING TO PERSUADE OTHER EC COUNTRIES TO ABSTAIN.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEP P M AND CABINET

Mr. Haughey (F)

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO

0GBAAJ

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	SA	FAS(EANZ)	EUR		
FAS(DN)	FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)			
GLT	FAS(MFS)					

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

180

O.PA79093 1715 22.7.80 CLA

O.PA79093 DRHA
TOR 0233 23.07.80

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6230

RP.
RR HANOI/178 PEKING/259 WASHINGTON/1917
RR BANGKOK/263 SINGAPORE/205 KUALA LUMPUR/127
RR UN NEW YORK/978

Handwritten signature

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4, 253/6/4 REF O.CH903810

R E S T R I C T E D

FRANCE: KAMPUCHEA

ON 22 JULY WE SPOKE TO SCHULMBERGER (INDOCHINA DESK, FOREIGN MINISTRY) MAKING REFTEL'S POINTS ABOUT AUSTRALIAN POLICY ON RECOGNITION OF KAMPUCHEA.

2. SCHULMBERGER CONFIRMED THAT THE NINE'S DISCUSSION ON KAMPUCHEA AT THE LAST POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING (O.B52765) HAD BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH PRESSURE TO REACH A CONCERTED EC POSITION ON THE CREDENTIALS OF RIVAL KHUMER DELEGATIONS AT THE NEXT UNGA: HE RECALLED THAT LAST YEAR THE NINE HAD HAD DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW, ABOUT HALF VOTING IN FAVOUR OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS, AND THE OTHER HALF (INCLUDING FRANCE) ABSTAINING. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT FRANCE WAS LIKELY TO ABSTAIN AGAIN, AND THIS WAS ONLY LOGICAL SINCE FRANCE HAD NEVER HAD RELATIONS WITH THE POL POT GOVERNMENT, AND COULD NOT THEREFORE BE EXPECTED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF DK CREDENTIALS.

3. COMMENTING ON THE INDIAN RECOGNITION OF THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME, SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT THE INDIAN ACTION MIGHT RESULT IN THE DECISION BY SOME NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ALSO TO RECOGNISE HENG SAMRIN. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS NOTABLY SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT FRANCE, IN ITS ROUTINE PRE-UNGA CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCOPHONE-AFRICAN COUNTRIES, WOULD BE ENJOINGING THOSE AFRICAN COUNTRIES NOT/ NOT TO RECOGNISE THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME. SUMMING UP, SCHLUMBERGER

THOUGHT THAT, WHILE THERE WOULD BE SOME MOVEMENT IN FAVOUR OF RECOGNISING DPRK CREDENTIALS AT THE NEXT UNGA, IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO UNSEAT THE DK DELEGATION: NEXT YEAR WOULD BE CRITICAL, BUT NOT THIS YEAR.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

179

2-0.PA79093

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PRIME MINISTER
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DEP P M AND CABINET
JIO

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ACTION: PA

LBBB
JBAACA
JBCA
JBAC

SEC
SEA

DEPSECS
FAS(NSA)

PPU
NA

EX
SA

MCO
FAS(EANZ)

FAS(SEP)
EUR

→ 25/1/4/37.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

178

O.PA75400 JCNI
TOR 2237 03.04.80

O.PA75400 1055 3.4.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/3171

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/1753 PEKING/208 BANGKOK/252
RR HANOI/169

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

Mr. Maguire (F)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

IN A CONVERSATION WITH SCHLUMBERGER (INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER, FOREIGN MINISTRY) ON 2 APRIL, THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED:

- THE FRENCH HAD SO FAR NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT WHETHER THE THAIS WERE REPATRIATING KHMER REFUGEES, AND, IF SO, HOW MANY. THE RED CROSS INSISTED THAT REPATRIATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE WHILE THE THAI GOVERNMENT INSISTED THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT SOME REPATRIATIONS WERE TAKING PLACE (ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NO IDEA OF THE NUMBER) AND WERE VERY CONCERNED FOR THE FATE OF THE REFUGEES. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT ONE POSSIBLE MOTIVATION OF THE THAIS MIGHT BE TO SUPPLEMENT THE RESISTANCE FORCES FIGHTING WITHIN CAMBODIA, AS WELL AS TO GET RID OF SOME KHMER ELEMENTS FEUDING AMONG THEMSELVES IN THAILAND. (SON SANN HAS APPARENTLY LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE IS PREPARED TO TAKE UNDER HIS WING KHMERS WHO HAD BEEN REPATRIATED FROM THAILAND).
- SIHANOUK LEFT PARIS ON 30 MARCH FOR PEKING AND PYONG-YANG. FROM INTERVIEWS GIVEN BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, WE GATHERED THAT SIHANOUK WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH HIS EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONTACTS, IN PARTICULAR HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE APPARENT AMERICAN UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE HIM MATERIAL ASSISTANCE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED PESSIMISM ABOUT ANY FUTURE FOR HIMSELF IN THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD HAD NO/NO CONTACT WITH SIHANOUK BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.
- THE FRENCH HAVE STILL NOT DECIDED ON THE LEVEL OF THEIR HUMANITARIAN AID FOR KHMER REFUGEES FOR APRIL-DECEMBER 1980 (O.PA74480). SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE STILL

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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2-0.PA75400

WAITING FOR SOME CONCRETE PROOF OF THE 'GOOD FAITH' WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD FROM THE KAMPUCHEAN AUTHORITIES. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE EC AID TO THE KHMERS WAS CLOSE TO BEING FINALISED AND THAT IT WOULD BE GREATER THAN THE LAST CONTRIBUTION OF USDLRS 10.75 MILLION, AND ITS PROPORTION FOR THE SECOND PHASE WOULD BE ABOUT THE SAME I.E. JUST OVER A QUARTER OF THE TOTAL. AS FAR AS BILATERAL AID WAS CONCERNED SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT/NOT GOT VERY FAR IN DISCUSSING THE LEVEL OR NATURE OF AID THAT FRANCE WOULD GIVE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JACC

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)		NA	
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	FAS(DN)	NUC		DEF	
FAS(IOAME)	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)			FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

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→ 25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

176

O.PA76287 JAMC
TOR 1937 03.05.80

O.PA76287 1025 3.5.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/3904

RP.
RR MOSCOW/427 WASHINGTON/1805 LONDON/9840
RR BANGKOK/255 HANOI/172

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/4 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCO/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS: SOUTH EAST ASIA

ACCORDING TO NOIVILLE (DIRECTOR, ASIA-OCEANIA, FOREIGN MINISTRY) ON 30 APRIL THE FRENCH DISCUSSIONS WITH GROMYKO ABOUT CAMBODIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA PRODUCED NOTHING OF INTEREST. THE FRENCH PRESSED STRONGLY THE NEED FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA AND FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT: IN RETURN THE RUSSIANS SAID ALL THE USUAL THINGS ABOUT THE NECESSITY FOR THE VIETNAMESE INTERVENTION AT THE INVITATION OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. OVERALL, THE FRENCH IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE DISCUSSION GOT NO WHERE.

2. NOIVILLE SAID THAT THE FRENCH EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A MEETING ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF CAMBODIA, UNDER WALDHEIM'S AUSPICES, AND WERE PREPARING TO ATTEND IT.

3. AS TO SIHANOUK, NOIVILLE WAS AWARE OF SIHANOUK'S STATEMENTS, APPARENTLY MADE IN PEKING, THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN WITH SON SANN AND HENG SAMRIN TO FORM A SORT OF "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY" BUT WAS INCLINED NOT TO GIVE THESE STATEMENTS MUCH IMPORTANCE. SIHANOUK SAID DIFFERENT THINGS AT DIFFERENT TIMES AND NOIVILLE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH MUST NOW BE RATHER MORE INCLINED TO WRITE HIM DOWN THAN HAS HITHERTO BEEN THE CASE.

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

175

2-0. PA762B7

ACTION: SEA
EUR
DDO

JBBBC

SEC	DEPSECS	PPU	LA	EX	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)		NA	SA	
FAS(EANZ)	ANZ	FAS(DN)		NUC	DEF	
FAS(IOAME)	IO	AME		FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		FAREP-S	

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
174

O.PA73795 DBKE
TOR 0725 20.02.80

O.PA73795 1800 19.2.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/1840

RP.
RR BANGKOK/249 WASHINGTON/1701 OTTAWA/426
RR JAKARTA/160 SINGAPORE/192 PEKING/215
RR HANOI/168 WELLINGTON/345

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 253/6/4/2 225/7/4 REF O.PA73420

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIHANOUK

I SAW SIHANOUK FOR AN HOUR ON 15 FEBRUARY.

2. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE ON VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. ON HIS RETURN, HE WOULD GO TO BELGIUM AND THE FRG, THEN HE INTENDED TO SPEND APRIL AND MAY IN NORTH KOREA, SINCE HE HAD PROMISED KIM II SUNG TO DO SO IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATTER'S ANNIVERSARY. HE WOULD THEN GO TO PEKING, SINCE HE HAD ALSO PROMISED THE CHINESE TO SPEND SOME TIME THERE. FINALLY, HE STILL PROPOSED TO VISIT AUSTRALIA, BUT NOT UNTIL THE END OF JUNE OR EARLY JULY.

3. ALL THESE VISITS WILL BE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, SINCE THEY ALL WISHED TO SEE HIM. HE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD AN INVITATION FROM COLIN PRATT AND THE AUSTRALIAN/CAMBODIAN ASSOCIATION AND GAVE NO INDICATION OF DESIRING ANYTHING MORE.

4. HE EXPRESSED A GOOD DEAL OF GLOOM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA, AND INDEED ABOUT HIS OWN ABILITY TO EXERT ANY USEFUL INFLUENCE, THOUGH HE WAS STILL WORKING FOR A NEUTRAL INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DEVELOP INTERNATIONAL INTEREST OR SUPPORT FOR THAT APPROACH: HE AGREED THAT IT COULD ONLY BECOME A REALITY IF IT SHOULD COME TO SUIT ALL CONCERNED, AND NOTABLY THE CHINESE, VIETNAMESE AND RUSSIANS.

5. HE SAID THAT THE GREATEST CONCENTRATION OF CAMBODIAN REFUGEES WAS OF COURSE IN THAILAND, BUT THAT THE THAI AUTHORITIES WOULD NOT ADMIT HIM. THEY THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD ONLY MAKE TROUBLE. ASKED WHY HE HAD CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO SINGAPORE AND WHETHER HE WOULD NOT BE WISE TO "SHOW HIS FACE" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE SAID THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOWED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN HIS GOING THERE AT PRESENT - EVEN THOUGH HE HAD HAD A PERSONAL

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA73795

INVITATION FROM LEE KUAN YEW. THE ASEAN COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO RECOGNISE POL POT, DESPITE ALL THE CRIMES OF HIS REGIME, AND SIHANOUK COULD NOT AGREE WITH THAT. THE KHMER ROUGE HAD ASKED HIM TO BECOME HEAD OF STATE FOR THEIR REGIME, BUT TO DO SO WOULD BE IMMORAL AND HE HAD REFUSED: HE RECALLED THE MASSACRES OF POL POT INCLUDING THE DEATHS OF HIS OWN CHILDREN AND RELATIVES. HE ALSO RECALLED THE FOLLY OF THE KHMER ROUGE IN PROVOKING THE VIETNAMESE IN THE FIRST PLACE BY TRYING TO REPOSSESS FORMER CAMBODIAN LANDS IN COCHIN CHINA. HE SAID THAT THE KHMER ROUGE REMNANTS WERE STILL READY TO RESUME THEIR MASSACRES IF THEY HAD THE CHANCE: TO THAT EXTENT, THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WAS AN IMPROVEMENT. IF IT WERE EVER TO FALL, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO SEE THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING TO REPLACE IT OTHER THAN THE KHMER ROUGE - PREFERABLY, A REGIME LED BY HIMSELF, SINCE HE WAS STILL REGARDED AS A NATIONAL SYMBOL.

6. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT THE MOST USEFUL PURPOSE HE COULD SERVE NOW WOULD BE TO ENTER CAMBODIA AND ORGANISE GUERILLA RESISTANCE THERE. EVEN THOUGH HE RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF A "MILITARY SOLUTION", HE WAS THE PERSON BEST ABLE TO RALLY THE VARIOUS GUERILLA ELEMENTS NOW ON THE GROUND, IN THE HOPE OF MAKING LIFE UNCOMFORTABLE ENOUGH FOR HENG SAMRIN AND THE VIETNAMESE FOR THEM TO COME TO SEE ADVANTAGES IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE HAD JUST TOLD THE CHINESE CHARGE HERE AND WOULD ALSO TELL THE AMERICANS THAT THEY SHOULD HELP HIM GET INTO CAMBODIA, AND SUPPORT HIM THERE WITH ARMS AND SUPPLIES. IT WAS NO USE HIS FORMING A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE, SINCE TO HAVE ANY CREDIBILITY ANY REGIME WOULD HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED ACTUALLY ON CAMBODIAN SOIL. (HE DID NOT SPEAK OF THIS HOWEVER AS NECESSARILY AN EARLY STEP ONCE HE WAS THERE).

7. ASKED HOW MANY GUERILLA FIGHTERS THERE WERE IN CAMBODIA, SIHANOUK SAID THAT THE CLAIMS OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS WERE CERTAINLY MUCH EXAGGERATED, SOME OF THEM CLAIMING THOUSANDS OF ACTIVE ADHERENTS. NEVERTHELESS, HE THOUGHT THERE WERE CERTAINLY "SOME THOUSANDS" IN ALL. ASKED WHETHER THE RELIEF AID SUPPLIES WERE NOW BEING DISTRIBUTED OR KEPT FOR THE VIETNAMESE, HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WAS A CERTAIN DISTRIBUTION, THOUGH NOT A VERY EFFECTIVE ONE. INDEED, THOUGH THE POLICY OF THE VIETNAMESE WAS NOT TO MURDER THE POPULATION AS DID POL POT BUT TO ALLOW THEM QUIETLY TO ABANDON THEIR LANDS AS REFUGEES OR TO DIE OFF IN ORDER TO VACATE TERRITORY FOR RESETTLEMENT BY VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY FROM THE OVERCROWDED RED RIVER DELTA.

8. HE DISMISSED THE RECENT YOMIURI SHIMBUN STORY THAT VIETNAM MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA AS A TYPICAL VIETNAMESE MANOEUVRE, REFLECTING THEIR PROPENSITY FOR "LYING AND DECEIT". (O.PA73679.)

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

172

3-0.PA73795

COMMENT (UNDERLINED)

9. ALL IN ALL SIHANOUK SOUNDED SOMEWHAT DESPONDENT. NOR DID HE SOUND AS IF HE HAD MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF HIS GETTING INTO CAMBODIA TO ORGANISE GUERILLA WARFARE, SINCE HE CONTINUED TO SPEAK OF A PROGRAMME OF VISITS CARRYING HIM AT LEAST UP TO JULY THIS YEAR.

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP P M AND CABINET T/T
CERHOS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

171

4-0.PA73795

ACTION: SA
EUR

JACC
JBAACA
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	HCO	PA	
PRO	FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC		
FAS(NUC)	IO	FAS(CIC)	ICR	FAS(ECO)		
FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P			
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB					

ANKARA ATHENS BERNE BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN GENEVA
HONG KONG LISBON MADRID MALTA MANILA MOSCOW NICOSIA
PORT MORESBY RANGOON ROME STOCKHOLM THE HAGUE TOKYO VIENNA
VIENTIANE

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CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37
170

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA73679 KPMO
TOR 0616 16.02.80

O.PA73679 1746 15.2.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/1750

RP.
RR BANGKOK/248 SINGAPORE/191 WASHINGTON/1699
RR PEKING/214 MOSCOW/386
BB HANOI/33 KUALA LUMPUR/14 JAKARTA/16
BB MANILA/13

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

ON 15 FEBRUARY WE SPOKE TO SCHLUMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY INDO-CHINA DESK). WE ASKED HIM ABOUT PRESS REPORTS FROM AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (AFP) AND YOMIURI SHIMBUN, WHICH INDICATED THAT THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT NOW BE WILLING TO HOLD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, AND MIGHT ALSO BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA.

2. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN THE REPORTS BUT HAD HAD NO CORROBORATION FROM FRENCH MISSIONS IN THE REGION. HIS VIEW WAS THAT THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT INDEED BE WILLING TO HAVE A CONFERENCE, BUT (AS THE VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION HAD MADE CLEAR TO AFP) SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD INCLUDE ONLY THE THREE INDO-CHINA COUNTRIES AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. SCHLUMBERGER WAS PRETTY SURE THAT IN HINTING AT A CONFERENCE, THE VIETNAMESE WERE STARTING A NEW CHARM OFFENSIVE (SIMILAR TO THE ONE UNDERTAKEN BEFORE THE INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA) BUT THAT THEY WOULD BE ENTIRELY UNWILLING TO HAVE ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON KAMPUCHEA. SCHLUMBERGER CONTINUED THAT IF THE VIETNAMESE WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW SOME TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA, IT WOULD ONLY BE BECAUSE THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITTED IT AND NOT BECAUSE THEY REALLY WANTED TO MAKE A GESTURE TOWARDS THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. SCHLUMBERGER READ US A CABLE FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW REPORTING ON THE RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW OF HENG SAMRIN. THE CABLE CONCLUDED THAT ALL INDICATIONS WERE THAT VIETNAMESE, SOVIET AND HENG SAMRIN AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION AS SETTLED. THERE WAS, SAID SCHLUMBERGER, LITTLE TO INDICATE THAT THE VIETNAMESE FELT ANY PRESSURE TO "NEGOTIATE" ON KAMPUCHEA.

3. RETURNING TO THE PRESS REPORTS, WE NOTED THAT THEY MADE A LINK BETWEEN THE BAD INTERNATIONAL RECEPTION OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND A POSSIBLE SOVIET DESIRE TO EASE INTERNATIONAL TENSION BY "SOFTENING UP" ON KAMPUCHEA. SCHLUMBERGER DISMISSED

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA73679

THIS LINK, SAYING THAT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WERE INDULGING IN WISHFUL THINKING: THE VIETNAMESE CONTROL OVER KAMPUCHEA WAS STRONG ENOUGH, AND THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION GREAT ENOUGH

✓ FOR THEM TO BE EXTREMELY UNWILLING TO EASE THE PRESSURE ON KAMPUCHEA JUST TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE A LITTLE BETTER. SCHLUMBERGER REPEATED THE CONSISTENTLY HELD FRENCH VIEW THAT ONLY SERIOUS MILITARY PRESSURE ON VIETNAM (EITHER FROM THE CHINESE OR FROM SOME RESISTANCE FORCE THAT WOULD NEED TO BE MUCH STRONGER THAN PO POT'S) WOULD OBLIGE THEM TO WITHDRAW FROM KAMPUCHEA.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JACC
JBAK

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	HCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S				

BELGRADE BERLIN BONN BRUSSELS HONG KONG LONDON NEW DELHI
PORT MORESBY RANGOON TOKYO VIENTIANE WARSAW

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

168

O.PA73420 KPMO
TOR 0147 10.02.80

O.PA73420 1415 9.2.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/1534

RP.
RR BANGKOK/247 SINGAPORE/190 WELLINGTON/339
RR WASHINGTON/1689 PEKING/213 JAKARTA/159
RR HANOI/167

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 253.7.4.2 REF O.PA72528, O.CH866618

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIHANOUK

SIHANOUK HAS NOW RETURNED FROM MOROCCO AND HIS EXPECTED DEPARTURE FOR THE UNITED STATES SEEM IMMINENT. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO SIHANOUK'S ENTOURAGE REMINDING THEM OF THE AMBASSADOR'S DESIRE TO CALL ON SIHANOUK. (THE NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN ARRANGED.) IN CASE AN APPOINTMENT FOR US IS ARRANGED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY ADDITIONAL POINTS YOU MIGHT WISH TO BE PUT TO SIHANOUK ABOUT HIS POSSIBLE VISIT TO AUSTRALIA.

2. YOU WILL RECALL FROM OUR O.PA73203 THAT THE FRENCH THINK THAT SIHANOUK SHOULD NOT HAVE CANCELLED HIS VISIT TO SINGAPORE, AS HE NEEDED URGENTLY TO MUSTER SE ASIAN SUPPORT FOR A NEUTRAL KAMPUCHEA.

3. NOIVILLE (DIRECTOR, ASIA-OCEANIA, FOREIGN MINISTRY) TOLD US 7 FEBRUARY THAT HE THOUGHT AUSTRALIA SHOULD PERHAPS TRY TO 'PUMP UP' SIHANOUK SOMEWHAT, TO KEEP UP SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. NOIVILLE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT SIHANOUK'S VALUE WAS LARGELY SYMBOLIC AND THAT A SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD NEED SOME STRONGER FIGURE ALONGSIDE SIHANOUK WHO COULD BE THE REAL LEADER. REFERRING TO OUR POSITION ON NOT REPEAT NO DE-RECOGNITION OF POL POT (O.CH861441) NOIVILLE COMMENTED THAT TO WITHDRAW RECOGNITION OF POL POT NOW WOULD DEPRIVE US OF A BARGAINING CARD WE MIGHT LATER WANT TO USE WITH THE VIETNAMESE.

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

167

2-0. PA73420

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP P M AND CABINET T/T
CERHOS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

166

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0. PA73420

ACTION: SA

JACC
JBAACA
JBAL

EUR
DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	HCO	PA	
PRO	FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC		
FAS(NUC)	IO	FAS(CIC)	ICR	FAS(ECO)		
FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P		
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB					

ANKARA ATHENS BERNE BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN GENEVA
HONG KONG LISBON MADRID MALTA MANILA MOSCOW NICOSIA
PORT MORESBY RANGOON ROME STOCKHOLM THE HAGUE TOKYO VIENNA
VIENTIANE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37
165

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA73203 DBKE
TOR 0900 02.02.80

O.PA73203 1950 1.2.80 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1348

RP.
PP WASHINGTON/1669 NEW DELHI/121 PEKING/210
PP HANOI/166 LONDON/9521 KUALA LUMPUR/115
PP BANGKOK/246 JAKARTA/157

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

ROBIN (POLITICAL DIRECTOR, FOREIGN MINISTRY) TOLD ME ON 1 FEBRUARY THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD'S PARTY HAD FOUND THE INDIANS ON THE POINT OF RECOGNISING THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME AND HAD DONE THEIR BEST TO DISSUADE THEM - THEY THOUGHT WITH SOME SUCCESS, AT LEAST UNTIL PERHAPS MARCH. THE INDIANS HAD SAID THAT HENG SAMRIN NOW MET THE CRITERION OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL, TO WHICH THE FRENCH REPLIED THAT CONTROL WAS EXERTED BY VIETNAMESE FORCES NOT BY HENG SAMRIN WHO WOULD COLLAPSE WITHOUT THEM.

2. THE FRENCH WERE ANXIOUS THAT, IF FINALLY THE INDIANS DID TAKE THIS STEP (AND THEY SAID THEY WERE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE) THEY SHOULD NOT DO SO IMMEDIATELY AFTER GROMYKO'S PLANNED VISIT. THAT WOULD APPEAR TO MARK A VICTORY FOR THE RUSSIANS AND AN UNDESIRABLE ALIGNMENT OF INDIAN POLICY ON SOVIET WISHES.

3. ROBIN COMMENTED THAT SIHANOUK SHOULD NOT HAVE CANCELLED HIS SOUTHEAST ASIAN VISITS: IT WAS NOW MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER FOR HIM TO SHOW HIS FACE THERE IN ORDER TO MUSTER SUPPORT FOR A NEUTRAL NONALIGNED KAMPUCHEA.

4. HE ADDED THAT THE INDIANS SAID THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE GROWING LUKEWARM IN THEIR CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ESTABLISHED ASEAN POSITION THIS WAS A DANGEROUS VIEW FOR THE INDIANS TO BE ABLE TO SPREAD ABOUT, IF INDEED THERE WAS ANY FOUNDATION FOR IT, AND THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE WARNED ACCORDINGLY.

5. IN ROBIN'S VIEW, CONTINUED RECOGNITION OF POL POT IS NOT A VIABLE POLICY IN THE LONG TERM. BUT ANY WEAKENING IN THE DIRECTION OF HENG SAMRIN NOW WOULD PLAY INTO VIETNAMESE AND SOVIET HANDS, IN RELATION TO AFGHANISTAN (RECOGNISING 'SITUATIONS OF FACT', AS THE INDIANS EXPRESSED IT) AS WELL AS INDOCHINA.

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA73203

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

163

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA73203

ACTION: SA

JACC
JBAACA
JBAL

EUR
DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	PA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	IO	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		

ANKARA ATHENS BERNE BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN DUBLIN GENEVA
HONG KONG LISBON MADRID MALTA MANILA MOSCOW NICOSIA
PORT MORESBY RANGOON ROME SINGAPORE STOCKHOLM THE HAGUE TOKYO
VIENNA VIENTIANE

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37
162
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA72528 GDCA
TOR 0432 12.01.80

O.PA72528 1741 11.1.80 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/0769

RP.
RR BANGKOK/244 WASHINGTON/1621 HANOI/165
RR SINGAPORE/188 PEKING/203 JAKARTA/152

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 253/6/4/2 REF O.PA71861

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIHANOUK

WE SPOKE ON 11 JANUARY TO MR KHEK LERANG, A MEMBER OF SIHANOUK'S ENTOURAGE AND PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH SECTION OF THE CONFEDERATION OF NATIONALIST KHMERS' COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. KHEK CONFIRMED THAT SIHANOUK STILL HOPED TO CALL ON OUR AMBASSADOR IN PARIS AND TO TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA IN MID-1980.

2. SIHANOUK IS CURRENTLY OUT OF PARIS, AND EXPECTS TO TRAVEL TO YUGOSLAVIA ON ABOUT 21 JANUARY, AND THEN TO MOROCCO AND GUINEA. HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN MID-FEBRUARY, AND KHEK WILL CONTACT US ON SIHANOUK'S RETURN FROM CANADA TO ORGANISE A MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR. SIHANOUK'S OTHER TRAVEL PLANS INCLUDE INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE: KHEK SUGGESTED THAT SIHANOUK COULD PERHAPS GO ON TO AUSTRALIA FROM SINGAPORE. HE SAID THE PLAN WAS TO VISIT SINGAPORE IN MAY/JUNE (ALTHOUGH THE SINGAPORE EMBASSY HERE BELEIVES THAT THE VISIT IS TO TAKE PLACE IN LATE MARCH). THE NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY HAS HEARD RUMOURS THAT SIHANOUK ALSO WANTS TO VISIT NEW ZEALAND, WHICH CAME AS A SURPRISE TO WELLINGTON AS NO APPROACHES HAVE BEEN AMDE TO THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT.

INVITATION (UNDERLINED)

3. KHEK LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT SIHANOUK WOULD ONLY VISIT AUSTRALIA IF HE WERE INVITED TO DO SO. GIVEN THE DELICACY OF SIHANOUK'S POSITION, YOU MAY WISH TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO THE FORM AN EVENTUAL INVITATION. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE TACKLED THIS PROBLEM A VARIETY OF WAYS: WE BELIEVE THAT IN SINGAPORE AND YUGOSLAVIA, SIHANOUK WILL BE THE PERSONAL GUEST OF LEE KUAN YEW AND TITO RESPECTIVELY (ALTHOUGH KHEK TOLD US THAT SIHANOUK WAS THE GUEST OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT). IN CANADA HE WILL BE THE GUEST OF SOME UNIVERSITIES AND THE KHMER COMMUNITY. IN INDONESIA, SIHANOUK (ACCORDING TO KHEK) WILL BE THE GUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TERMS ON WHICH HE WILL GO TO THE UNITED STATES HAVE YET TO BE SETTLED, ALTHOUGH THE NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY HERE HAS

.../2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA72528

HEARD THAT HE MAY BE THE GUEST OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY THERE. SIHANOUK IS IN FRANCE AS 'A FRIEND OF FRANCE' AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE SOME ACCOMMODATION AVAILABLE, BUT HIS VISIT IS OFFICIALLY PRIVATE ONE: NO INVITATION OF ANY KIND WAS ISSUED. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THE GERMAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT SIHANOUK WILL BE WELCOME, BUT THAT NO INVITATION WILL BE ISSUED.

4. IN OUR OWN CASE, WHILE SIHANOUK WOULD PREFER TO BE INVITED AS OFFICIALLY AS POSSIBLE, IT SEEMS CLEAR FROM OUR CONVERSATION WITH KHEK THAT SIHANOUK IS FLEXIBLE ABOUT THE FORM WHICH ANY INVITATION MIGHT TAKE. YOU MIGHT FIND THAT KHMER ASSOCIATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UNIVERSITIES, OR THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MIGHT BE WILLING TO LEND THEIR NAME TO AN INVITATION. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SIHANOUK DOES NOT LACK MONEY. ALTHOUGH OUR CONTACT WITH KHEK WAS A PRELIMINARY ONE WHICH SHOULD NOT FORM THE BASIS FOR A CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT, WE SUSPECT THAT SIHANOUK WOULD IN FACT COME TO AUSTRALIA WITHOUT AN INVITATION AS LONG AS HE COULD BE SURE OF BEING RECEIVED AT SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVEL.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: SA JBAC
EUR JBAL
DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		

25/1/4/37

160

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA71996 ACHO
TOR 0359 20.12.79

O.PA71996 1710 19.12.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/348
RR BANGKOK/238 MANILA/75 LONDON/9398
RR SINGAPORE/185 KUALA LUMPUR/111 JAKARTA/151

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/1597 UN NEW YORK/886 PEKING/198
BB HANOI/31

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/2, 225/7/4 REF O.CH861982 O.PA71860

C O N F I D E N T I A L

INDO-CHINA : ASEAN

I DISCUSSED GENERALLY WITH NOIVILLE (DIRECTOR, ASIA/OCEANIA, FOREIGN MINISTRY) ON 17 DECEMBER AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE VIEWS IN YOUR REFTEL. HIS COMMENTS ACCORDED WITH THOSE IN OUR O.PA71860. HE ACCEPTED THAT ANY NEGOTIATING ASSET PRESENTED BY POL POT WAS DIMINISHING, BUT THOUGHT THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WOULD WANT FOR THE PRESENT TO STAND FIRM ON THEIR POSITION OF PRINCIPLE, WHILE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH HANOI - NOTABLY THROUGH THE PROPOSED VISIT BY RITHAUDEEN. AS INDICATED IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM O.PA71994, HE SAW NO PARTICULAR INITIATIVES THAT COULD USEFULLY BE PURSUED AT THE MOMENT.

2. SIHANOUK HIMSELF, IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCOIS-PONCET AND THE PRESIDENT, HAD RECOGNISED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THAT HE COULD DO, THAT NO SOLUTION OF A MILITARY KIND WAS POSSIBLE, AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STAND BY AND WAIT FOR SOME OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP. MEANWHILE THE FRENCH POSITION OF PRINCIPLE, IN FAVOUR OF A NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT CAMBODIA ALSO REMAINED FIRM - BY WHICH NOIVILLE IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT PROPOSING TO TAKE ANY STEPS TOWARDS HENG SAMRIN BUT TO CONTINUE THEIR PRESSURE ON VIETNAM FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES AND THE EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AID.

COMMENT

3. IN A FRENCH TELEVISION INTERVIEW BROADCAST SUBSEQUENT TO THIS CONVERSATION (ON 18 DECEMBER) PHAM VAN DONG SAID THAT VIETNAM HAD NO INTENTION OF KEEPING ITS FORCES PERMANENTLY IN KAMPUCHEA, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS SOON AS THE SITUATION THERE WAS 'CALM'. PRESUMABLY, THIS COULD BE READ AS SOME INDICATION OF AWARENESS OF THE SORT OF REPRESENTATIONS BEING MADE BY THE FRENCH, THOUGH I DO NOT THINK THE LATTER WOULD BE INCLINED TO READ ANY MORE INTO IT THAN THAT.

...ROWLAND

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

159

3-0.PA71996

ACTION: SEA

JCCACB
JBAC
JACF
JACC

SA
EUR
IO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ	
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		

BONN BRUSSELS HONG KONG MOSCOW NEW DELHI PORT MORESBY RANGOON
TOKYO VIENTIANE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
158

O.PA71993 RLOP
TOR 0307 20.12.79

O.PA71993 1515 19.12.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/345

RP.
RR BANGKOK/236 WASHINGTON/1594 UN NEW YORK/884
RR PEKING/197
BB HANOI/29

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 253/6/4/2 REF O.PA71861

R E S T R I C T E D

SIHANOUK

ACCORDING TO NOIVILLE (DIRECTOR, ASIA-OCEANIA, FOREIGN MINISTRY) SIHANOUK WILL BE IN FRANCE UNTIL TOWARDS THE END OF JANUARY. HE THEN INTENDS TO RETURN TO PEKING AND NORTH KOREA (FOR A KIM IL SUNG ANNIVERSARY). HE HAS ALSO MENTIONED HIS INTENTION OF VISITING AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AT SOME POINT THEREAFTER FOR ABOUT SIX WEEKS (PRESUMABLY IN ALL RATHER THAN IN EACH COUNTRY). THIS WOULD SEEM TO FIT IN WITH THE JULY DATE EARLIER MENTIONED FOR AUSTRALIA.

2. SO FAR SIHANOUK HAS NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US HERE, AND I HAVE NOT SOUGHT HIM OUT. BUT I HAVE IN MIND DOING SO IN EARLY JANUARY.

...ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

M. L...

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

152

2-0.PA71993

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAACA
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	HCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

156

O.PA71861 JCNI
TOR 2209 15.12.79

O.PA71861 1815 14.12.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/D239

RP.
RR BANGKOK/235 WASHINGTON/1585 UN NEW YORK/882
RR PEKING/196
BB HANOI/28

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

Handwritten signature and initials

RESTRICTED

R E S T R I C T E D

SIHANOUK

SIHANOUK SAW PRESIDENT GISCARD ON 13 DECEMBER. LITTLE HAS
EMERGED FROM THIS MEETING IN THE PRESS, OTHER THAN THE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. THE PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THE VISIT, 'A PRIVATE
ONE', TOOK PLACE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF FRANCE'S CONCERN FOR
THE SURVIVAL OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE. SIHANOUK HIMSELF, MORE
FORTHCOMING THAN THE PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN, SAID 'PRESIDENT
GISCARD THINKS, CORRECTLY, THAT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR AN ARMED
STRUGGLE ARE VERY LIMITED, AND THAT WE MUST DEVOTE OURSELVES
ABOVE ALL TO A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN
PROBLEM'. SIHANOUK CONTINUED THAT HIS SUPPORTERS WERE PUSHING HIM
TO UNDERTAKE ARMED ACTION, BUT THAT THAI OPPOSITION TO THE USE
OF THAI TERRITORY BY PRO-SIHANOUK FORCES MADE MILITARY ACTION
FOR THE TIME BEING IMPOSSIBLE. SIHANOUK ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED
PRESIDENT GISCARD TO HELP HIM IN CALLING FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA, AIMED AT RESTORING ITS NEUTRALITY AND
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
J10

RESTRICTED

.../2

25/1/4/37

155

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.UN16751 JCNI
TOR 0920 07.12.79

O.UN16751 1430 6.12.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6062

RP.
RR PARIS EMB/724 GENEVA/2032 WASHINGTON/4161
RR BANGKOK/671
BB HANOI/59

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 602/19 REF O.PA71391

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

IN CONVERSATION AT A FRENCH EMBASSY FUNCTION ON 5 DECEMBER, JEAN-PIERRE BLOCH (UDF) WHO LED THE FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP WHICH RECENTLY VISITED VIETNAM, PHNOM PENH AND THE THAI/KAMPUCHEAN BORDER AREA, SAID THAT THE GROUP SPENT 3 1/2 DAYS IN PHNOM PENH BUT WERE UNDER CLOSE SURVEILLANCE AND WERE UNABLE TO TRAVEL BEYOND A RADIUS OF TEN KILOMETRES FROM THE CITY CENTRE IN A VISIT THAT WAS STAGE-MANAGED THROUGHOUT. MEMBERS OF THE GROUP WERE, HOWEVER, ABLE TO EVADE THEIR OFFICIAL GUIDES QUITE OFTEN AND TO TALK FREELY TO A GOOD NUMBER OF FRENCH-SPEAKING KAMPUCHEANS.

2. WHAT THE GROUP WAS TOLD IN AND ROUND PHNOM-PENH REINFORCED CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS BY REFUGEES IN THE BORDER AREAS THAT INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID AND OTHER RELIEF SUPPLIES WERE BEING DIVERTED TO THE VIETNAMESE ON A LARGE SCALE. THE GROUP WAS ALSO TOLD AND HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE SYSTEMATICALLY MINING RICE FIELDS AND INHIBITING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AS PART OF DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO STARVE OR DRIVE OUT THE KAMPUCHEAN POPULATION. THE GROUP HAD OF COURSE NO MEANS OF VERIFYING REPORTS THAT VIETNAMESE FARMERS WERE BEING RESETTLED IN EASTERN REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY.

3. BLOCH SAID THE MISSION HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WHEN THE VIETNAMESE FORCES FIRST ENTERED KAMPUCHEA THEY WERE WIDELY GREETED AS LIBERATORS FROM THE DETESTED POL POT REGIME, BUT THAT AFTER THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF OCCUPATION THE MOOD OF THE POPULATION HAD CHANGED TO ONE OF HATRED. WHILE THE POL POT REGIME HAD DENUDED THE CAPITAL OF PEOPLE, REDUCING THE POPULATION TO SOME FOUR OR FIVE THOUSAND, AND HAD COMMITTED SOME ISOLATED ACTS OF DESTRUCTION LIKE RAZING THE CATHEDRAL, IT WAS THE VIETNAMESE WHO HAD SYSTEMATICALLY STRIPPED EVERY HOUSE AND BUILDING OF ALL ITS CONTENTS AND FIXTURES, LEAVING THE CITY AN EMPTY SHELL. (THERE WERE NOW SOME 50,000 PEOPLE LIVING IN IT BUT SERVICES AND FACILITIES WERE RUDIMENTARY.) THE

.../2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN16751

154

"SECOND GENOCIDE" WHICH THE VIETNAMESE WERE PRACTISING (BLOCH SAID) HAD REVIVED NATIONALIST SENTIMENT AND ANCESTRAL HATRED OF THE KAMPUCHEANS FOR THE VIETNAMESE AND THE PEOPLE WERE NOW SUPPORTING POL POT OR OTHER RESISTANCE GROUPS AS THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS.

4. THE GROUP WAS RECEIVED FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF BY HENG SAMRIN, WHO HAD "PARROTED" THE VIETNAMESE VERSION OF EVENTS BUT HAD BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE THEM IN A QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION THAT HE HIMSELF HAD NOT BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE EXCESSES OF THE POL POT REGIME. THE GROUP'S IMPRESSION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS OF A CYPHER AND THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE KAMPUCHEANS MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS THEY HAD MET WERE FRIGHTENED OPPORTUNISTS WITHOUT ANY BASE OF POPULAR SUPPORT.

5. EXCEPT FOR THE AIRPORT, WHERE THE VIETNAMESE WERE VERY MUCH IN CONTROL, BLOCH SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE PRESENCE IN PHNOM PENH ITSELF WAS DISCREET BUT THAT THE GROUP WAS TOLD THE VIETNAMESE WERE "EVERYWHERE". HE ALSO SAID THAT VIETNAMESE FORCES IN KAMPUCHEA WERE OF POOR QUALITY, MANY OF THEM BEING YOUTHS OF 15 OR 16, AND THAT THE BEST VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE NOW DEPLOYED ON THE CHINESE FRONTIER - BUT THIS WAS CLEARLY HEARSAY.

6. BLOCH ALSO MADE THE SURPRISING ASSERTION THAT WHEN THE GROUP MET WITH CONTINUED OBSTRUCTION FROM THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY IN PARIS OVER THE ISSUE OF VIETNAMESE VISAS, HE THREATENED THE AMBASSADOR WITH MOUNTING A DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY UNLESS THE VISAS WERE ISSUED WITH TEN DAYS - FOLLOWING WHICH THEY WERE ISSUED WITHIN THREE.

7. THERE WERE OCCASIONAL INCONSISTENCIES IN BLOCH'S OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS AND I WOULD NOT REGARD HIM AS A WITNESS OF IMPECCABLE ACCURACY. HE PRESENTED HIS VIEWS, HOWEVER WITH A LOT OF CONVICTION AND IT WOULD BE INTERESTING IF PARIS COULD CHECK THEM WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PARTY.

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.UN16751

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.../4

25/1/4/37
152
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA71391 TNS
TOR 1049 30.11.79

O.PA71391 2100 29.11.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/9860

RP.
RR GENEVA/1626 WASHINGTON/1561 UN NEW YORK/863
RR BANGKOK/226
BB HANOI/20

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.CH859671

R E S T R I C T E D

KAMPUCHEA

..... IN REPORT IN REFTEL, THE UDF DELEGATION (O.PA70925) PAINTED A BLEAK PICTURE OF CONDITIONS IN KAMPUCHEA. THEIR OBSERVATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO AREAS AROUND PHNOM PENH BUT THEIR REACTION WAS ONE OF HARSH CRITICISM OF WHAT THEY FOUND. THEY SAID AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION WAS BEING STOLEN FROM FARMERS AND INTERNATIONAL AID WAS NOT FINDING ITS WAY TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE BUT WAS BEING DIVERTED TO THE VIETNAMESE. THEY ALSO SAID THERE HAD BEEN NEW ARRESTS AND THAT GENERALLY THE POPULATION WAS HOSTILE TO THE VIETNAMESE. THE DELEGATION SAY THEY WILL PROVIDE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CLAIMS SHORTLY.

2. IN THE ASSEMBLY ON 28 NOVEMBER ONE MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION, CLEMENT, RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AID IN A QUESTION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID "...FRANCE CONTRIBUTES TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AID. BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE GREAT PART OF THIS AID IS TODAY STORED AND, WHEN IT IS DISTRIBUTED, THIS IS ACCORDING TO POLITICAL CRITERIA. IN ORDER TO EAT IT IS NECESSARY TO COLLABORATE WITH THE OCCUPYING ARMY. FRANCE MUST ARRANGE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION TO BE SUPERVISED ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD NOT BE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BECAUSE, SINCE THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, THERE EXISTS THE CONCEPT OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY WHICH ARE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY..."

3. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE DISTRIBUTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS THEMSELVES BUT AS SECURITY CONDITIONS WERE NOT APPROPRIATE AND THE NUMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL WERE INADEQUATE ALL THAT COULD BE DONE WAS FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT SOME CHECKS OF DISTRIBUTION. HE AGREED THAT AT PRESENT THE DISTRIBUTION WAS IMPERFECT AND THERE WERE GAPS AND SAID THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WOULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THESE DEFECTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ADDED THAT THE IMPERFECTIONS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, LEAD TO A REDUCTION OR INTERRUPTION OF

.../2

152

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA71391

THE ASSISTANCE WHICH WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE KHMER PEOPLE.

4. FRANCOIS-PONCET ALSO ATTACKED THE VIETNAMESE PRESENCE. HE SAID "...THERE IS ONLY ONE FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA: THAT OF A FOREIGN POWER WHICH IS OCCUPYING THE CAMBODIAN TERRITORY..." AND "...FOREIGN TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW FROM KHMER TERRITORY. THE KHMER PEOPLE MUST BE ABLE TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES FREELY AND TO CHOOSE THEIR LEADERS FREELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL CAMBODIA LIVING ON GOOD TERMS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS..."

5. WE HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO PIERRE-BLOCH, THE LEADER OF THE DELEGATION, AS HE IS CAUGHT UP IN THE PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE VISIT TO KAMPUCHEA, BUT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIS STAFF WHO ARE PROVIDING US WITH SOME MATERIAL ON THE DELEGATION'S FINDINGS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

150

3-0.PA71391

ACTION: SEA
SA

EUR
IO

PPR
SEAP

JACC
BGA
BGA
OEB
OGGG
T/T BHBA
T/T BBA
BHBA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
LA	FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)		INF
FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		
FAS(BP)	PAAP	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL	FS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

149

O.PA71387 DRHA
TOR 1806 30.11.79

O.PA71387 1910 29.11.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9857

RP.
RR BANGKOK/225 HANOI/160 WASHINGTON/1560
RR PEKING/190 MOSCOW/353 UN NEW YORK/862

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 211/1/11

M. [Signature]

R E S T R I C T E D

FRANCE AND KAMPUCHEA

M. [Signature]

IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM A COMMUNIST M.P. CRITICISING THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR ITS NON-RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN AND FOR ITS SUPPORT FOR SIHANOUK, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 28 NOVEMBER OF SIHANOUK : 'SHOULD FRANCE REFUSE HIM ENTRY TO HER TERRITORY, WHEN HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND TO OUR COUNTRY, WHO TRIED TO STRENGTHEN CO-OPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WHO WELCOMED GENERAL DE GAULLE IN PHNOM PENH IN 1966 AND WHO FOR SO LONG KEPT HIS COUNTRY OUT OF THE WAR? FRANCE DOES NOT CULTIVATE THE HABIT OF GOING BACK ON HER FRIENDSHIPS'. HE ALSO SAID THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ACCEPTING (BY RECOGNITION) THE FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN KAMPUCHEA CONSTITUTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME.

2. QUESTIONED ON THE SAME OCCASION BY A UDF M.P. WHO HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF THE RECENT PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION TO KAMPUCHEA AND WHO SAID THAT AID WAS ONLY BEING DISTRIBUTED TO THOSE WHO COLLABORATED WITH THE PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES, FRANCOIS-PONCET CONCEDED THAT THE IDEAL SOLUTION (OF DISTRIBUTION BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS) WAS NOT PRACTICABLE, BUT THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE URGED THAT THIS PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DIMINISH THE AID FLOW TO KAMPUCHEA

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

.../2

198

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA71387

ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S			

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

147

O.PA71391 DRHA
TOR 1049 30.11.79

AMENDED COPY

O.PA71391 2100 29.11.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/9860

RP.
RR GENEVA/1626 WASHINGTON/1561 UN NEW YORK/863
RR BANGKOK/226
BB HANOI/20

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.CH859671

R E S T R I C T E D

KAMPUCHEA

++ AS INDICATED ++ IN REPORT IN REFTEL, THE UDF DELEGATION (O.PA70925) PAINTED A BLEAK PICTURE OF CONDITIONS IN KAMPUCHEA. THEIR OBSERVATIONS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO AREAS AROUND PHNOM PENH BUT THEIR REACTION WAS ONE OF HARSH CRITICISM OF WHAT THEY FOUND. THEY SAID AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION WAS BEING STOLEN FROM FARMERS AND INTERNATIONAL AID WAS NOT FINDING ITS WAY TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE BUT WAS BEING DIVERTED TO THE VIETNAMESE. THEY ALSO SAID THERE HAD BEEN NEW ARRESTS AND THAT GENERALLY THE POPULATION WAS HOSTILE TO THE VIETNAMESE. THE DELEGATION SAY THEY WILL PROVIDE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CLAIMS SHORTLY.

2. IN THE ASSEMBLY ON 28 NOVEMBER ONE MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION, CLEMENT, RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AID IN A QUESTION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID "...FRANCE CONTRIBUTES TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AID. BUT WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE GREAT PART OF THIS AID IS TODAY STORED AND, WHEN IT IS DISTRIBUTED, THIS IS ACCORDING TO POLITICAL CRITERIA. IN ORDER TO EAT IT IS NECESSARY TO COLLABORATE WITH THE OCCUPYING ARMY. FRANCE MUST ARRANGE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE DISTRIBUTION TO BE SUPERVISED ON THE GROUND. THIS WOULD NOT BE INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS BECAUSE, SINCE THE NUREMBURG TRIALS, THERE EXISTS THE CONCEPT OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY WHICH ARE WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY..."

3. FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET'S RESPONSE WAS THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE DISTRIBUTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS THEMSELVES BUT AS SECURITY CONDITIONS WERE NOT APPROPRIATE AND THE NUMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL WERE INADEQUATE ALL THAT COULD BE DONE WAS FOR THEM TO CARRY OUT SOME CHECKS OF DISTRIBUTION. HE AGREED THAT AT PRESENT THE DISTRIBUTION WAS IMPERFECT AND THERE WERE GAPS AND SAID THAT EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WOULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THESE

.../2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

146

2-0.PA71391

DEFECTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ADDED THAT THE IMPERFECTIONS SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, LEAD TO A REDUCTION OR INTERRUPTION OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO THE KHMER PEOPLE.

4. FRANCOIS-PONCET ALSO ATTACKED THE VIETNAMESE PRESENCE. HE SAID "...THERE IS ONLY ONE FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA: THAT OF A FOREIGN POWER WHICH IS OCCUPYING THE CAMBODIAN TERRITORY..." AND "...FOREIGN TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW FROM KHMER TERRITORY. THE KHMER PEOPLE MUST BE ABLE TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES FREELY AND TO CHOOSE THEIR LEADERS FREELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INDEPENDENT AND NEUTRAL CAMBODIA LIVING ON GOOD TERMS WITH ITS NEIGHBOURS..."

5. WE HAVE NOT SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK TO PIERRE-BLOCH, THE LEADER OF THE DELEGATION, AS HE IS CAUGHT UP IN THE PARLIAMENT AND WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE VISIT TO KAMPUCHEA, BUT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIS STAFF WHO ARE PROVIDING US WITH SOME MATERIAL ON THE DELEGATION'S FINDINGS.

++ AMENDMENT ++

AC. AMENDED TEXT PARA 1.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

.../3

25/1/4/37

145

O.PA71342 RRT
TOR 0800 29.11.79

O.PA71342 1830 28.11.79 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9821

RP.
RR BANGKOK/224 UN NEW YORK/860 PEKING/189
RR WASHINGTON/1558 MOSCOW/352
BB HANOI/18

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 211/1/11

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FRANCE: KAMPUCHEA AND SIHANOUK

DURING THE COURSE OF A TELEVISED INTERVIEW ON 27 NOVEMBER, PRESIDENT GISCARD MENTIONED KAMPUCHEA BRIEFLY, STRESSING THE OVERWHELMING NEED FOR HUMANITARIAN AID TO PREVENT 'THE DEATH OF A PEOPLE'. HE UNDERLINED IN PREDICTABLE TERMS THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT RESPECTED KAMPUCHEA'S SOVEREIGNTY, NEUTRALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. SPEAKING OF SIHANOUK, HE SAID 'I THINK THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK... WHO HAD LONG EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IS AMONG THOSE WHO CAN EFFECTIVELY PLEAD IN FAVOUR OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION. IN ANY CASE, FRANCE WILL SUPPORT THE EFFORT TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA'.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

.../2

NNNN
DP02395

PRINTED BY: GDCA
FOR EUR

0.PA71064 1750 21.11.79 CLA

TO.

RR CANBERRA/9586

RP.

RR PEKING/185 WASHINGTON/1544

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 253/6/4/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIHANOUK

AS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO SEE SIHANOUK WHILE HE IS IN FRANCE, WHERE HE IS DUE TO ARRIVE ON 25 NOVEMBER, I SHOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHETHER ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT HIS VISIT TO AUSTRALIA IS AVAILABLE BEYOND THAT IN M.CH054460, O.CH856370, O.PK12978 AND O.PK12991. TO BE AWARE OF AS MUCH AS WE KNOW ABOUT SIHANOUK'S PLANS WOULD HELP ME TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM HIM, ALTHOUGH I REALISE THAT NO MORE MAY BE KNOWN THAN I HAVE RECEIVED ALREADY AND THAT IT APPEARS THAT THEY ARE STILL EVER-CHANGING.

2. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR QUESTIONS YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO RAISE WITH HIM APART FROM THE MATTERS INDICATED IN M.CH054460?

3. FROM THE ATTACHMENT TO M.CH055792 WE NOTE THAT SIHANOUK MAY PLAN TO TRAVEL TO AUSTRALIA WITHOUT A PASSPORT OR WITH A PASSPORT WHICH AUSTRALIA DOES NOT RECOGNISE. ARE THERE ANY PARTICULAR INSTRUCTIONS YOU WISH TO GIVE US ABOUT THE ISSUE OF VISAS, DOCUMENTARY OR DIPLOMATIC, FOR SIHANOUK AND HIS ENTOURAGE SHOULD HE SEEK VISAS HERE?

...ROWLAND

XC. 0.PA71064 1750 21.11.79 9586 185 1544 253/6/4/2

CM.

25/1/4/37

144

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH858366 MJWO

O.CH858366 1315 22.11.79 CLA

TO.

RR PEKING/4708 PARIS EMB/8507

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 3016/10/10/2 REF O.PK12978

R E S T R I C T E D

VISIT OF PRINCE SIHANOUK TO AUSTRALIA

COLIN PRATT ADVISED ON 22 NOVEMBER THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK WILL NOT VISIT AUSTRALIA BEFORE JULY 1980. HE SAID THAT THE PRINCE WILL BE IN EUROPE UNTIL THE END OF FEBRUARY 1980 VISITING FRANCE, FRG AND SWEDEN.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
CERHOS

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: SA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	PRO	FAS(NSA)
NA	FAS(WES)	EUR	FAS(IOC)	CIP	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(MFS)			

BANGKOK BONN HANOI STOCKHOLM

25/1/4/37
143

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA71294 DBKE
TOR 0728 28.11.79

O.PA71294 1900 27.11.79 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9782

RP.
RR BANGKOK/223 MOSCOW/351 PEKING/188
RR UN NEW YORK/857 WASHINGTON/1556
BB HANOI/17

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 211/1/11

U N C L A S S I F I E D

SIHANOUK : FRANCE

ON 27 NOVEMBER, THE FRENCH PRESIDENT'S SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT GISCARD WOULD MEET SIHANOUK DURING HIS STAY IN FRANCE. A DATE IS YET TO BE DECIDED FOR THIS INTERVIEW.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: SA
EUR

JACC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S			

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

142

O.PA71129 DBKE
TOR 0858 23.11.79

O.PA71129 1655 22.11.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9643

RP.
RR PEKING/186 LONDON/9311 SINGAPORE/177
RR JAKARTA/145 MANILA/70 WASHINGTON/1547
RR BANGKOK/220 UN NEW YORK/852 KUALA LUMPUR/105

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 225/7/2 REF O.PA70776

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

AT DINNER ON 20 NOVEMBER, SECRETARY OF STATE STIRN SPOKE TO THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR ON THE SAME LINES AS THOSE REPORTED IN REFTEL, SAYING THAT THE FIRST AIM MUST BE TO SAVE THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE BUT BEYOND THAT TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES AND A NEUTRALISED CAMBODIA, ADDING THAT THE FRENCH WERE CONTINUING TO TALK TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THIS AND WERE FINDING THEM RATHER MORE RESPONSIVE THAN BEFORE. IN STIRN'S VIEW THE RUSSIANS WERE SENSITIVE TO THE EMBARRASSEMENT CAUSED TO THEM BY THE BEHAVIOUR OF THEIR VIETNAMESE ALLIES, AND THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE ASEAN COUNTRIES ALARMED AND HOSTILE TO VIETNAM. THE FRENCH HAD TOLD THE VIETNAMESE THAT THEY WERE GREATLY DAMAGING THEIR RELATIONS WITH ASEAN AND BELIEVED THAT THEY ALSO WERE SENSITIVE TO THE POINT.

2. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE AT SOME SUITABLE STAGE FOR A POLITICAL CONFERENCE TO NEUTRALISE CAMBODIA, TO WHICH STIRN SAID (AS BEFORE) THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE UNLESS CHINA, THE USSR AND VIETNAM ALL WANTED THAT SOLUTION. THE INDIAN ALSO SUGGESTED THAT SIHANOUK SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO STAY ON IN FRANCE AS THE EVENTUAL LEADER OF A NEUTRALISED CAMBODIA, TO WHICH STIRN REPLIED WITH A SMILE THAT THE PRECEDENT OF KHOMEINY WAS NOT NECESSARILY ENCOURAGING .

3. COMMENT:

SO FAR THE FRENCH HAVE TAKEN TWO INITIATIVES IN RELATION TO INDOCHINA CONFERENCES (ON REFUGEES AND THE SUGGESTION FOR A PLEDGING CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA) SO THAT THE INDIAN SUGGESTION DOES NOT FALL ON UNPREPARED GROUND. THOUGH THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE IN THEIR EYES, THEY WILL NO DOUBT TRY TO BUILD ON THEIR PRESENT FAVOURABLE POSITION IN RELATION TO INDOCHINA AND TO TAKE SUCH INITIATIVES AS SEEM OPEN TO THEM.

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

141

2-0.PA71129

...ROWLAND

(BANGKOK: PLEASE PASS THIS AND 0.PA70776 TO HANOI)

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP FINANCE
MIN+DEP HEALTH
MIN+DEP PRIMARY IND
MIN+DEP TDE AND RSCS
TREASURER + TREASURY
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

140

O.PA70925 GDCA
TOR 2230 17.11.79

O.PA70925 1004 17.11.79 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9472

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/846 GENEVA/1619 BANGKOK/219
RR WASHINGTON/1542 PEKING/184
BB HANOI/16

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA70716

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FRANCE: AID TO KAMPUCHEA

THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ANNOUNCED ON 16 NOVEMBER THAT A TEAM OF RAILWAY EXPERTS WOULD BE SENT TO KAMPUCHEA IN THE NEAR FUTURE "TO ASSIST IN THE REPARATION OF THE KAMPUCHEAN RAILWAYS".

2. THE STATEMENT DID NOT CLARIFY WHETHER THIS WORK WOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER UNICEF/ICRC AUSPICES, BUT THE MINISTRY'S DESK OFFICER TOLD US (RETEL) THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. A FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION FROM PRESIDENT'S UDF PARTY WILL LEAVE ON 21 NOVEMBER FOR A VISIT TO KAMPUCHEA.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

.../2

139

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA70925

ACTION: SEA
SA
EUR
IO

SEAP
DDO

JACC
BGA
OEB
OGGG
T/T BHBA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	
FAS(IOC)	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	EO	
EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	
FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOL	FS		



DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

0.PA70776 NASH
TOR 1129 15.11.79

0.PA70776 1800 14.11.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9349

RP.
RR LONDON/9277 SINGAPORE/175 JAKARTA/143
RR MANILA/69 PEKING/183 WASHINGTON/1535
RR UN NEW YORK/841 BANGKOK/218 KUALA LUMPUR/104

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225.7.4 225.7.2.2 REF 0.CH856370

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY OF STATE STIRN: INDOCHINA

DURING MY DISCUSSION ON 13 NOVEMBER, STIRN STRESSED THE FRENCH HUMANITARIAN CONCERN WITH KAMPUCHEA WHERE HE SAID REPORTS INDICATED THAT ONLY ABOUT 2 MILLION OF THE POPULATION HAD SURVIVED, AND CONDITIONS WERE UNIVERSALLY VERY BAD. THE FIRST TASK THEREFORE WAS TO GET A LARGE SCALE AID PROGRAMME GOING, AND THE FRENCH WERE CONCENTRATING ON THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THEY WERE CONTINUING TO PRESS THE VIETNAMESE IN PRIVATE ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF THEIR WITHDRAWING THEIR FORCES AND MADE NO SECRET OF THEIR RELIEF THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WAS THE NEUTRALISATION OF CAMBODIA. WHEN HE SAW PHAM VAN DONG IN HANOI LAST YEAR, THE LATTER HAD SAID THE VIETNAMESE FORCES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, BUT NO DOUBT HE HAD INTENDED THIS TO HAPPEN ONLY AFTER FULL CONTROL HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY OR ON BEHALF OF HENG SAMRIN. THERE WAS NO SIGN OF SUCH A WITHDRAWAL AT PRESENT.

2. NEVERTHELESS, THE FRENCH POSITION CLEARLY WORRIED THE VIETNAMESE, WITH WHOM THE FRENCH STILL FELT THEY HAD CERTAIN LINKS, AND WHO WOULD LISTEN TO FRENCH VIEWS, TO WHICH THEY CONTINUED TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. THE VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY WORRIED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE FRENCH WERE SUPPORTING THE ASEAN RESOLUTION AT PRESENT UNDER DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK AND HAD INDEED ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH INTENDED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION ON RECOGNITION IN FAVOUR OF POL POT. STIRN HAD TOLD THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THAT THE FRENCH POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED, NAMELY RECOGNITION OF NEITHER REGIME IN CAMBODIA, BUT FIRM DISAPPROVAL OF THE VIETNAMESE INVASION AND FIRM ADVOCACY OF WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES. (STIRN DID NOT QUITE SAY THAT THE FRENCH WOULD VOTE FOR THE ASEAN RESOLUTION, THOUGH HE GAVE THAT IMPRESSION: AND I GATHER FROM THE MALAYSIANS HERE THAT THE ASEAN GROUP, WHO HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE FRENCH THROUGH STIRN HAVE NOT HAD A FIRM COMMITMENT). STIRN THOUGHT THAT CLEARLY THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF SECURING A NEUTRALISED CAMBODIA AT PRESENT, BUT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP ALERT TO THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA70776

POSSIBILITY OF SOME OPPORTUNITY PRESENTING ITSELF IN FUTURE. HE AGREED THAT A NETURALISED CAMBODIA COULD ONLY EVENTUATE IF THAT SOLUTION CAME TO SUIT VIETNAM, CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE NOTED THAT SIHANOUK HAD JUST WRITTEN A FURTHER LETTER TO PHAM VAN DONG (REPORTED IN THE HERALD TRIBUNE OF 13 NOVEMBER) AND THAT THAT SUGGESTED A CONTINUED ATTEMPT BY SIHANOUK TO SECURE SOME SORT OF OPENING TO HANOI, BACKED BY THE THREAT (WHICH HE AGREED MIGHT WELL BE INEFFECTIVE) OF ORGANISING GUERILLA RESISTANCE IF NO RESISTANCE IF NO READINESS FOR A 'PEACEFULL SOLUTION' WERE DISPLAYED BY HANOI BY NEXT FEBRUARY. ON THE CHINESE ATTITUDE, HE ADDED NOTHING TO WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY REPORTED OF THE DISCUSSION WITH HUA GUOFENG.

3. STIRN THOUGHT THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAD SHOWN CERTAIN SIGNS OF NOT WISHING TO ALARM THE ASEAN COUNTRIES TOO DEEPLY, AND THAT FOR THIS REASON THEY MIGHT NOT WISH TO BRING THAILAND UNDER STRONG PRESSURE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS ALWAYS THAT DANGER, AND NO-ONE COULD REALLY SAY WHAT THEIR PRESENT INTENTIONS WERE. THE FRENCH HOWEVER WISHED AND INTENDED TO MAINTAIN THEIR LINK AND DIALOGUE WITH HANOI. THEY DID NOT WISH TO SEE IT PUSHED EVEN FURTHER INTO THE SOVIET CAMP, OF WHICH THERE WAS CERTAINLY A DANGER IF THE RUSSIANS WERE LEFT AS THE ONLY PEOPLE TO WHOM THE VEITNAMESE COULD TURN.

4. AS TO SIHANOUK, STIRN CONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING PEKING FOR FRANCE ON 24 NOVEMBER, BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW LONG HE INTENDED TO STAY HERE. THE FRENCH HAD PUT NO PARTICULAR RESTRICTIONS ON HIM, BUT EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD NOT MAKE 'TOO INFLAMMATORY' STATEMENTS. I TOLD STIRN THAT SIHANOUK PROPOSED TO VISIT AUSTRALIA IN FEBRUARY AND THAT I WOULD PROBABLY BE SEEING HIM IN PARIS.

5. STIRN COMMENDED THE AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO INDOCHINA REFUGEE AND RELIEF PROBLEM, OF WHICH I GAVE HIM SOME DETAILS TOGETHER WITH SOME POINTS DRAWN FROM MR PEACOCK'S SPEECH IN NEW YORK. HE SEEMED INCIDENTALLY RATHER PLEASED WITH WHAT HE EVIDENTLY REGARDED AS THE SKILL AND CONSISTENCY OF FRENCH POLICY, WHICH HAD ENABLED THEM TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENT ATTITUDES WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND OTHERS CONCERNED, AND WHICH HE COMPARED WITH THEIR POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE THEY HAD MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT THAT ANY SOLUTION WHICH LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT BE WORKABLE.

...ROWLAND

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

136

3-0.PA70776

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP FINANCE
MIN+DEP HEALTH
MIN+DEP PRIMARY IND
MIN+DEP TDE AND RSCS
TREASURER + TREASURY
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0.PA70776

ACTION: SA
EURJACC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	
FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		
FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	SEAP	FAS(PTO)	
IOL	FS				

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
HANOI	LISBON	MADRID	MALTA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	
PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	VIENNA	
VIENTIANE							

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

134

O.PA70716 JCNI
TOR 1516 14.11.79

O.PA70716 1920 13.11.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9301

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/838 MOSCOW/350 GENEVA/1615
RR PEKING/182 WASHINGTON/1532 BANGKOK/217
BB HANOI/15

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA: FRENCH VIEWS

DURING A CONVERSATION ON 13 NOVEMBER WITH SCHLUMBERGER
(FOREIGN MINISTRY DESK OFFICER ON INDO-CHINA), THE FOLLOWING
POINTS EMERGED:

SIHANOUK

2. SIHANOUK IS EXPECTED IN FRANCE ABOUT 24 NOVEMBER AND WILL MAKE CONTACT WITH EMIGRE GROUPS IN FRANCE. THE FRENCH EXPECT HIM TO USE FRANCE AS A "BASE" FOR THE TIME BEING, WITH EXCURSIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. THEY WILL ALLOW HIM TO SPEAK IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION AS MUCH AS HE WISHES TO. THE FACT THAT HE HAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL "DECLARE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE" DOES NOT WORRY THE FRENCH GREATLY, AND THEY DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO SOLICIT THE KHMERS IN FRANCE FOR ARMS OR MONEY WITH WHICH TO MAKE THE TRANSITION TO ARMED RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE IN KAMPUCHEA. (ON THE WHOLE, THE FRENCH ARE VERY SCEPTICAL ABOUT SIHANOUK'S CAPACITY AND WILL TO MAKE THIS TRANSITION OF HIS ACCORD AND BELIEVE THAT IF HE DOES SO, IT WILL BE AT CHINESE INSTIGATION AND WITH CHINESE ARMS).

FRENCH AID TO KAMPUCHEA

3. THE FRENCH WERE NOW HAVING DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE BEST WAYS OF SPENDING THEIR AID (USDLRS 10 MILLION TO BE GIVEN AS PART OF THE EC PACKAGE, AND USDLRS 5 MILLION TO BE GIVEN BILATERALLY.) THE MAJOR PROBLEM REMAINED A LOGISTIC ONE, AND THE FRENCH WERE NOW STUDYING, TOGETHER WITH ICRC/UNICEF, THE POSSIBILITY OF USING SOME OF THEIR AID TO REPAIR THE RAILWAY LINE BETWEEN KOMPONG SOM AND PHNOM PENH. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE KAMPUCHEAN AUTHORITIES WOULD AGREE TO THE CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE WOULD IMPLY, SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE, BUT HE ADDED THAT THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA70716

KAMPUCHEANS REMAINED EXTREMELY TOUCHY ON THIS SUBJECT. BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, HE MENTIONED THAT NOT ONLY HAD FRENCH MEDICAL TEAMS BEEN REFUSED ENTRY INTO KAMPUCHEA, BUT ALSO SEVERAL EAST EUROPEANS, INCLUDING SOVIET, MEDICAL TEAMS HAD BEEN SIMILARLY REFUSED ENTRY.

STATUS OF HENG SAMRIN REGIME

4. SCHLUMBERGER REITERATED THAT FRANCE RECOGNISED STATES, NOT GOVERNMENTS, AND THEREFORE HAD NO REQUIREMENT TO DECIDE ON THE RECOGNITION OF EITHER POL POT OR HENG SAMRIN, AND, AS THE FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN PHNOM PENH HAD BEEN EVACUATED IN 1975, THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL NEED TO SETTLE THE QUESTION. HE SAID THAT, AT THE TIME OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE POL POT REGIME, THE FRENCH HAD, ACCORDING TO THEIR USUAL PRACTICE, SENT HIM A TELEGRAM INDICATING THAT FRANCE WAS READY TO DO BUSINESS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT: THIS TELEGRAM HAD NEVER HAD ANY REPLY. FOR THIS REASON, THE FRENCH CONSIDER THEMSELVES AS NEVER HAVING HAD ANY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE POL POT REGIME. THEY HAD NOT REPEAT NOT SENT A SIMILAR TELEGRAM TO THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME UPON ITS ARRIVAL, AND HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING SO IN THE NEAR FUTURE. (COMMENT: THE FRENCH REGULARLY QUOTE THEIR PRINCIPLE OF RECOGNISING STATES, NOT GOVERNMENTS, TO SUPPORT THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THEY HAVE NO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RECOGNITION, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THEY HAVE MUCH THE SAME PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS DO COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNISE GOVERNMENTS. IN THE CASE OF KAMPUCHEA, DESPITE THEIR ARGUMENT THAT THE QUESTION OF REGIME IS IMMATERIAL IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE STATE OF KAMPUCHEA, THEY HAVE NEVERTHELESS CHOSEN NOT TO REPEAT NOT TO MAKE 'BUSINESS AS USUAL' OVERTURES TO HENG SAMRIN, AND THEY PREFER TO SEND THEIR IAD THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS THAT DO HAVE CONTACT WITH THE PHNOM PENH AUTHORITIES, RATHER THAN MAKE THIS CONTACT THEMSELVES).

5. SCHLUMBERGER COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH FELT THAT UNANIMITY BETWEEN THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME AND VIETNAM WAS NOT ALWAYS TOTAL, BUT WHEN PRESSED, HIS EVIDENCE WAS NOT VERY CONVINCING (DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS ON THE EXTENT OF FAMINE).

OTHER MATTERS

6. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT ARRIVALS OF FRENCH PERSONNEL IN KAMPUCHEA, DESPITE EFFORTS TO SEND MEDICAL TEAMS THERE AND THERE WERE NO UNOFFICIAL FRENCH CONTACTS WITH AREAS UNDER HENG SAMRIN CONTROL.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA70716

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

132
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

(3)

4-0. PA70716

ACTION: SEA
SA
EUR
IO
SEAP

JACC
OEB
OGGG
BHBA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	
FAS(IOC)	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	EO	
EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	
FAS(PTO)	IOL	FS			

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
130

O.PA70716 JCNI
TOR 1516 14.11.79

O.PA70716 1920 13.11.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/9301

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/838 MOSCOW/350 GENEVA/1615
RR PEKING/182 WASHINGTON/1532 BANGKOK/217
BB HANOI/15

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

Mr. [unclear] (F)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA: FRENCH VIEWS

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COUNTRIES. THEY WILL ALLOW HIM TO SPEAK IN PUBLIC ABOUT THE
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PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT HE WILL "DECLARE WAR ON THE VIETNAMESE"
DOES NOT WORRY THE FRENCH GREATLY, AND THEY DO NOT EXPECT HIM TO
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AND PHNOM PENH. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE KAMPUCHEAN AUTHORITIES
WOULD AGREE TO THE CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL
ON THE GROUND THAT SUCH AN EXERCISE WOULD IMPLY, SCHLUMBERGER SAID
THAT THE FRENCH THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE, BUT HE ADDED THAT THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA70716

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OTHER MATTERS

6. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT ARRIVALS OF FRENCH PERSONNEL IN KAMPUCHEA, DESPITE EFFORTS TO SEND MEDICAL TEAMS THERE AND THERE WERE NO UNOFFICIAL FRENCH CONTACTS WITH AREAS UNDER HENG SAMRIN CONTROL.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA70716

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

128
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.../4

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0. PA70716

ACTION: SEA
SA
EUR
IO
SEAP

JACC
OEB
OGGG
BHBA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	
FAS(IOC)	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	EO	
EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	
FAS(PTO)	IOL	FS			

127
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

125

126

O.PA70189 GDCA
TOR 2156 27.10.79

O.PA70189 0900 27.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8871

RP.
RR HANOI/157 WASHINGTON/1508 MANILA/67
RR KUALA LUMPUR/102 BANGKOK/213 UN NEW YORK/825
RR JAKARTA/139 PEKING/179 MOSCOW/345
RR SINGAPORE/171

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FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA70018

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE; SIHANOUK AND "THIRD FORCE" POSSIBILITIES

SCHLIMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER) GAVE US ON 26 OCTOBER SOME BACKGROUND ON THE RECENT FRENCH STATEMENT (REFLECTED TO THE EFFECT THAT SIHANOUK WAS WELCOME TO VISIT "AS A FRIEND OF FRANCE"). HE CONFIRMED THAT THE FRENCH WANTED TO MEND THEIR FENCES WITH HIM AFTER THE SHARP EXCHANGES IN AUGUST THIS YEAR (O.PA67946, O.PA67900, O.PA67901). THE FACT THAT THE STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT SIHANOUK WOULD BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT GISCARD.

2. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT SOME OBSERVERS HAD (MISTAKENLY) INTERPRETED THE STATEMENT TO MEAN THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEGUN TO SEE SOME HOPE FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON THE HORIZON: SINCE SIHANOUK HAD BEEN PLANNING TO VISIT FRANCE ANYWAY, THE STATEMENT WAS PURELY A SIGNAL TO HIM THAT HE WAS WELCOME.

3. DISCUSSING THE CHANCES FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE FACT THAT NONE SEEMED POSSIBLE FOR THE TIME BEING DID NOT MEAN THAT THE FRENCH WERE GOING TO GIVE UP THE IDEA ALTOGETHER. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THEY WERE KEEPING UP CONTACT WITH SIHANOUK. THE FRENCH ANALYSIS WAS THAT SIHANOUK WAS A CARD THAT COULD ONLY BE PLAYED WITH CHINESE SUPPORT: THE CHINESE BELIEVED THAT ONLY A MILITARY SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE AND THEY WOULD BE UNINTERESTED IN SIHANOUK UNTIL THE POL POT RESISTANCE WAS VIRTUALLY CRUSHED (O.PA70190). ONLY THEN WOULD TALK OF "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT" BE POSSIBLE. SCHLUMBERGER THEN ADDED BLEAKLY THAT, ONCE POL POT FORCES WERE ELIMINATED, THE VIETNAMESE WOULD SEE EVEN LESS NEED FOR ANY "POLITICAL SETTLEMENT", SINCE, FOR THEM, THE POLITICAL PROBLEM WAS ALREADY RESOLVED AND THE MILITARY ACTION THEY WERE CURRENTLY UNDERTAKING WAS TO CONSOLIDATE THE POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT THEY HAD ALREADY IMPOSED.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA70189

4. SCHLUMBERGER MADE SOME COMMENTS ON SIHANOUK'S CHANCES OF GATHERING KAMPUCHEAN GROUPS BEHIND HIM. AFTER SIHANOUK'S FAILURE TO CARRY THROUGH THE PLAN TO CREATE A "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION" IN BRUSSELS IN AUGUST, HE HAD SEEN THE NEED FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE STRUCTURE, (THE "CONFEDERATION" HE HAD FORMED IN PYONG YANG LAST MONTH) WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE DIFFERING ELEMENTS WITHIN THE KAMPUCHEAN GROUPS ABROAD SOME ROOM FOR CO-EXISTENCE WITHOUT CAUSING EXPLOSIONS. SCHLUMBERGER SAID HE HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE VARIOUS EXILE GROUPS IN FRANCE, WHICH WERE NUMEROUS AND CONSTANTLY CHANGING ALLEGIANCE, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE MAJORITY MIGHT BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW SIHANOUK WITHIN SOME LOOSE CONFEDERATION.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

124

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0. PA70189

ACTION: SA

JBAC

JACC

EUR

JBAL

DDO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S			

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
LISBON	LONDON	MADRID	MALTA	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	PORT MORESBY	
RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	VIENNA	VIENTIANE	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

155

123

O.PA70188 NASH
TOR 0806 27.10.79

O.PA70188 1821 26.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8870

RP.
RR PEKING/177 UN NEW YORK/823 OTTAWA/380
RR DUBLIN/292 HANOI/156 JAKARTA/138
RR LONDON/9227 WASHINGTON/1506 BANGKOK/211
RR GENEVA/1605 BRUSSELS/1079 SINGAPORE/170
RR KUALA LUMPUR/101 MANILA/66

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE: UN CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA

ON 26 OCTOBER, SCHLUMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER) TOLD US THAT THE FRENCH AIM, IN PROPOSING THE UN CONFERENCE WAS TO PROVIDE A STIMULUS FOR DONOR COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE AID TO KAMPUCHEA, AND ALSO TO SHOW VIETNAM (AND CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION) THAT THE TIME WAS PAST FOR HAGGLING ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF THIS OR THAT REGIME AND THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE SERIOUS ABOUT GIVING HUMANITARIAN AID. THE FRENCH HOPED THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, AND THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE LATE IN NOVEMBER WOULD THEN TAKE CARE OF THE POLITICAL ELEMENT.

2. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT WORRYING THE FRENCH AT THIS STAGE. THEY HOPED THAT "INTERESTED PARTIES" WOULD ATTEND, AT WHATEVER LEVEL THEY THOUGHT APPROPRIATE. THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA'S REPRESENTATION WAS OF COURSE A REAL ONE. THE FRENCH HOPED THAT BOTH HENG SAMRIN AND POL POT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ATTEND (SO THAT THEY COULD BE "BULLIED INTO ACCEPTING AID") AND THAT THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN WOULD BE ABLE TO DISCIPLINE THEM SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT WASTE TOO MUCH TIME WITH POLEMICS. EVEN IF ONE SIDE ONLY WERE THERE, OR NEITHER, THE FRENCH HOPE WAS THAT IF THE AID WAS KEPT COMING, AT LEAST SOME OF IT WOULD END UP IN THE HANDS OF CIVILIANS, EVEN IF A GOODLY PROPORTION ALSO WENT TO VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

3. AS TO A FRENCH CONTRIBUTION, SCHLUMBERGER SAID IT WAS CERTAIN THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT THE CONFERENCE. FRENCH AUTHORITIES WERE NOW DEBATING THE LEVEL AND NATURE OF THEIR AID (O.PA69990), BUT IT WAS LIKELY TO INCLUDE FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND CASH. THE LEVEL OF FRENCH AID WOULD ALSO BE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION, DUE TO BE TAKEN EARLY NEXT WEEK, WITHIN THE EC ABOUT THE ACTUAL SIZE AND DIVISION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE GLOBAL EC AID PACKAGE

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

122

2-0.PA70188

ANNOUNCED AFTER THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 20-21 OCTOBER
(O.DU2711).

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T
DEP P M AND CABINET T/T
DEP TDE AND RSCS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN TDE AND RSCS
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP SPL TDE REP
TREASURER + TREASURY
DEP BUS CON AFF
DEP DEFENCE
DEP INDY COMM

DEP NAT DEV
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP SPL TDE REP
DEP TREASURY
ONA
ASIO (C)
JIO
ASIO (M)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.../3

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA70188

ACTION: SA
EURIO
EOPPR
SEAP
DDOJACC
OCCB
OCDBB
JAGBB
OCCB
OCDBB
OCDE

BBA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	AME	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC
FAS(NUC)	NS	NP	FAS(IOC)	CIP	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	EP	FAS(LT)	
GLT	IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	
FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PAAP	FAS(PTO)	
PDC	IOL	FS			

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37
120

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA70188 NASH
TOR 0806 27.10.79

O.PA70188 1821 26.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8870

RP.
RR PEKING/177 UN NEW YORK/823 OTTAWA/380
RR DUBLIN/292 HANOI/156 JAKARTA/138
RR LONDON/9227 WASHINGTON/1506 BANGKOK/211
RR GENEVA/1605 BRUSSELS/1079 SINGAPORE/170
RR KUALA LUMPUR/101 MANILA/66

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE: UN CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA

ON 26 OCTOBER, SCHLUMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER) TOLD US THAT THE FRENCH AIM, IN PROPOSING THE UN CONFERENCE, WAS TO PROVIDE A STIMULUS FOR DONOR COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE AID TO KAMPUCHEA, AND ALSO TO SHOW VIETNAM (AND CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION) THAT THE TIME WAS PAST FOR HAGGLING ABOUT THE LEGITIMACY OF THIS OR THAT REGIME AND THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE SERIOUS ABOUT GIVING HUMANITARIAN AID. THE FRENCH HOPED THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD DEAL ONLY WITH HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, AND THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE LATE IN NOVEMBER WOULD THEN TAKE CARE OF THE POLITICAL ELEMENT.

2. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT WORRYING THE FRENCH AT THIS STAGE. THEY HOPED THAT "INTERESTED PARTIES" WOULD ATTEND, AT WHATEVER LEVEL THEY THOUGHT APPROPRIATE. THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA'S REPRESENTATION WAS OF COURSE A REAL ONE. THE FRENCH HOPED THAT BOTH HENG SAMRIN AND POL POT REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ATTEND (SO THAT THEY COULD BE "BULLIED INTO ACCEPTING AID") AND THAT THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN WOULD BE ABLE TO DISCIPLINE THEM SUFFICIENTLY SO THAT THE CONFERENCE WOULD NOT WASTE TOO MUCH TIME WITH POLEMICS. EVEN IF ONE SIDE ONLY WERE THERE, OR NEITHER, THE FRENCH HOPE WAS THAT IF THE AID WAS KEPT COMING, AT LEAST SOME OF IT WOULD END UP IN THE HANDS OF CIVILIANS, EVEN IF A GOODLY PROPORTION ALSO WENT TO VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

3. AS TO A FRENCH CONTRIBUTION, SCHLUMBERGER SAID IT WAS CERTAIN THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT THE CONFERENCE. FRENCH AUTHORITIES WERE NOW DEBATING THE LEVEL AND NATURE OF THEIR AID (O.PA69990), BUT IT WAS LIKELY TO INCLUDE FOOD, MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND CASH. THE LEVEL OF FRENCH AID WOULD ALSO BE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION, DUE TO BE TAKEN EARLY NEXT WEEK, WITHIN THE EC ABOUT THE ACTUAL SIZE AND DIVISION BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE GLOBAL EC AID PACKAGE

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

119

2-0.PA70188

ANNOUNCED AFTER THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING ON 20-21 OCTOBER
(O.DU2711).

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T
DEP P M AND CABINET T/T
DEP TDE AND RSCS

PRIME MINISTER	DEP NAT DEV
FOREIGN MINISTER	DEP PRIMARY IND
MIN TDE AND RSCS	DEP SPL TDE REP
MIN+DEP DEFENCE	DEP TREASURY
MIN+DEP SPL TDE REP	ONA
TREASURER + TREASURY	ASIO (C)
DEP BUS CON AFF	JIO
DEP DEFENCE	ASIO (M)
DEP INDY COMM	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

155

118

O.PA70080 KPMO
TOR 0931 25.10.79

O.PA70080 2000 24.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8776

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/1501 GENEVA/1601 LONDON/9216
RR UN NEW YORK/818 BRUSSELS/1071 DUBLIN/288
RR BANGKOK/208 TOKYO/402 PEKING/174

Ph. Ingénieur (F)

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA70081

R E S T R I C T E D

KAMPUCHEA : FRANCE

INDOCHINESE ISSUES WERE THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THE WEEKLY FRENCH CABINET MEETING ON 24 OCTOBER. AS WELL AS STATEMENT ON REFUGEES (REPORTED SEPARATELY), THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING SECTION ON KAMPUCHEA, ANNOUNCING SOME DETAILS OF THE FRENCH INITIATIVE REPORTED IN O.PA70081. THIS PASSAGE READ:

“THE FOREIGN MINISTER UNDERLINED THAT THE MOST SERIOUS CURRENT SITUATION WAS THAT WHICH THREATENED THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CAMBODIA AND THE KHMER PEOPLE.

THE CAMBODIAN DRAMA CONCERNED THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, WHICH OWED IT TO ITSELF TO RESPOND MASSIVELY TO THE APPEAL LAUNCHED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS.

FRANCE, FOR ITS PART, INTENDED TO PARTICIPATE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THIS GESTURE OF SYMPATHY. IT HAD OBTAINED, DURING THE LAST INFORMAL POLITICAL COOPERATION MEETING OF THE NINE, AGREEMENT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL COMMUNITY AID PROGRAM SHOULD BE QUICKLY PUT INTO OPERATION. APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NINE COUNTRIES WOULD MEET TO THIS END ON 26 OCTOBER.

FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK HAD MADE AN APPROACH TO MR WALDHEIM IN ORDER TO STUDY WITH HIM INITIATIVES WHICH COULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO PROVIDE TO THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE IN AN EFFECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL MANNER THE HELP WHICH WAS URGENTLY NEEDED”.

BANGKOK : PLEASE PASS BY BAG TO HANOI.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

112

2-O.PA70080

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

116

3-0. PA70080

ACTION: SA
EUR

JACC

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	
FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB		
FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	SEAP	FAS(PTO)	
PDC	10L				

BONN HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR MANILA MOSCOW
NEW DELHI PORT MORESBY RANGOON SINGAPORE

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

115 155

O.PA69814 PDPO
TOR 0822 18.10.79

O.PA69814 1830 17.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8555

RP.
RR BANGKOK/205 HANOI/153 PEKING/170
RR VIENTIANE/53 WASHINGTON/1490 LONDON/9194
RR UN NEW YORK/811

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA : FRENCH VIEWS

ON 17 OCTOBER WE SAW GORY (HEAD, SOUTH EAST ASIA BRANCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY) ABOUT KAMPUCHEA.

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

2. WE ASKED WHETHER THE TALKS WITH HUA GUOFENG WHO IS AT PRESENT IN FRANCE HAD PRODUCED ANYTHING INTERESTING ON THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TO KAMPUCHEA. GORY SAID THAT SO FAR THE TALKS HAD BEEN ONLY ON A VERY GENERAL LEVEL AND HAD NOT SHED ANY NEW LIGHT ON THE CHINESE APPROACH. BUT FURTHER ROUNDS WERE TO TAKE PLACE. GORY'S UNDERSTANDING, BASED ON AN NCNA REPORT, WAS THAT THE CHINESE WERE STILL RESOLUTELY OPPOSED TO ANY TALK OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND REMAINED BEHIND POL POT. THEY WERE HOPING THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD WEAR THEMSELVES OUT.

3. GORY'S ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE A PROSPECT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ONLY IF THE CHINESE AND THE USSR COULD REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING ABOUT KAMPUCHEA. BUT HE NOTED THAT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THESE TWO WAS SO LABOURED AND SLOW THAT HE WONDERED WHETHER THEY COULD INDEED MAKE ANY PROGRESS. MEANWHILE THE NINE COULD MAKE THEIR DECLARATIONS BUT THESE HAD NO EFFECT. GORY SAID THAT THE FRENCH PLANNED TO SAY TO THE CHINESE THIS WEEK THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE PUT THEIR WEIGHT BEHIND THIS SEARCH. THEY WOULD ALSO BE SAYING THAT FRANCE HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE CHINESE ATTACK ON VIETNAM AND CONTINUED TO CONSIDER THAT SUCH RECOURSE TO FORCE WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

4. GORY WAS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, EVEN WITH THE ASEANS, THE WEST AND THE CHINESE AGAINST THEM. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE NEW OFFENSIVE IN KAMPUCHEA AND WOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM THIS BY THE UN DEBATE ON KAMPUCHEA. HE THEREFORE SAW LITTLE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ASEANS' DESIRE TO HAVE THIS ITEM TAKEN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD PREFER IT TO COME AFTER THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0. PA69814

DISCUSSION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES, LEST THE HEIGHTENED TENSION PROVOKED BY THE POLITICAL DEBATE SHOULD REDUCE THE PROSPECT OF A SATISFACTORY DISCUSSION OF THE REFUGEE ISSUE. (WE PASSED GORY A COPY OF YOUR FIGURES FOR THE VIETNAMESE REFUGEE OUTFLOW - HE FOUND IT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS IT WAS THE FIRST SUCH COMPILATION HE HAD SEEN).

5. SPEAKING OF FRANCE'S ABSTENTION ON THE KAMPUCHEAN REPRESENTATION VOTE, GORY SAID THE MAIN REASON WAS THAT FRANCE FELT UNABLE TO VOTE FOR POL POT BECAUSE OF THE UNPALATABLE NATURE OF HIS REGIME AND THE CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS IT. LOGICALLY THE FRENCH POSITION SHOULD THEN HAVE BEEN TO VOTE AGAINST BOTH CLAIMS BUT THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE INVOLVED THE DANGER OF THE VOTE AGAINST POL POT BEING CONSTRUED AS IMPLYING SOME INCREASED APPROVAL OF HENG SAMRIN. THE FRENCH HAD BEEN PREPARED TO SEE AN EMPTY SEAT APPROACH ADOPTED AND HAD THIS HAPPENED WOULD HAVE MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IT SHOULD REMAIN VACANT UNTIL A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT MADE POSSIBLE THE DESIGNATION OF A GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE.

EMIGRE GROUPS

6. GORY ATTACHED LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN PARIS LAST WEEK BY SON SANN OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE KHMER PEOPLE' OPPOSED TO BOTH THE KHMER ROUGE AND HENG SAMRIN. HE NOTED THAT SON SANN CLAIMED TO HAVE SOME PEOPLE ON THE GROUND IN KAMPUCHEA BUT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THIS GROUP OR OTHER SIMILAR GROUPS COULD ACHIEVE ANYTHING UNTIL THERE WAS A REAL PROSPECT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AT WHICH TIME AN OPENING FOR THE THIRD FORCE PEOPLE MIGHT BE CREATED. GORY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SIHANOUK HAD ANY CONTACTS WITH SON SANN. HE EXPECTED SIHANOUK TO COME TO FRANCE LATER THIS YEAR ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT RESPONDED TO THE FRENCH COMMUNICATION INFORMING HIM THAT THERE WAS NO OBJECTION TO A VISIT. GORY'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT SIHANOUK WAS NOT RPT NOT NOW PLANNING TO HOLD A CONGRESS OF KHMER EXILES IN EUROPE BUT THAT HE WOULD CONTENT HIMSELF WITH THE SMALL GATHERING HE HAD HELD IN PYONGYANG.

RELIEF SUPPLIES

7. THE 10,000 TONNES OF CEREALS WHICH THE FRENCH ARE PROVIDING FOR KAMPUCHEA (O. PA69320) IS BEING HANDLED THROUGH ICRC, UNICEF, AND FAO. IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE IT ARRIVES AS SHIPPING IS STILL BEING ARRANGED. THE PRIVATELY-SPONSORED FRENCH RELIEF VESSEL, 'ILE DE LUMIERE' IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN KOMPONG SOM WITHIN TWO OR THREE WEEKS WITH A LOAD OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. GORY SAID THAT LANDING APPROVAL HAD BEEN SOUGHT THROUGH THE ICRC AND ALTHOUGH NO RESPONSE HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY DIFFICULTY. HE COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE ICRC/UNICEF FLIGHTS WERE OPERATING SUCCESSFULLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATE QUANTITIES OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WAS BEING CARRIED OUT, THERE WAS STILL NO WAY IN WHICH THE MAJOR RELIEF

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA69814

DISTRIBUTION WHICH WAS NEEDED COULD BE ACHIEVED UNLESS THE HENG SAMRIN AUTHORITIES GAVE FULL CO- OPERATION. THEY DID NOT YET SEEM PREPARED TO DO THIS.

COMMENT:

8. GORY SEEMED TO BE VIRTUALLY RESIGNED TO THE IMPOTENCE OF THE REST OF WORLD IN THE FACE OF THE VIETNAMESE UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN ASSESSING THAT THE ONLY REAL HOPE LAY IN A DEAL BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR HE NONETHELESS SAW THIS VERY MUCH AS A LONG SHOT. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN PUTTIN HIT TO US THAT THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO BE INTERESTED IN ANYTHING OTHER THAN A CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR HOLD OVER KAMPUCHEA. ON THIS OCCASION GORY DID NOT SAY THIS IN SO MANY WORDS BUT IT WAS IMPLIED IN HIS REMARKS. HE WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER THE ASEANS WOULD IN DUE COURSE RESIGN THEMSELVES TO THE DE FACTO ABSORPTION OF KAMPUCHEA BY THE VIETNAMESE.

9. THANKS YOUR BRIEFING INFORMATION WHICH ENABLED US TO BRING GORY UP TO DATE ON OUR POSITION ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND ON RELIEF EFFORTS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP FINANCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY
ONA
JIO

.../4

112

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

4-0.PA69814

ACTION: SEA
SA
EUR
IOL

JBAC

BGA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	
ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	
FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	
EO	EP	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	
PAAP	SEAP	FAS(PTO)	PDC		

BRUSSELS JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR MANILA MOSCOW NEW DELHI
PORT MORESBY RANGOON SINGAPORE TOKYO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

Lu Angulor F.

25/1/4/37

155

O.UN15401 KPMO
TOR 1001 06.10.79

CONFIDENTIAL

O.UN15401 1740 5.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/4737

RP.
RR PARIS EMB/644 WASHINGTON/3078 LONDON/1427
RR SINGAPORE/208 KUALA LUMPUR/237 JAKARTA/625
RR BANGKOK/337 MANILA/147 WELLINGTON/405
RR PEKING/256 MOSCOW/308

FM. UN NEW YORK / FILE 602/19

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA

*Healthy
shift in terms
of our regards to
French to get closer
to islanders of S/P*

AT A FRENCH EMBASSY LUNCH FOR ASEAN AND SOUTH PACIFIC DELEGATION LEADERS ON 5 OCTOBER, OLIVIER STIRN (FRENCH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) APPEALED FOR CLOSER CONSULTATION IN FUTURE BETWEEN FRANCE AND ASEAN/SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES ON INDO-CHINESE QUESTIONS. HE ARGUED THAT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH FRANCE SHARED THE OPPOSITION OF THE ASEAN/SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES TO THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA AND THEIR DESIRE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN WHICH KAMPUCHEA WOULD ENJOY AN INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE.

2. STIRN EXPLAINED THE FRENCH ABSTENTION IN THE RECENT VOTE ON KAMPUCHEAN CREDENTIALS BY REFERENCE TO THE STRENGTH OF PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE AGAINST POL POT, THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNITY IN FRANCE AND THE FACT THAT FRANCE RECOGNISED NEITHER POL POT NOR HENG SAMRIN. HE EMPHASISED THAT THE FRENCH HAD BEEN URGING BOTH THE VIETNAMESE AND THE USSR THAT VIETNAM SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AND SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, AND SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BASED ON INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIAN INDEPENDENCE AND NEUTRALITY AND THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION. HE ADDED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE TALKING ON SIMILAR LINES TO HUA GUO FENG DURING THE LATTER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PARIS.

3. RAJARATNAM AND ROMULO ARGUED THAT THE BEST WAY TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION WAS TO SHAKE THE ARROGANT SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE BY BRINGING THE WEIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION TO BEAR. THIS HAD BEEN DONE AT THE GENEVA MEETING ON REFUGEES AND DURING THE CREDENTIALS DEBATE. THE FORTHCOMING DEBATE ON THE ASEAN RESOLUTION, WHICH WOULD AGAIN CALL FOR VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL WHILE LEAVING 'A WAY OUT FOR VIETNAM' BY AVOIDING ANY CONDEMNATION OF THE VIETNAMESE INVASION AND BY PROPOSING NEW ELECTIONS UNDER UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION, WOULD PROVIDE A THIRD SUCH OPPORTUNITY. RAJARATNAM AND ROMULO STRESSED THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE ANXIOUS TO MUSTER THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.UN15401

WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR THEIR RESOLUTION. THEY APPEALED TO STIRN TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR. STIRN AVOIDED GIVING ANY COMMITMENT.

4. THE DISCUSSION WAS TOO SHORT TO PERMIT ANY EXPLORATION OF FRENCH IDEAS ON HOW A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY MIGHT BE SET UP. STIRN DID SAY AFTERWARDS THAT HE HOPED SIHANOUK COULD PLAY A ROLE BUT HE APPEARED UNABLE TO ELABORATE FURTHER.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SEA
SA
DDO

JCCAD
JACC

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ	EUR
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	
BONN	BRUSSELS	HANOI	HONG KONG	PORT MORESBY	RANGOON
VIENTIANE					TOKYO

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

109

O.PA69320 BOMBA
TOR 0810 05.10.79

O.PA69320 1930 4.10.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/8149

RP.
RR BANGKOK/203 HANOI/152 SINGAPORE/167
RR PEKING/169 KUALA LUMPUR/99 MANILA/64
RR JAKARTA/135 MOSCOW/337 UN NEW YORK/803
RR GENEVA/1592 WASHINGTON/1479

Mr. Zingales (P)

RESTRICTED

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

R E S T R I C T E D

FRENCH AID TO KAMPUCHEA

ON 3 OCTOBER, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT FRANCE WILL GIVE 10,000 TONNES OF CEREALS TO KAMPUCHEA. IT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE CHANNEL OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (ICRC/UNICEF): THE TRANSPORT (BY BOAT, IN THREE OR FOUR LOADS) WILL BE PAID FOR BY THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

2. SCHLUMBERGER (FOREIGN MINISTRY INDOCHINA DESK OFFICER) TOLD US ON 4 OCTOBER THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THE MODALITIES OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE AID WITH ICRC/UNICEF. THE FRENCH ARE HOPING THAT THE HENG SAMRIN AUTHORITIES WILL STICK BY THEIR ENGAGEMENT TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL AID TO BE IMPARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED. OTHER FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED TO US THEIR FRUSTRATION THAT IT HAS TAKEN SO LONG TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY CLEARANCES WITHIN THE FRENCH ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE AID COULD BE ORGANISED. ANOTHER REASON FOR THE DELAY IN CLEARING THE AID IS THAT HITHERTO SUCH FRENCH AID HAS ONLY BEEN GIVEN TO GOVERNMENTS, WHEREAS THIS TIME A NEW PRECEDENT HAS BEEN CREATED, THAT OF PROVIDING BILATERAL AID FOR DISTRIBUTION THROUGH MULTILATERAL CHANNELS.

RESTRICTED

3. FRENCH NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS WILL BE SENDING A FURTHER 1,500 TONNES OF FOOD (BY BOAT) IN THE NEAR FUTURE, ADDITIONAL TO EARLIER SMALL AIRLIFTS OF EMERGENCY AID,

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

108

2-0. PA69320

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DEP FINANCE
DEP HEALTH
DEP P M AND CABINET
DEP PRIMARY IND
DEP TDE AND RSCS
DEP TREASURY

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ACTION: IO
IOL

OGGG
T/T OGGG
BGA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	STE
FAS(SEP)	SEA	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	ANZ	
EUR	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	EO	EP	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S		
DIR-ADAB	FAS(BP)	PPR	PAAP	SEAP	
FAS(PTO)	PDC				

25/14/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA69117 DBKE
TOR 2012 29.09.79

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/7986

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/799 GENEVA/1584 BANGKOK/202
RR STOCKHOLM/160 LONDON/9148 SINGAPORE/166
RR TOKYO/395 KUALA LUMPUR/98 HANOI/151

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRENCH VIEWS ON KAMPUCHEA

ON 28 SEPTEMBER WE SPOKE TO SCHLUMBERGER, MFA INDO-CHINA DESK OFFICER. THREE MAIN TOPICS WERE COVERED: THE POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION, THE HANDLING OF THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION IN THE UN, AND HUMANITARIAN AID.

POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION

2. THE FRENCH HAD NOTHING NEW TO ADD, OTHER THAN TO OBSERVE THAT THE PROSPECT FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, FAINT AT THE BEST OF TIMES, NOW SEEMED NON-EXISTENT, ESPECIALLY AS SIHANOUK HAD (AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING) GIVEN UP TRYING TO ASSEMBLE AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO HENG SAMRIN AND POL POT. PHAN HIEN IN NEW YORK HAD RECENTLY REPEATED TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET WHAT HAD BEEN SAID SO OFTEN BEFORE, NAMELY THAT THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA WAS "IRREVERSIBLE." "THE VIETNAMESE TROOPS NOW IN KAMPUCHEA SEEMED TO BE DOING THEIR BEST TO GIVE EFFECT TO THIS DESCRIPTION, AND THE FRENCH THOUGHT THE VIETNAMESE WERE NOW BETTER EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH A CHINESE ATTACK THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN FEBRUARY. DESPITE THE DETERMINATION OF THE KHMER ROUGE, THEIR PROSPECTS LOOKED BLEAK IN THE LONG RUN.

UNITED NATIONS

3. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT NO FIXED FRENCH POSITION HAD YET EVOLVED ABOUT HOW BEST TO HANDLE THE KAMPUCHEA QUESTION IN NEW YORK: FRANCOIS-PONCET WAS CURRENTLY THERE AND WAS LIKELY TO DECIDE POLICY ON THE SPOT. THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA WAS IN ANY EVENT EVOLVING TOO FAST FOR THE FRENCH TO WANT TO SETTLE THEIR POSITION IMMEDIATELY. SCHLUMBERGER NOTED THAT ONE GUIDE FOR THE FRENCH WOULD BE THE VIEWS OF THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, TO WHOM THE FRENCH WOULD WANT TO REMAIN CLOSE. (COMMENT: DESPITE THIS VIEW, WHICH HAS BEEN PUT TO US AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PAST MONTHS, THE FRENCH ABSTAINED ON THE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA69117

✓ VOTE ON KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS, AND WE WOULD EXPECT THEIR EXPRESSED WISH TO "STAY WITH ASEAN" NOT ALWAYS TO ACCORD WITH THE LINE THAT THE FRENCH END UP TAKING). IT IS BALANCED BY THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP OPEN THEIR LINES TO HANOI BECAUSE OF ITS IMPORTANCE AS A SOUTHEAST ASIAN POWER.

HUMANITARIAN AID

4. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT THOUGH THE FRENCH HAD ANNOUNCED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF SENDING IT AND HAVING IT DISTRIBUTED WERE SO GREAT THAT THEY HAD NOT YET OFFERED ANY SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS. WHILE IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT ICRC AND UNICEF WERE TO BE ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH OFFICES IN PHNOM PENH, IT WAS DISAPPOINTING THAT THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME (AND, FOR THAT MATTER, THE VIETNAMESE, ON THE OCCASION OF PHAN HIEN'S CONVERSATION WITH FRANCOIS-PONCET) WERE ADAMANT THAT AID SHOULD NOT BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE KHMER ROUGE.

5. SCHLUMBERGER SAID THAT UNICEF/ICRC HAD TOLD THE FRENCH THAT THEY WOULD TRY, DESPITE THE HENG SAMRIN VETO, TO DISTRIBUTE AID IMPARTIALLY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BUT THE FRENCH DID NOT THINK THIS WAS POSSIBLE: UNICEF/ICRC HAD NO TRANSPORT IN KAMPUCHEA OTHER THAN THAT WHICH HENG SAMRIN WOULD ALLOW THEM TO USE, THE HENG SAMRIN FORCES THEMSELVES WERE SHORT OF FOOD AND MEDICINES AND WOULD UNHESITATINGLY REQUISITION ANY SUPPLIES THAT ICRC/UNICEF MIGHT TRY TO FERRY TO CIVILIANS IN KHMER ROUGE-CONTROLLED REGIONS. BESIDES, ADDED SCHLUMBERGER, WITH SOME 200,000 VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA, IT WOULD BE RASH IN THE EXTREME FOR UNARMED UNICEF/ICRC PERSONNEL TO TRY TO DISTRIBUTE AID OUTSIDE "SAFE" AREAS, I.E. THOSE WHERE THE VIETNAMESE WERE IN CONTROL.

6. SCHLUMBERGER ALSO NOTED THAT, UNTIL THE UNICEF/ICRC OPERATION IN PHNOM PENH WERE BETTER ESTABLISHED, THE PHYSICAL CAPACITY TO RECEIVE AND DISTRIBUTE AID WAS PITIFULLY SMALL. HE SAID THAT ANOTHER POSSIBILITY, OF SENDING RELIEF SUPPLIES FROM THAILAND FOR DISTRIBUTION JUST ACROSS THE BORDER, WAS FRAUGHT WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY AS THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN BORDER AREAS INCREASED: THE FRENCH HAD HAD SIGNS THAT THE THAIS WERE INCREASINGLY TORN BETWEEN THEIR DESIRE TO HELP THE KHMER ROUGE TO CONTINUE THE RESISTANCE TO THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR FEAR THAT, BY SO DOING, THEY WOULD PROVOKE THE VIETNAMESE INTO ENTERING THAILAND IN "HOT PURSUIT" RAIDS. SUMMING UP, SCHLUMBERGER SAID THE AID PROBLEM LOOKED CLOSE TO BEING INSURMOUNTABLE, BUT THE FRENCH WERE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH UNICEF/ICRC AND WERE READY TO MOVE AS SOON AS "THE HORIZON LIGHTENS A LITTLE".

COMMENT (UNDERLINED)

7. SCHLUMBERGER AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING OUR CONVERSATION PAINTED

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0.PA69117

A BLEAK PICTURE OF BOTH THE HUMANITARIAN AND THE POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN KAMPUCHEA, BUT WHEN ASKED WHETHER SUCH AN ANALYSIS WOULD NOT LOGICALLY IMPLY ACCEPTANCE OF VIETNAM'S DOMINATION OF KAMPUCHEA, SCHLUMBERGER IMMEDIATELY SAID THAT 'SUCH A THING WAS NOT POSSIBLE. HOWEVER WE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE FRENCH INCREASINGLY FEEL THAT, IF AID ON ANY EFFECTIVE SCALE IS TO BE GIVEN TO KAMPUCHEA, IT CAN ONLY BE DONE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME AND THAT, EVEN THEN, THE AID WILL ONLY BE DISTRIBUTED IN AREAS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE POL POT FORCES. WESTERN DONORS WILL HAVE TO MAKE DIFFICULT CHOICES BETWEEN THEIR HUMANITARIAN DESIRE TO HELP AND THEIR POLITICALLY-BASED RELUCTANCE TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE NOT TOO SQUEAMISH TO USE STARVATION AS A WEAPON BOTH TO LESSEN KHMER ROUGE RESISTANCE AND TO GAIN SOME KIND OF RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN. THE FRENCH CURRENTLY APPEAR TO BE HESITATING IN THEIR CHOICE, WITH THEIR ABSTENTION ON THE KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS PERHAPS BEING A POINTER THAT THEY MAY IN THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE TAKE THE PLUNGE AND ACCEPT THE FACT OF THE NEW REGIME IN PHNOM PENH.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

104

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ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	FAS(MFS)	
FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S			

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	JAKARTA
LISBON	MADRID	MALTA	MANILA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	PEKING
PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	THE HAGUE	VIENNA	VIENTIANE		
WASHINGTON							

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/79
25/1/4/37
155
103

O.PA68380 DBKE
TOR 0237 06.09.79

O.PA68380 1825 5.9.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/7394

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/790 BANGKOK/200 WASHINGTON/1449
RR BONN/986 HANOI/149 LONDON/9076
RR SINGAPORE/163 WELLINGTON/284 JAKARTA/132
RR PEKING/166 VIENTIANE/51 ROME/756
RR OTTAWA/358 MANILA/61 KUALA LUMPUR/96
RR STOCKHOLM/151 MOSCOW/331 GENEVA/1567
RR NEW DELHI/101 TOKYO/383

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRENCH VIEWS ON KAMPUCHEA/VIETNAM/CHINA

DUE TO ABSENCES ON LEAVE OF RELEVANT FRENCH OFFICIALS, WE HAD BEEN UNABLE UNTIL 4 SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS THE HANDLING OF KAMPUCHEA AT UNGA 34. WE SPOKE TO DEFAY (FOREIGN MINISTRY DESK OFFICER ON INDOCHINA), DRAWING ON REFTEL.

2. DEFAY, WHILE NOTING OUR POINTS, PROVED LITTLE INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEMS OF KAMPUCHEA WITHIN THE UN CONTEXT. HIS LACK OF INTEREST WAS OCCASIONED PARTLY BY A TRADITIONAL FRENCH PREFERENCE FOR BILATERAL RATHER THAN MULTILATERAL ACTION, AND PARTLY BY THE FRENCH ANALYSIS THAT THE SITUATION IN INDOCHINA WAS BECOMING SO THREATENING THAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO SEPARATE HUMANITARIAN FROM POLITICAL ASPECTS WERE, AS HE PUT IT, IMPOSSIBLE TO REALISE AND, ANYWAY, "BESIDE THE POINT".

3. THE FRENCH VIEW OF THE SITUATION WAS THAT, WITH THE NEXT DRY SEASON BEGINNING IN LATE OCTOBER, THE VIETNAMESE WOULD LAUNCH A DETERMINED EFFORT TO ERADICATE POL POT AND OTHER RESISTANCE. (THE FRENCH HAVE INFORMATION FROM THE THAIS SIMILAR TO OUR OWN (O.BK27347) TO THE EFFECT THAT RESISTANCE IS QUITE STRONG, AND, EVEN ALLOWING FOR SOME THAI WISHFUL THINKING, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NO EASY TASK AHEAD). THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE WILL THEN CHOOSE TO DELIVER THEIR THREATENED "SECOND LESSON" TO THE VIETNAMESE, TAKING ADVANTAGE NOT ONLY OF THEIR ENTANGLEMENT IN KAMPUCHEA, BUT ALSO OF THE PITIFUL STATE OF THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY. DEFAY SAID THAT CHINESE TROOP MOVEMENTS ON THE VIETNAMESE BORDER SUPPORTED THE FRENCH HYPOTHESIS. HE WENT ON TO NOTE THAT THE FRENCH WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, ONCE AGAIN, ALLOW ITSELF TO BE HUMILIATED BY BEING SEEN NOT TO PUNISH CHINA FOR

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

102

2-O.PA68380

ATTACKING VIETNAM.

4. TO THIS GLOOMY SCENARIO, DEFAY ADDED A NUMBER OF MINOR POINTS: ONE TO THE EFFECT THAT, DURING THE LAST SINO-VIETNAMESE BILATERAL TALKS, THE CHINESE HAD TALKED ABOUT NOTHING BUT KAMPUCHEA, WHICH TO THE FRENCH SOUNDED LIKE PREPARING A CHINESE JUSTIFICATION TO ATTACK VIETNAM. THE OTHER WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT WITH HUA GUOFENG DUE TO VISIT EUROPE SOON, THE FRENCH WERE UNCOMFORTABLY REMINDED OF TENG HSIAOPING'S CHARM OFFENSIVE IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY THE CHINESE ATTACK ON VIETNAM IN FEBRUARY THIS YEAR, AND BY STRIDENT SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF USA-CHINA COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK. THE FRENCH WERE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCUSE THE EUROPEANS OF CONNIVANCE THIS TIME, SHOULD CHINA ATTACK VIETNAM AFTER HUA'S VISIT TO EUROPE.

5. ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WESTERN POWERS COULD DO TO EASE THE TENSION, DEFAY SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE CONTINUING THEIR BILATERAL PRESSURE ON VIETNAM: THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN CALLED IN AGAIN LAST WEEK (THE PREVIOUS TIME WAS ON 5 AUGUST) BY FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS- PONCENT, WHO, AS ON THE FIRST OCCASION, HAD BEEN EXTREMELY BLUNT WITH THE AMBASSADOR. THEIR DISCUSSION WAS LARGELY ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE UNDERTAKINGS ON REFUGEES, AND DEFAY DID NOT SAY WHETHER KAMPUCHEA HAD BEEN DISCUSSED.

6. DEFAY RETURNED, AT OUR INSISTENCE, TO THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL ACTION ON KAMPUCHEA WITHIN THE UN CONTEXT. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH UNDERSTOOD THE ASEAN DESIRE TO STICK TO THE POLITICAL ASPECTS, SINCE THEY WERE ALL 'TERRIFIED' OF FURTHER DESTABILISATION OF THE REGION. THE ASEAN'S UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THEY COULD DO INDIVIDUALLY, AND THEIR HOPE WAS THAT, IN THE BRIGHT LIGHT OF A FULL UN DEBATE ON THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING KAMPUCHEA, THE MAJOR PROTAGONISTS MIGHT AT LEAST SHOW SOME SENSITIVITY TO THE PRESSURE OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION. IF HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS DOMINATED DISCUSSION OF KAMPUCHEA IN THE UN, VIETNAM WOULD BENEFIT FROM (A) MORE AID GIVEN TO HELP PROBLEMS THAT ARE AT LEAST PARTLY OF ITS OWN MAKING., (B) SOME FORM OF DE FACTO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF HENG SAMRIN., AND (C) LESS PRESSURE TO CONCEDE GROUND, EITHER LITERALLY OR FIGURATIVELY, ON ITS BEHAVIOUR IN KAMPUCHEA. AT THE SAME TIME, DEFAY STRESSED THAT FRANCE WAS BY NO MEANS UNCARING ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CAMBODIAN REFUGEES WHO WERE THUS THE MISERABLE PAWNS IN THIS SITUATION AND NOTED THAT FRANCE INTENDED TO GIVE FOOD AND MEDICAL AID TO THEM (O.PA68292). HE ADDED THAT, IN ANY CASE, ANY DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL ASPECT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY ENTAIL DISCUSSION OF HOW BEST TO RELIEVE THE PLIGHT OF THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE.

7. COMMENT: DEFAY SPEAKS RATHER FREELY, AND MAY OCCASIONALLY GO BEYOND THE CONSIDERED FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSESSMENT IN GIVING HIS

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

101

3-0.PA68380

VIEWS. NEVERTHELESS HE REPRESENTED THE FOREGOING AS REFLECTING THE
MINISTRY'S VIEW RATHER THAN HIS OWN. WE SHALL CHECK AT HIGHER LEVEL
AND REPORT FURTHER.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DEP IMM ETH AFF T/T

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
ASIO (C)
JIO
ASIO (M)

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: NA
SA
EUR
IO
CIP

JBAACA
LF
0GBAAAA
LF

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)		
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	
IL	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	FAREP-P	FAREP-S	
DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	IOI		

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
125
100

O.PA67946 CLBA
TOR 0309 23.08.79

O.PA67946 1900 22.8.79 UNC

TO.
RR CANBERRA/7050

RP.
RR PEKING/161 HANOI/145 BANGKOK/193
RR WASHINGTON/1433

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA67800

U N C L A S S I F I E D

KAMPUCHEA : FRENCH VIEWS ON SIHANOUK'S ACTIVITIES

THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON 21 AUGUST
OF WHICH RELEVANT EXTRACTS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

''THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS PLACED NO PARTICULAR CONDITIONS ON
THE ARRIVAL IN FRANCE OF PRINCE SIHANOUK ... OTHER THAN THOSE
APPLIED TO ALL FOREIGNERS IN FRANCE, NOTABLY THE OBLIGATION NOT TO
ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES''. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO CONFIRMED
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONSULTATION WITH THE VIETNAMESE
AUTHORITIES ABOUT SIHANOUK.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

*This applied to Khmeri and
Bakhar?*

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

99

2-0.PA67946

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)	INF	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	
IOL					

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
98

O.PA67901 AEW
TOR D309 22.08.79

O.PA67901 1830 21.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/7013

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/1429 PEKING/160 HANOI/144
RR BANGKOK/192

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA67800

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA/SIHANOUK

GORY (HEAD, SOUTH EAST ASIA BRANCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY) TOLD US ON 21 AUGUST THAT, SINCE OUR CONVERSATION REPORTED IN REFTEL, THE FRENCH HAD CONVEYED A REPLY TO SIHANOUK'S REQUEST FOR A VISA TO VISIT FRANCE. THE REPLY HAD INDICATED THAT SIHANOUK WOULD BE WELCOME TO VISIT FRANCE AT THE END OF THE YEAR, AS ORIGINALLY REQUESTED, OR EARLIER. IT HAD NOTED THAT VISITORS TO FRANCE WERE REQUIRED TO OBSERVE CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOUR. GORY SAID THAT THE TERMS OF THE REPLY HAD NOT BEEN PRECISE ABOUT WHAT SORT OF ACTIVITIES SIHANOUK SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT CONDUCT IN FRANCE BUT HAD CONTAINED A REMINDER ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

2. THE PRESS REPORTS SIHANOUK AS RESPONDING TO THIS BY SAYING "THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS AFRAID TO DISPLEASE THE USSR, CHINA AND VIETNAM. FRANCE IS READY TO ALLOW ME TO VISIT BUT PLACES A CONDITION UPON THIS - THAT I DO NOT UNDERTAKE POLITICAL ACTIVITY. I WOULD NEVER GO TO FRANCE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS BECAUSE FRANCE ALLOWED THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINY TO DO WHAT HE LIKED AND ALSO PERMITS ANY KHMER OTHER THAN SIHANOUK, INCLUDING THE POL POT GROUP, TO CARRY OUT POLITICAL ACTIVITY. I PROTEST AGAINST THIS OSTRACISM OF ME BY FRANCE".

3. COMMENT: (UNDERLINE ONE) REFTEL REPORTED THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH GORY SAID WERE LEADING THE FRENCH TO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING SIHANOUK ENTRY WITHOUT CONDITIONS. THEIR DECISION TO RESTRICT HIS FREEDOM TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY SUGGESTS AN ASSESSMENT THAT SCOPE FOR HIM TO PLAY A REAL ROLE IS LIMITED AS WELL AS A DESIRE TO KEEP THEIR HANDS FREE TO DEAL WITH OTHER FORCES INVOLVED IN THE KAMPUCHEAN AFFAIR.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

97

2-0. PA67901

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)		INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)		PDC
IOL					

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37
96

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O. PA67800 KPMO
TOR 0331 18.08.79

O. PA67800 1905 17.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6932

RP.
RR PEKING/158 WASHINGTON/1425 HANOI/141
RR BANGKOK/189 BRUSSELS/1009

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA - SIHANOUK

SIHANOUK HAS LET IT BE KNOWN THROUGH A TELEGRAM ADDRESSED ON 13 AUGUST TO AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE IN PEKING THAT HE IS, FOR THE TIME BEING, NOT REPEAT NOT COMING TO FRANCE. HE ALSO SAID THAT ANY CONFERENCE WITH OTHER CAMBODIAN EXILES WOULD PROBABLY BE HELD IN PYONG YANG (O. PA67630) (BUT SEE BELOW). HE HAS ALSO EXPRESSED IRRITATION AT THE APPARENT FRENCH HESITATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING HIM INTO FRANCE, ADDING 'I FEEL HUMILIATED, SINCE I AM NOT A VIETNAMESE CITIZEN, WHEN FRANCE FEELS OBLIGED TO INFORM THE COMMUNIST VIETNAMESE ABOUT HER DECISIONS CONCERNING ME'. (SIHANOUK WAS REFERRING TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET'S INTERVIEW WITH THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR ON 5 AUGUST (O. PA67453), DURING WHICH FRANCOIS-PONCET IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE VIETNAMESE THAT A VISA HAD BEEN ISSUED FOR SIHANOUK).

2. ON 14 AUGUST, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT SAYING THAT SIHANOUK WOULD BE WELCOME IN FRANCE AT ANY TIME HE CHOSE TO COME, BUT IT DID NOT REFER TO SIHANOUK'S CRITICISMS MENTIONED ABOVE.

3. WE HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH CAMBODIAN EMIGRE GROUPS IN PAIRS NOTABLY KEO ANN, 'PRIME MINISTER' OF THE 'CAMBODIAN LIBERATION GOVERNMENT' (M. PA2271 REFERS), WHO CONFIRMED THAT SIHANOUK WAS BY NO MEANS ACCEPTED BY ALL THE EMIGRE GROUPS (O. PA67630). KEO ANN ASSERTED THAT IT WAS BECAUSE HE WAS AGAINST SIHANOUK THAT SIHANOUK DECIDED NOT TO COME TO FRANCE THIS MONTH TO CONFER WITH CAMBODIANS HERE. OUR IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT OF THE 30,000 CAMBODIANS NOW LIVING IN FRANCE, FEW REMAIN POLITICALLY-ACTIVE, AND THESE FEW APPEAR TO BE INTENT ON NEUTRALISING EACH OTHER BY INDULGING IN THE KIND OF BITTER FACTIONALISM THAT SEEMS TYPICAL OF EMIGRE POLITICS REGARDLESS OF COUNTRY OF ORIGIN.

4. GORY (HEAD, SOUTH EAST ASIA BRANCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY) SAID TO US ON 17 AUGUST THAT JUST BEFORE HE LEFT PEKING FOR PYONGYANG IN JUNE

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

2-0.PA67800

SIHANOUK ASKED THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PEKING IF HE COULD HAVE A VISA TO VISIT FRANCE AT THE END OF THE YEAR. AFTER CONSIDERING THE REQUEST THE FRENCH HAD ASKED THEIR AMBASSADOR IN PEKING TO TRY TO CONVEY TO SIHANOUK, BY THEN IN PYONGYANG, THE INFORMATION THAT HE WOULD BE GRANTED A VISA. AS FRANCE HAD NO RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA THE FRENCH HAD FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO CONVEY THIS MESSAGE (GORY REMARKED WITH A TOUCH OF IRRITATION THAT IT WAS NOT VERY SENSIBLE OF SIHANOUK, IF HE WANTED TO RETURN TO A POLITICAL ROLE, TO LOCATE HIMSELF AT 'THE END OF THE WORLD', ALTHOUGH HE COULD UNDERSTAND SIHANOUK'S REASONS FOR WANTING TO SEPARATE HIMSELF FROM PEKING).

5. GORY SAID THAT THERE HAD THEN BEEN AN UNFORTUNATE MISHANDLING BY THE FRENCH OF THE MATTER WHEN THE NEWS THAT THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THAT SIHANOUK WOULD BE GIVEN A VISA AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT (PARA 2 ABOVE) WERE MADE PUBLIC AT ALMOST THE SAME TIME. SIHANOUK HAD DRAWN THE (INCORRECT) INFERENCE THAT FRANCE HAD SOUGHT TO CLEAR WITH THE VIETNAMESE THEIR INTENTION TO GIVE SIHANOUK A VISA. SIHANOUK HAD THUS BEEN IRRITATED AND HAD ANNOUNCED THE CANCELLATION OF HIS PLANS TO VISIT FRANCE. (OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SIHANOUK WAS REACTING ON FACT ONLY TO THE REPORT THAT THE FRENCH HAD DISCUSSED HIS POSSIBLE VISIT WITH THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR).

6. GORY SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD RECEIVED REQUESTS THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES (ABOUT WHOSE AUTHENTICITY THEY WERE LESS THAN SURE) FOR AGREEMENT TO THE HOLDING OF A KAMPUCHEAN EXILES' CONFERENCE AND FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. A RESPONSE TO THESE APPROACHES HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE - THE MATTER REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. WOULD THE FRENCH WANT A SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT IN EXILE ON FRENCH SOIL? WOULD THIS NOT PREVENT THE FRENCH FROM HAVING NORMAL CONTACTS WITH OTHER PARTIES IN KAMPUCHEA, AS THEY WOULD BE TAKEN AS BEING SPONSORS OF SIHANOUK'S MOVEMENT? WHILE THERE MIGHT WELL STILL BE A ROLE FOR SIHANOUK, HE WAS NOT THE ONLY ELEMENT IN THE PICTURE, GORY COMMENTED.

7. THESE MATTERS TOOK TIME TO WEIGH UP, GORY SAID, AND, FURTHERMORE, MOST FRENCH MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS WERE ON LEAVE AT PRESENT. GORY SAID RATHER PLAINTIVELY THAT THE FRENCH COULD NOT BE EXPECTED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO MEET THE REQUEST FOR A QUICK DECISION. IT SEEMED, HE ADDED, THAT THE BELGIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO DO SO AS THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE CONFERENCE OF EXILES WAS GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN BELGIUM IN SEPTEMBER. DETAILS OF THIS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN PRINTED IN ONE OF THE KHMER EXILES' JOURNALS BUT GORY DID NOT HAVE ANY CONFIRMATION FROM THE BELGIANS (WE HAVE ALSO HAD SECOND-HAND REPORTS THAT KHMER EXILES IN PARIS HAVE SPOKEN OF A CONFERENCE IN BELGIUM IN SEPTEMBER BUT THIS HAS NOT SO FAR BEEN MENTIONED IN OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH SUCH GROUPS - PARA 3 ABOVE).

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

94

3-0.PA67800

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)		INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)		PDC
IOL					

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
93

O.PA67799 KPMO
TOR 0326 18.08.79

O.PA67799 1900 17.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6931

RP.
RR UN NEW YORK/774 WASHINGTON/1424 BRUSSELS/1008
RR KUALA LUMPUR/90 LONDON/9009 HANOI/140
RR TOKYO/374 BANGKOK/188 PEKING/157
RR BONN/967 OTTAWA/349 SINGAPORE/159
RR JAKARTA/126 MANILA/56

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 225/7/2/3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

KAMPUCHEA AND THE U.N.

GORY (HEAD, SOUTH-EAST ASIA BRANCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY) COMMENTED TO US ON 17 AUGUST THAT WHILE FRANCE DID NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH POL POT, THE FRENCH WOULD PROBABLY GO ON ACCEPTING THE SEATING OF THE POL POT REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U.N. FOR THE PRESENT. FRANCE WOULD LOOK TO THE ASEANS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING ABOUT ANY CHANGE AND WOULD FOLLOW THEIR LEAD.

2. GORY SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT THE ASEANS HAD DECIDED TO SEEK INSCRIPTION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY ITEM ON THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA ON THE UNGA AGENDA. THE FRENCH SAW NO REASON WHY THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL. GORY REMARKED THAT A DISCUSSION OF KAMPUCHEA IN UNGA COULD SERVE AS A PARTIAL SUBSTITUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA, WHICH COULD NOT TAKE PLACE WHILE THE USSR AND VIETNAM REMAINED OPPOSED. GORY HAD A MILD PREFERENCE FOR DISCUSSION OF KAMPUCHEA UNDER SUCH AN ITEM RATHER THAN THE UNITED STATES 'NON-PAPER' PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL ITEM ON SOUTH-EAST ASIA, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA, FAMINE RELIEF AND REFUGEES. WE NOTED OUR PREFERENCE FOR HANDLING REFUGEES SEPARATELY AND GORY SAID THE FRENCH POSITION WAS SIMILAR. GORY EXPECTED TODAY'S MEETING IN NEW YORK TO CLARIFY THE PROSPECTS OF THE VARIOUS CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR UNGA DISCUSSION OF INDO-CHINA QUESTIONS.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

92

2-0. PA67799

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SEA
EUR
DDO

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	FAS(SEP)
PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	SA	FAS(WES)	ANZ
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	
IO	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	
FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M		FAREP-P	FAREP-S	

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
155
91

O.PA6763D PDPD
TOR 0052 11.08.79

O.PA6763D 1602 10.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6779

RP.
RR HANOI/135 VIENTIANE/50 BANGKOK/183
RR WASHINGTON/1417

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIHANOUK AND THE ACTIVITIES OF CAMBODIAN EXILES IN FRANCE

THE "LE MONDE" EDITOR FOR SOUTH-EAST ASIA, PATRICE DE BEER, TOLD US ON 10 AUGUST THAT SIHANOUK WAS NOW EXPECTED TO ARRIVE LATER IN THE YEAR IN FRANCE. THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND CAMBODIAN EXILES IN FRANCE SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST (O.PA67453) HAS NOW BEEN DEFERRED BECAUSE OF DISPUTES AMONG THE DIFFERING GROUPS.

2. ACCORDING TO DE BEER, SIHANOUK HAS INSISTED THAT THE CONFERENCE BE HELD IN A FEW MONTHS TIME IN PYONG YANG, WHILE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CAMBODIAN GROUPS WANT TO HOLD THE CONFERENCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH THEY ARE READY TO GO TO PYONG YANG. DE BEER COMMENTED THAT SIHANOUK'S HOLD ON VARIOUS FACTIONS OF EMIGRE CAMBODIANS SEEMED TO BE WEAKENING AND HE SAID ALSO THAT SEVERAL CAMBODIAN EXILES HAD TOLD HIM (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT SIHANOUK HAD APPARENTLY ORDERED "KHMER BLANC" NOW FORMING PART OF THE RESISTANCE TO HENG SAMRIN IN CAMBODIA TO STOP FIGHTING THE VIETNAMESE THERE. DE BEER THOUGHT THAT SIHANOUK WAS TRYING TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN CAMBODIA IN THE HOPE THEREBY OF ELIMINATING POL POT AND THE KHMER ROUGE.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

90

2-0.PA67630

ACTION: SA
EUR
DDO

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)		INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)		PDC
IOL					

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
LISBON	LONDON	MADRID	MALTA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	
PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	VIENNA	

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
89

O.PA67600 1746 9.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6750

RP.
RR PEKING/154 HANOI/134 LONDON/8987
RR WASHINGTON/1416 BANGKOK/182 VIENTIANE/49

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/4 REF O.PA67453 O.PA67253

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIA : FRENCH VIEWS

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET ALSO RAISED CAMBODIA WHEN HE CALLED IN THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR ON 5 AUGUST (O.PA67453).

2. ON 8 AUGUST, DEFAY, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DESK OFFICER ON INDOCHINA, TOLD US THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT HAD BEEN BRIEF: THE FRENCH HAD, WITHOUT MINCING THEIR WORDS, TOLD THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THAT THE CATALYST FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION IN INDOCHINA WAS THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA AND THAT VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HAD REPLIED ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES ('SPONTANEOUS REBELLION AGAINST POL POT THE TYRANT' ETC), AND THE SUBJECT HAD THEN BEEN DROPPED.

3. SPEAKING OF THE VIETNAMESE APPROACH TO CAMBODIA, DEFAY'S PRESENTATION WAS A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM SCHLUMBERGER'S (O.PA67116) WHO DISMISSED ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE BEING PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. DEFAY SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT AT SOME STAGE IN THE STILL DISTANT FUTURE ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA. HOWEVER, DEFAY ALSO SAID THAT THE FRENCH WERE SURE THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD ONLY AGREE TO A CONFERENCE IF THEY HAD FAILED TO SUBJUGATE THE CONTINUING CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE, AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE BOTH PATIENT AND DETERMINED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO DO SO. THE NEXT DRY SEASON WOULD PROBABLY WITNESS A STRONG VIETNAMESE DRIVE TO WIPE OUT THE CAMBODIAN RESISTANCE, AND IT MIGHT ONLY BE IF THIS FAILED, AND IF THE DRY SEASON AFTER THAT ALSO SAW FAILURE, THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD AGREE TO A CONFERENCE.

SIHANOUK

4. DEFAY SAID THAT THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES DID NOT KNOW WHEN SIHANOUK PLANNED TO VISIT FRANCE FOR TALKS WITH CAMBODIAN EXILES OR HOW LONG HE INTENDED TO STAY. HE WOULD NEED TO BE GRANTED A

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CONFIDENTIAL

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

88

2-0.PA67600

VISA BEFORE ARRIVAL, (WHILE THE PRESS HAS REPORTED FRANCOIS-PONCET AS HAVING TOLD THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR - O.PA67453 - THAT SIHANOUK HAS ALREADY BEEN GRANTED A VISA, DEFAY'S COMMENT SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE). DEFAY SAID THAT IT WAS ALL VERY WELL IF SIHANOUK PLANNED JUST TO TALK TO OTHER CAMBODIANS IN FRANCE, BUT IF HE PLANNED TO SET UP A GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE ('NATIONAL UNION FRONT' - O.PA67116), HE WOULD BE EXERCISING A POLITICAL ACTIVITY THAT WAS NOT NORMALLY PERMITTED FOR REFUGEES LIVING IN FRANCE.

COMMENT

PRESS REPORTS OF SIHANOUK'S IMPENDING ARRIVAL HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT (INDEED, ONE REPORT TODAY INDICATES THAT SIHANOUK WILL ARRIVE BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK). WE ARE INCLINED TO DOUBT DEFAY'S CLAIM THAT FRENCH AUTHORITIES KNEW NOTHING OF SIHANOUK'S PLANS. WE BELIEVE THAT SIHANOUK WOULD BE GIVEN A VISA IF HE APPLIED FOR ONE, AND THAT FRENCH ASSESSMENTS OF HIS CHANCES OF PLAYING ONCE AGAIN A POLITICAL ROLE IN CAMBODIA WILL COLOUR THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY WILL PERMIT HIM TO BE POLITICALLY ACTIVE IN PUBLIC ON FRENCH SOIL.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
MIN+DEP IMM ETH AFF
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
J10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

87

3-0.PA67600

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)	INF	
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)	FAREP-M	
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)	PDC	
IOL					

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
LISBON	MADRID	MALTA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	PORT MORESBY	
RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	VIENNA		

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
25/1/4/39
86

O. PA67453 MKCR
TOR 0446 07.08.79

O. PA67453 2030 6.8.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/6630

RP.
RR HANOI/132 SINGAPORE/153 MANILA/50
RR VIENTIANE/48 WASHINGTON/1412 JAKARTA/120
RR UN NEW YORK/763 PEKING/152 BANGKOK/179
RR KUALA LUMPUR/84

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/2/3 225/7/4

R E S T R I C T E D

FRANCE/INDOCHINA

ON 5 AUGUST, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET CALLED IN THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR. A COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THIS MEETING INDICATED THAT FRANCOIS-PONCET STRESSED THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD APPLY THE MEASURES ON REFUGEES AGREED TO IN GENEVA, WHILE RESPECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS, AND, SPEAKING OF THE MORATORIUM, FRANCOIS-PONCET EMPHASISED THAT NO VIETNAMESE SHOULD BE FORCED TO LEAVE (IF THEY DID NOT WANT TO), NOR TO STAY, (SHOULD THEY WANT TO LEAVE).

2. FRANCOIS-PONCET IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD TO THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THAT THE FRENCH VIEW OF THE MORATORIUM IS THAT IT WAS A PURELY PRACTICAL MEASURE DESIGNED TO PERMIT A "BREATHING SPACE" FOR THE COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM.

3. CAMBODIAN REFUGEES AND THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA WERE REPUTEDLY ALSO DISCUSSED. FRANCOIS-PONCET INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT SIHANOUK HAD BEEN GRANTED A FRENCH VISA (APPARENTLY FOR REASONABLY LONG-TERM RESIDENCE).

4. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WILL BE SEEING THE ASEAN AMBASSADORS LATER THIS WEEK.

5. WE HAVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH MFA ON 8 AUGUST AND WILL REPORT FURTHER. IT APPEARS THAT A FRENCH OBJECTIVE MAY HAVE BEEN TO DISPELL ANY IMPRESSION EITHER INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC THAT FRANCE WAS BEING TOO COMPLAISANT TOWARDS VIETNAM OVER THE REFUGEE ISSUE.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3-0. PA67453

ACTION: SA
EUR

JBAC
JBAL

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	PPU	MCO	LA
FAS(SEP)	SEA	PSP	FAS(NSA)	NA	
FAS(WES)	ANZ	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	
FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	CIP	FAS(PCR)		INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	GLT	FAS(MFS)		FAREP-M
FAREP-P	FAREP-S	DIR-ADAB	FAS(PTO)		PDC
IOL					

ANKARA	ATHENS	BERNE	BONN	BRUSSELS	COPENHAGEN	DUBLIN	GENEVA
LISBON	LONDON	MADRID	MALTA	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NICOSIA	
PORT MORESBY	RANGOON	ROME	STOCKHOLM	THE HAGUE	TOKYO	VIENNA	

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/19 155
25/1/4/37
25/1/4/39 84
O.PA52250 MB1/NAS
TOR 1144 21.2.79

0.PA52250 2100 20.2.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/2407

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/1255 LONDON/3042 MOSCOW/294
RR HANOI/104 PEKING/121 NEW YORK UN/711
RR COPENHAGEN/225 BRUSSELS/853 BONN/841

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHINA - VIETNAM - CAMBODIA : FRENCH VIEWS

ON 20 FEBRUARY WE SAW GORY (HEAD, SOUTH EAST ASIA BRANCH, FOREIGN MINISTRY) TO SEEK LATEST FRENCH VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS.

2. WE BEGAN BY RE-STATING AUSTRALIA'S CONCERN AT THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR REASONS. WE GAVE GORY THE TEXT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT. (HAVING PREVIOUSLY SENT IT TO HIS DIVISION HEAD). GORY REMARKED UPON THE MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET BUT DID NOT KNOW WHAT STAGE THE PREPARATION OF THE REPLY, WHICH IS BEING HANDLED BY THE BILATERAL BRANCH, HAD REACHED. GORY MENTIONED THE BRIEFING GIVEN IN CANBERRA ON 19 FEBRUARY TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND OTHERS (O.CH801148) AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF IT.

3. GORY ANALYSED THE SITUATION ON TWO LEVELS:

- THE CHINESE INVASION OF VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE USSR REACTION
- THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION.

4. TAKING THE BROADER ISSUE, GORY SAID THAT THE LATEST INFORMATION HE HAD WAS A PRESS AGENCY ITEM HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORTING THAT A CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD TOLD "A EUROPEAN OFFICIAL VISITOR" THAT CHINESE WITHDRAWAL HAD NOW BEEN COMPLETED. THE FRENCH HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS (WHILE WE WERE THERE, GORY RANG THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TO CHECK THIS REPORT BUT THEY HAD NOTHING AT THIS STAGE TO CONFIRM THAT THE CHINESE WERE WITHDRAWING). (TO-NIGHT'S "LE MONDE" DATED 21 FEBRUARY CARRIES WHAT MUST BE THE ITEM TO WHICH GORY REFERRED. IT REPORTS AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY MO YING TO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN PEKING THAT THE CHINESE WERE WITHDRAWING. OBVIOUSLY THE FRENCH HAD HAD NO REPORT OF THIS FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN PEKING BY THIS AFTERNOON).

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CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

83

2-0.PA52250

5. GORY SAID THERE WAS NOW SOME SPECULATION THAT IF THE CHINESE DID WITHDRAW, THE VIETNAMESE MIGHT PURSUE THEM INTO CHINESE TERRITORY TO GIVE A RETURN LESSON. THIS VIEW APPEARED TO BE BASED ON THE VIETNAMESE CLAIM THAT, IN THE END, IT WOULD BE THEY WHO WOULD DELIVER THE CHINESE A LESSON. WE SAID THAT THIS SEEMED MORE LIKELY TO MEAN ONLY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD CLAIM TO HAVE EXPELLED THE CHINESE FROM VIETNAMESE TERRITORY BUT GORY SAID HE WOULD NOT DISCOUNT, AT THE EXTREME, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VIETNAMESE MAKING A RETALIATORY MOVE INTO CHINESE TERRITORY.

6. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET REACTION, GORY GAVE ALMOST THE SAME ASSESSMENT AS HAD DE DAMPIERRE (HEAD, USSR SECTION - O.PA52248) - THIS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW LONG THE CHINESE STAYED IN VIETNAM. AT THE MOMENT THE FRENCH HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE ABOUT TO MAKE A MOVE BUT GORY NOTED THE SOVIET OFFICIAL STATEMENT WARNING THE CHINESE TO WITHDRAW BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD DECIDE TO TAKE SOME STEP IF THE CHINESE STAYED IN VIETNAM FOR LONG. THE DANGER OF A WIDER CONFRONTATION, HE CONCLUDED, COULD DEPEND ON WHETHER OR NOT THE CHINESE WERE IN FACT NOW WITHDRAWING.

7. WE ASKED WHETHER FRANCOIS-PONCET HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBLE CHINESE MOVEMENT INTO VIETNAM DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW LAST WEEK. GORY, READING FROM A TELEGRAM SUMMARISING THE CONVERSATIONS, SAID THIS HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED. (SEE ALSO O.PA52248). HE QUOTED THE PASSAGES DEALING WITH CHINA WHICH REPORTED THE RUSSIANS AS UNDERLINING THE DANGER TO DETENTE POSED BY CHINESE POLICIES AND URGING THE FRENCH NOT TO SUPPLY CHINA WITH TECHNOLOGY OR ARMS.

8. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, GORY SAID THAT EVEN IF THE CHINESE DID WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, WE WOULD BE LEFT WITH A TENSE AND VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHICH HE UNDERLINED. FROM INFORMATION OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN GORY UNDERSTOOD THAT 40,000 TO 50,000 POL POT MILITIA WERE CARRYING OUT AN ORGANISED AND EFFECTIVE GUERILLA CAMPAIGN (HOWEVER, HE HAD HEARD NOTHING NEW DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS). IN THE PARTS OF CAMBODIA WHICH HAD BEEN OVERRUN BY THE VIETNAMESE, GORY SAID, THE CONTROL OF THE NEW REGIME WAS ONLY BEING MAINTAINED BY VIRTUE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.

9. WE NOTED THAT IN THE PAST FRENCH POLICY HAD BEEN THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF CAMBODIA WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AND ASKED WHETHER THIS REMAINED THE FRENCH POSITION. GORY SAID THAT THIS WAS STILL FIRM FRENCH POLICY. THE FRENCH DESIRE TO SEE VIETNAMESE FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM CAMBODIA REFLECTED THIS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

82

3-0.PA52250

CONFIDENTIAL

10. WE ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH HAD MADE ANY REPRESENTATIONS TO THE RUSSIANS, CHINESE OR VIETNAMESE DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS AND GORY REPLIED THAT NO SPECIFIC DEMARCHES HAD BEEN MADE ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME ROUTINE CONTACTS. WE COMMENTED THAT THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS HAD BEEN RESTRAINED, GIVEN THAT THE SITUATION WAS A THREATENING ONE, WITH THE DANGER NOT RESTRICTED TO THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN REGION. GORY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND HIS EXPLANATION WAS THAT THERE WAS FAULT ON ALL SIDES WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO BE CRITICAL OF ANY INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT - THE CHINESE MOVE WAS DANGEROUS, BUT THE VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN CAUSING TROUBLE FOR SOME TIME: THEN AGAIN, THE POL POT REGIME HAD BEEN UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNED FOR ITS POLICIES. (GORY NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION HAD, BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE POL POT REGIME, NOT BEEN PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF THE VIETNAMESE INVASION OF CAMBODIA).

11. (COMMENT - IN ADDITION TO GORY'S EXPLANATION ABOVE, MANY OF THE FACTORS LISTED IN O.LH25353 PARA 10 ARE, TO OUR MIND, CERTAIN TO HAVE BEEN RELEVANT TO THE FRENCH POSITION. THE FRENCH HAVE HIGH HOPES FOR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND SOME NEGOTIATIONS ARE AT AN IMPORTANT STAGE: THEY HAVE A RANGE OF ISSUES TO HANDLE WITH THE USSR AND DO NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE GISCARD'S FORTHCOMING VISIT THERE WHICH WILL PROVIDE AS GOOD AN OPPORTUNITY AS ANY FOR THE FRENCH TO SHORE UP THEIR FACADE OF MAINTAINING BALANCED RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST. FINALLY, DESPITE THEIR CONTINUED DISENCHANTMENT WITH VIETNAM, THE FRENCH STILL HAVE SOME IMPORTANT INTERESTS THERE - E.G. OIL SEARCH - AND SOME HOPES OF RETAINING SOMETHING OF A SPECIAL POSITION).

12. GORY TOLD US, HOWEVER, THAT A DRAFT FRENCH STATEMENT ON THE INDO-CHINA SITUATION HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR CONSIDERATION AT THE CABINET MEETING ON 21 FEBRUARY. THE DRAFT APPEARS TO BE STRONGER THAN THE NINE'S STATEMENT PUBLISHED ON 19 FEBRUARY. NOTABLY, THE DRAFT CALLS FOR WITHDRAWALS BY BOTH CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE. IT ALSO UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE THE FRENCH ATTACH TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND INDEPENDENCE OF CAMBODIA.

13. GORY WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE ASEAN REACTION. WE HAVE O.SI27598 BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE MATERIAL.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

81

4-0.PA52250

ACTION: MR PARKINSON

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN DEFENCE
MR YEEND
SIR ARTHUR TANGE
GEN SIR ARTHUR MCDONALD
MR FURLONGER
MR MCMICHAEL
PERMANENT HEADS SUB-COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: MR PARKINSON

MR PARSONS	MR HENDERSON	MR BROWN (EX)	MR M J WILSON (FAS(NSA))
MR ASHWIN (FAS(WES))	MR LYON (FAS(SEP))	MR PERCIVAL (NA)	
MR COOPER (FAS(DEF))	MR POCKOCK (FAS(ECO))	MR A D CAMPBELL (FAS(IOC))	

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

80

O.PA51228 SMW11/BAN
TOR 0840 12.1.79

O.PA51228 1830 11.1.79 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/1565

RP.
RR NEW YORK UN/699 WASHINGTON/1225 MOSCOW/279
RR HANOI/096 PEKING/108

M. Potter
Mr. G

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11 REF O.PA51151

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE: VIEWS ON CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

WE SPOKE ON 10 JANUARY WITH DEFAY, MFA DESK OFFICER FOR INDOCHINA. AT THE TIME WE HAD NOT RECEIVED YOUR O.CH783820, BUT WE PASSED TO HIM THE OUTLINE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT AS REPORTED IN RADIO AUSTRALIA NEWS (O.CH782606).

2. DEFAY WAS ON THE WHOLE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE REGION, INCLUDING ASEAN REGION, SAYING, FIRSTLY, THAT HOPES TO KEEP SUPER-POWER INFLUENCE IN THE AREA TO A MINIMUM NOW SEEMED ILLUSORY, AND, SECONDLY, THAT COUNTRIES WOULD NEED TO RETHINK THEIR VIEW THAT VIETNAM COULD BE COAXED INTO BEHAVING AS A RESPONSIBLE AND CO-OPERATIVE WORLD CITIZEN (A VIEW SUPPORTED BY THE VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC "CHARM OFFENSIVE" LAST YEAR). DEFAY POINTED TO JAPAN, WHICH HAD QUITE HEAVILY INVESTED, AND NOT ONLY IN THE COMMERCIAL SENSE OF THE TERM, IN VIETNAM AND WHICH HAD NOW ABRUPTLY CUT OFF ITS AID TO VIETNAM. HE THOUGHT SUCH CHANGES OF POLICY WOULD BE SEEN ALSO IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. THE FRENCH THOUGHT THAT SINO/AMERICAN NORMALISATION WAS A MUCH LESS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PRECIPITATING VIETNAMESE ADVANCE INTO CAMBODIA THAN THE SOVIET/VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP PACT. FOR CORROBORATION HE MENTIONED THAT TWO MONTHS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE SOVIET/INDIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY, THE INDIANS HAD BEEN AT WAR WITH CHINA, AND THIS PATTERN SEEMED NOW TO BE REPEATED IN INDOCHINA. HE PUT THE THEORY THAT SOVIETS MIGHT NOT, AFTER ALL, HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY CONVINCED ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A HASTY VIETNAMESE TAKEOVER IN CAMBODIA. HIS ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE VIETNAMESE, AS A QUID QUO FOR AGREEING TO ENTER COMECON, HAD PERSUADED THE USSR TO SUPPORT VIETNAMESE ESCALATION OF EXISTING FIGHTING WITH CAMBODIA, AND SAID THAT THE COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED AFTER THE SOVIET/VIETNAMESE TREATY'S SIGNATURE HAD INDICATED THAT DISCUSSIONS WERE "FRANK", A SURE SIGN OF SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT. IN HIS VIEW, THIS DISAGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE BEEN OVER CAMBODIA. (COMMENT: IT SEEMS TO US THAT WHILE USSR MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO REVENGE RECENT CHINESE DIPLOMATIC SUCCESSES BY INFLICTING A LOSS

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

79

2 - O.PA51228

IN CAMBODIA, IT WOULD ACCORD WITH THE AGE AND USUAL REPUTATION FOR CAUTION OF THE SOVIET REGIME TO BE UNEASY ABOUT VIETNAMESE OVER-HASTINESS.)

4. ON FUTURE VIETNAMESE/RUSSIAN RELATIONS, DEFAY WONDERED ALOUD ABOUT VIETNAMESE CHANCES OF OPERATING AS "AN AUTONOMOUS PAWN". THE VIETNAMESE HAD A LONG HISTORY OF TENACIOUS INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS A MUCH LARGER COUNTRY. IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE THAT A SMALL "CLIENT" COUNTRY (E.G. EGYPT) HAS SENT THE RUSSIANS PACKING: BUT TO DO THIS SUCCESSFULLY, IT NEEDS TO CULTIVATE SUCCESSFULLY ANOTHER LARGE POWER. IN VIETNAM'S CASE, CHINA WAS SIMPLY TOO CLOSE AND TOO MUCH AN HISTORICAL ENEMY, AND THE USA WAS VERY UNLIKELY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO WANT TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH VIETNAM AGAIN. THEREFORE, UNLESS VIETNAM COULD FIND POWERFUL SUPPORT IN JAPAN OR ASEAN (HARDLY LIKELY AFTER ITS TACTLESS BEHAVIOUR IN BOTH CAMBODIA AND LAOS), VIETNAM SEEMED STUCK WITH THE USSR AS ITS ONLY POWERFUL ALLY.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS (UNDERLINED)

5. DEFAY SHOWED US THE TEXT OF A COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED AFTER AN ASEAN MEETING IN JAKARTA, ON 8 JANUARY, COMMENTING ON THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES THAT FACED THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT THE ANODYNE NATURE OF THE COMMUNIQUE WAS NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS FROM A MEETING PREPARATORY TO A MEETING OF ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTRIES TO BE HELD IN BANGKOK ON 12/13 JANUARY, BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT REFLECTED THE EXTREME CARE WITH WHICH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES HAD TO FACE INDOCHINA AND THE DIFFERENT ATTITUDES WHICH EACH BROUGHT TO THE ISSUE. THE MOST SERIOUS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS OF COURSE THAILAND WHICH NOW, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, HAS A BORDER WITH VIETNAM OF 1000-ODD KILOMETRES, WHICH AN ALREADY SHAKY REGIME WITH INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES MIGHT FIND VERY HARD TO HANDLE. IN DISCUSSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF EVENTS IN INDOCHINA FOR ASEAN COUNTRIES, DEFAY RUEFULLY WONDERED WHETHER THE OLD UNFASHIONABLE DOMINO THEORY MIGHT NOT MAKE A COME-BACK. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHO MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP THE ASEAN COUNTRIES IF VIETNAMESE CONTINUED TO BE UNINHIBITED ABOUT THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS. JAPAN WAS A POSSIBILITY, BUT IT HAD MUCH DISTRUST IN THE REGION TO OVERCOME FIRST.

UN SECURITY COUNCIL (UNDERLINED)

6. ON THE APPEARANCE OF SIHANOUK AT THE UN, DEFAY WONDERED WHETHER THE USSR WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IN BLOCKING THE PROPOSED SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, I.E. THAT SIHANOUK REPRESENTS NEITHER THE KHMER ROUGE NOR THE KNUFNS, SINCE HE IS SPEAKING ONLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS A CAMBODIAN "PERSONALITY", AND

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

78

3 - 0. PA51228

THAT A FAIR DEBATE WOULD IN ANY CASE REQUIRE REPRESENTATION FROM BOTH SIDES.

CAMBODIA'S FUTURE (UNDERLINED)

7. FRENCH SAID THAT THE SITUATION OF CAMBODIA ITSELF REMAINED DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. IT WAS HARD TO JUDGE THE DEGREE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE KNUFNS OR WHETHER THE KHMER ROUGE WOULD NOW CONDUCT A GUERRILLA WAR TO REGAIN POWER. QUITE APART FROM POL POT'S DEPLORABLE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, HIS WAS AFTER ALL THE LEGITIMATE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT. BECAUSE OF THIS, AND BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS EVOLVING QUICKLY, FRANCE WAS NOT IN A HURRY TO THINK ABOUT RECOGNISING THE NEW CAMBODIAN REGIME.

8. "LE MONDE" CORRESPONDENT FOR THE REGION, PATRICE DE BEER, (LONG RESIDENT IN BANGKOK) EXPRESSED TO US ON 11 JANUARY THE SAME PESSIMISM WE NOTED IN MFA, ALTHOUGH HE WAS PERHAPS LESS INCLINED TO STRESS RUSSIAN ROLE IN DESTABILISING THE REGION. HE WAS GLOOMY ABOUT CAMBODIA'S FUTURE SAYING THAT, WHILE KHMER ROUGE MIGHT HAVE BEEN NUMERICALLY FEW, THE KNUFNS WERE EVEN FEWER, AND WOULD BE UNABLE TO GOVERN WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL VIETNAMESE SUPPORT, AND THIS WOULD ENTAIL A SIMILARLY BRUTAL STYLE OF GOVERNMENT. HE SPOKE IN TERMS OF GOING FROM ONE GENOCIDE TO ANOTHER. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE VIETNAMESE SEEM TO HAVE ACQUIRED AN INSOLUBLE PROBLEM, SINCE THEIR OWN ECONOMY WAS CLEARLY CRUSHED BY THE WAR EFFORT, BUT THE WAR EFFORT WAS POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO HOLD TOGETHER A NATION RESTIVE WITH ECONOMIC MISERY, AND SO THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TURNS. THE ADDITION TO ITS FIEF OF A CAMBODIA THAT WAS STARVING, COMPLETELY DISORGANISED AND, PROBABLY IN THE FUTURE, RESENTFUL OF VIETNAMESE PRESENCE, WAS LIKELY TO AGGRAVATE VIETNAM'S EXISTING PROBLEMS.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN AND DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37 ISS

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

77

O.PA51151 SMW8/DA
TOR 0426 10.1.79

O.PA51151 1320 9.1.79 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1511

RP.
RR HANOI/094 WASHINGTON/1219 MOSCOW/277
RR NEW YORK UN/694

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FRANCE : CAMBODIA

ON 8 JANUARY, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER FRANCOIS-PONCET MADE A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ON CAMBODIA. HE NOTED THAT FRANCE HAD, SINCE 2 JANUARY 1978, PUBLICLY WARNED AGAINST THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM RENEWED FIGHTING IN THIS HIGHLY SENSITIVE REGION. FRANCE REGRETTED THAT TWO NATIONS WITH TRADITIONAL TIES OF FRIENDSHIP COULD NOT RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES PEACEFULLY. FRANCE RECOMMENDED A POLICY BASED ON THE CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CAMBODIA, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT CONTINUED TO DEPLORE THE FAILINGS OF THE CAMBODIAN REGIME IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

2. FRANCOIS-PONCET SAID THAT FRANCE WOULD ARGUE THIS POSITION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AND WOULD SUPPORT ANY EFFORTS TO REACH A SOLUTION BASED ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER, AND IN THE INTEREST OF AN OVERALL BALANCE IN ASIA. SUCH A SOLUTION IMPLIED THE EXISTENCE OF A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC CAMBODIA.

3. WE HAVE APPOINTMENT WITH MFA TO DISCUSS INDOCHINA ISSUES. IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC POINTS YOU WOULD LIKE US TO PUT, GLAD ADVICE BEFORE 1700 PARIS TIME, 10 JANUARY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN AND DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

76

2 - 0.PA51151

ACTION: SA
EUR
IO

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	LA	FAS(SEP)	SEA	PNG	FAS(NSA)
NA	FAS(WES)	ASP	EUR	AME	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)
FAS(IOC)	FAS(PCR)	INF	FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)	IL	FAS(MFS)		
FAREP(S-M)								

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37¹⁵⁵
75

O.PA51200 TKV2/CRO
TOR 0637 11.1.79

O.PA51200 1905 10.1.79 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1545

RP.
PP NEW YORK UN/698 WASHINGTON/1223

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11

Ma B. B. B.

U N C L A S S I F I E D

CAMBODIA

THIS EVENING'S PRESS PUBLISHES A BRIEF STATEMENT MADE BY THE ELYSEE SPOKESMAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FRENCH CABINET HAD TODAY CONSIDERED THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND THAT "FRANCE IS VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THE SUFFERINGS WHICH THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ENDURING FOR SEVERAL YEARS AND CONSIDERS THAT IT IS HIGH TIME THAT A GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REGIME SHOULD QUICKLY ESTABLISH ITSELF".

2. THE SOCIALIST PARTY CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES AND FOR RESPECT FOR CAMBODIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY FULLY SUPPORTS THE SUCCESS OF THE "CAMBODIAN PATRIOTS" AGAINST "A REGIME WHICH OFFERED A HATEFUL AND BLOODSTAINED CARICATURE OF SOCIALISM".

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP PM AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

25/1/8/37 155
74

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA51200 TKV2/CRO
TOR 0637 11.1.79

O.PA51200 1905 10.1.79 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1545

RP.
PP NEW YORK UN/698 WASHINGTON/1223

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11

U N C L A S S I F I E D

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP PM AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

73

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - 0.PA51200

ACTION: EUR
SA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	FAS(SEP)	FAS(NSA)	FAS(WES)	ASP
FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(NUC)	FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	INF
FAS(ECO)	FAS(LT)		FAS(MFS)	FAREP(S-M)			
ADAB(DIR)							

25/1/4/37155
72

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA51151 SMW8/DA
TOR 0426 10.1.79

O.PA51151 1320 9.1.79 UNC

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1511

RP.
RR HANOI/094 WASHINGTON/1219 MOSCOW/277
RR NEW YORK UN/694

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11

U N C L A S S I F I E D

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ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN AND DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

25/1/4/37 155

71

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

M. Potts

O.PA51169 SJD3/KM
TOR 0833 10.01.79

O.PA51169 1840 9.1.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1523

RP.
PP HANOI/095 WASHINGTON/1220 MOSCOW/278
PP NEW YORK UN/695

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11 REF O.PA51151

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE : CAMBODIA

NOIVILLE, WITH WHOM I SPOKE LAST NIGHT AT DINNER FOR SIR ARTHUR TANGE, SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE TRYING TO PERSUADE THE FRENCH AGAINST AGREEING TO A DEBATE ON CAMBODIA IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NO DOUBT THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY KNEW THAT THEY WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO SEVERE CRITICISM., INDEED THEY WOULD BE ALMOST AS MUCH TARGETS AS THE VIETNAMESE. BUT, ALTHOUGH A DEBATE WOULD NOT SERVE MUCH PURPOSE (AND SIAHANOUK'S FLIGHT TO NEW YORK VIA PEKING WAS VERY MUCH A LAST DESPERATE THROW BY THE POL POT REGIME) THE FRENCH WOULD NOT RESIST IT., INDEED HE COULD NOT RECALL INSTANCES IN WHICH REQUESTS FOR A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE HAD BEEN REJECTED. NO DOUBT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD ASK FOR THE FUNSK TO TAKE PART.

2. HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CAMBODIAN EVENTS ON THAILAND., THE THAI GOVERNMENT WAS WEAK AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THIS SORT COULD QUITE EASILY PROVOKE A COUP - THOUGH HE SAID HE HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH A THING WAS IN ANYONE'S MIND. TRECA AND GENERAL MERY (CHIEF OF STAFF FRENCH ARMED FORCES), WHO WERE PRESENT, TOOK THE LINE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PROBABLY ENCOURAGED THE VIETNAMESE IN THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST CAMBODIA. THE SAME LINE IS REFLECTED IN PRESS COMMENT HERE, WHICH NOTES THE PROMPT AND UNEQUIVOCAL WELCOME GIVEN IN MOSCOW TO THE FALL OF PNOM PENH. LE MONDE TONIGHT ASKS WHETHER THE RUSSIANS MAY NOT HAVE "INCITED THE VIETNAMESE TO PASS TO ACTION" AND SAYS THAT CAMBODIAN EVENTS ARE A CLEAR CHALLENGE BY MOSCOW TO PEKING AND ALSO, THOUGH OF A MORE VEILED KIND, TO WASHINGTON. IT ATTRIBUTES THESE EVENTS IN PART TO THE SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND CRITICISES AS "EXTREMELY DANGEROUS" THE REPORTED ATTITUDE OF BREZINSKI AT GUADELOUPE AS REJOICING AT THE CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE CLASH AND OPENLY PLAYING CHINA AGAINST THE USSR."

3. IN DISCUSSION, NOIVILLE AGREED THAT THE LATEST EVENTS WERE A BAD SIGN IN TERMS OF HOPES THAT VIETNAM WOULD ACT AS A SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRY BEHAVING RESPECTABLY TOWARDS ITS NEIGHBOURS, AND THAT

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

70

2 - O.PA51169

SOUTH EAST ASIA MIGHT BECOME A ZONE RELATIVELY FREE OF GREAT POWER INTERFERENCE. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY UNDERLINED THE WAY IN WHICH INDOCHINA HAD BECOME A PRINCIPAL THEATRE OF SINO/SOVIET RIVALRY. HE THOUGHT HOWEVER THAT VIETNAMESE AMBITIONS WERE LIMITED, AND THAT THEY WOULD NOW DO THEIR BEST TO REASSURE THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. THE CHINESE WOULD NO DOUBT ALSO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO WOO THE LATTER.

4. IN A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TODAY FOR SIR ARTHUR TANGE, THE FRENCH SEEMED TO THINK THAT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DIRECT CHINESE INVOLVEMENT ON THE SIDE OF THE CAMBODIANS., BUT THE COMMENT WAS MADE THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF A GOVERNMENT TO WHICH THEY HAD SO CLEARLY COMMITTED THEIR SUPPORT WOULD MEAN A CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF FACE FOR THEM, SO THAT IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF THEY LOOKED FOR SOME KIND OF COUNTER ACTION.
... ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN AND DEP DEFENCE
DEP PM AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: EUR
SA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) NA FAS(WES) ASP
FAS(DEF) DP DC FAS(IOC) IO FAS(PCR) INF FAS(MFS) FAREP(S-M)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37 150
69

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA51169 SJD3/KM
TOR 0833 10.01.79

O.PA51169 1840 9.1.79 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/1523

RP.
PP HANOI/095 WASHINGTON/1220 MOSCOW/278
PP NEW YORK UN/695

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 211/1/11 REF O.PA51151

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE : CAMBODIA

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.../2

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - 0.PA51169

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... ROWLAND

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN AND DEP DEFENCE
DEP PM AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: EUR
SA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) NA FAS(WES) ASP
FAS(DEF) DP DC FAS(IOC) IO FAS(PCR) INF FAS(MFS) FAREP(S-M)

25/1/4/37

67

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.VT3820 RB2/DA
TOR 1832 26.6.78

Q.VT3820 1510 26.6.78 CLA

TO.
PP CANBERRA/3823

R P
R R PARIS/09

M. VIENTIANE / FILE 221/5/4

R E S T R I C T E D

EXPULSION OF FRENCH DIPLOMATS

THE HEAD OF MFA DIVISION II, SOMBAT CHOUNRAMANY, CALLED IN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (DUZER) ON 23 JUNE TO INFORM HIM THAT THE FRENCH COUNSELLOR (LAMBERT) AND THE CULTURAL COUNSELLOR (GUSTIN) WERE PERSONAE NON GRATAE (UNDERLINE THREE) AND THAT THEY WERE TO LEAVE WITHIN 24 HOURS. REASONS FOR THE DECISION WERE NOT DIVULGED BY THE LAO MED IA BUT DUZER SUMMED IT UP AS "OPERATING A SPY NETWORK AND HELPING REFUGEES TO FLEE".

2. LAMBERT WAS ALREADY IN FRANCE ON CONSULTATIONS AND GUSTIN LEFT TOD AY (26/6) BY AIR VIETNAM.

3. DETAILS BY BAG.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP P M AND CABINET
ONA
JIO

ACTION: SA
EUR

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) FAS(WES) FAS(DEF) DP DC FAS(IOC) IO FAS(PCR) INF FAS(LT) FAS(MFS)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL 66

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
Kuala Lumpur

JAN 13 10 55 AM '78

In reply quote 840/151/1

Memorandum No: P.25
DEF12

INWARDS

10 January 1978

THIS COPY TO

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA.

The Director,
Joint Intelligence Organisation,
Department of Defence,
CANBERRA.

25/1/4/37 3006/2/1
3016/1/1/13
3016/1/1/16
3020/1/1/16

VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA BORDER OPERATIONS

Reference: Our O.KL17354 of 9 Jan 78

1. The French Defence Attache in Kuala Lumpur, Colonel Robert Fourest (please protect), spent many years in Indo China including five years from about 1968 to 1973 as Defence Attache in Cambodia. He spoke to the Defence Adviser last night about the current Vietnam-Kampuchea border fighting.
2. Colonel Fourest said that, in his opinion (and this was not necessarily official French government opinion) the SRV was attacking Cambodia at this time for several reasons, as follows:
 - a. To prevent further Cambodian attacks on SRV territory. Attacks over the last year had been serious, 105 mm artillery and rockets had been used, Cambodian troops had savagely killed many women and children.
 - b. To take possession of Cambodian territory east of the Mekong because:
 - (1) Vietnam was still short of rice, harvests had not been good partly due to slowness of reconstruction, and the Cambodian area east of the Mekong was good rice-growing country; and,

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(2) The SRV Government had come to the conclusion that the present Cambodian leaders were mad, ie, insane. It was necessary for the security of all in the area that the Cambodian leaders should be displaced and preferably destroyed. It was thought that they had already killed up to two or even three million of their own people.

c. Many of the people living in eastern Cambodia were now friendly to the Vietnamese. Many had sought refuge in Vietnam from the excesses of the present Cambodian government, had been (comparatively) well-treated by the Vietnamese, and some had been returned to Cambodia by the Vietnamese with the ~~intention~~ that they should form cadres of pro-Vietnamese sentiment.

d. The weather and terrain at present were dry and very suitable for operations including the movement of large bodies of troops, armoured cars, artillery, etc.

3. Colonel Fourest thought that reports of Cambodian successes were incorrect. Although the Cambodians might have a few local successes the SRV forces were much stronger, better motivated, better equipped and had better leaders. Furthermore the peasantry in eastern Cambodia had been so badly treated by their own government that they would seek relief from the presence of SRV troops.

4. The SRV was determined eventually to bring all of the old French Indo-China under its control. The SRV was also very interested in gaining control over offshore petroleum deposits in the Gulf of Thailand.

5. Although some people saw, or said they saw, PRC-USSR manipulation of the events in Indo China, Colonel Fourest thought that it was a local affair, ie, that the SRV invaded Cambodia for its own reasons, and that the PRC was very cautious about the Cambodian government because the PRC government did not want to be associated with a government of madmen who would do nothing to enhance communism's reputation and who moreover had committed great crimes against their people. The Cambodians were seeking support by saying that the USSR was helping the SRV. The Chinese were keeping their own counsel on the business.

6. There were two possibilities about the Thai reaction. One was that the Thais would welcome the destruction of the Cambodian government and perhaps would take the opportunity of taking over control of Cambodia west of the Mekong, or at least of gaining some sort of suzerainty over the area. The Thais would, in this, hope to come to an accommodation with the SRV.

7. The other possibility is that the Thais would react with alarm over the approach of the SRV and, although welcoming the demise of the present Cambodian government, would see an SRV dominated Cambodia as a potentially even greater threat. In this event, Thailand would still need to seek an accommodation with the SRV but would take what steps she could to prevent any further SRV expansion.

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Colonel Fourest concluded by saying that these were his own views and not all of his views were accepted in Paris. He remarked that many of the people in Paris had never been to Indo China or the East, and often had "no idea" of what was going on.

John MacNeil

(S.R. MACNEIL)
Group Captain
Defence Adviser

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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O. PA39971 LW3/NIV
TOR 0558 7.1.78

O. PA39971 1857 6.1.78 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/3237

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/906 HANOI/071 PEKING/062
RR MOSCOW/195 BANGKOK/097 LONDON/5753

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/7/2

R E S T R I C T E D

KAMPUCHEA - VIETNAM

LE FIGARO OF 6 JANUARY CARRIED COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO A FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN ABOUT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, HOWEVER, HAVE TOLD US THAT THE ONLY FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON THE FIGHTING WAS THAT OF 2 JANUARY REPORTED IN O. PA39800 AND THE FIGARO STORY WAS NOT BASED ON A MINISTRY STATEMENT. IT PROBABLY REFLECTS MINISTRY BACKGROUND.

2. THE FIGARO STORY SAID "IN PARIS A FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN NOTED THAT THE CURRENT FIGHTING WAS THE RESULT OF A LONG-STANDING AND DEEP DIFFERENCE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE INDOCHINESE PENINSULAR WHICH THE VIETNAMESE HAVE THE INTENTION OF ORGANISING, IF NOT TO SAY ESTABLISHING HEGEMONY THERE. ACCORDING TO THE SPOKESMAN HANOI HAS NEVER FORMALLY RECOGNISED THE BORDERS INHERITED FROM COLONIALISM." THE STORY GOES ON TO COMMENT THAT IN "CERTAIN WESTERN DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES" IT IS JUDGED THAT THE VIETNAMESE HOPE TO BRING TO BEAR ON THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP SUFFICIENT PRESSURE TO LEAD IT TO NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION OF THE BORDER DISAGREEMENT AND PERHAPS EVEN TO PRODUCE A CHANGE IN THE LEADERSHIP ITSELF.

3. WE ARE SEEING THE HEAD OF THE CAMBODIA-LAOS-VIETNAM BRANCH ON 9 JANUARY.

ACTION: DEP FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
MIN+DEP DEFENCE
DEP PM+CABINET
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: SA
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SEA

SEC	DEPSECS	EX	MCO	DDO	FAS(SEP)	PNG	FAS(NSA)	NA
FAS(WES)	ASP	FAS(DEF)	DP	DC	FAS(IOC)	IO	FAS(PCR)	INF
FAS(MFS)	FAREP(S-M-P)							

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
4, RUE JEAN REY
75724 PARIS CEDEX 15
TEL. 575.62.00

Memo: 1156
File: 225/7/4/1
19 December, 1977

30/6/2/1

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

CAMBODIA - INTERNAL SITUATION

On 15 December I had my final discussion with Causeret (Cambodia, Laos desk officer, Foreign Ministry) on Cambodian matters. Causeret has been transferred to another section of the Quai d'Orsay.

Pol Pot

2. Causeret said that the last time we had spoken together he had told me that it was almost certain that Pol Pot was Saloth Sar. Since then one or two facts had emerged which had cast some doubt on this. It was known, for example, that Saloth Sar was born in 1927 but a Pyongyang radio broadcast had stated that Pol Pot was born in 1925. Causeret said however that the doubts had proved groundless. Pol Pot had been photographed during his visit to Peking and this photograph had been shown to Saloth Sar's brother who lived in Lyon and who positively identified Pol Pot as his brother.

3. The Foreign Ministry's view, Causeret said, was that Pol Pot was the undisputed master of Cambodia. Only a man in a sound position of power would have had the confidence to leave Cambodia for a visit to Peking. Causeret said that Pol Pot's emergence as leader had only occurred over the last year. Prior to this he had "disappeared" and the last official mention of Saloth Sar of which the Quai was aware, had been in 1972. Causeret said that one plausible explanation of this "disappearance" was that Pol Pot had been involved in a struggle for leadership. There were two possible groups which may have been competing with Pol Pot for the leadership, Causeret said. These groups tended to divide on ideological as well as generational factors. The first group consisted of the 2000 or so Cambodians who had gone to North Vietnam in 1954 and who had subsequently been greatly influenced by the Vietnamese before filtering back to Cambodia as guerillas in the late 60s and early 70s. It was Causeret's view that this group had now been decimated. The other group was made up of the young "hot-heads" whose only experience of guerilla activity had been in the struggle against Lon Nol. Causeret speculated that this group held the most radical and "utopian" philosophies and that upon the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, it had effectively seized power "on the ground". It may be, Causeret continued, that this group was largely responsible for the post-victory massacres. It could also be the case, Causeret said, that the eclipse of the "hot-heads" would mark a new stage in Democratic Kampuchea's development.

A More Lenient Internal Policy?


4. Causeret said that it would be logical that, once firmly ensconced as leader, Pol Pot would mitigate the harshness of the leadership's previous treatment of the population. However, although Causeret could point to some indications that this was the case from Pol Pot's speeches in Peking, he admitted that the French had no hard evidence that a change in policy had been instituted. He said that this was partly due to the fact that the rate of crossing the border into Thailand by Cambodian refugees had slowed down drastically. He warned against interpreting this fact as evidence that conditions in Cambodia had improved. Rather, Causeret said that this was evidence that Khmer Rouge border patrols were becoming increasingly effective and that Thailand's inhospitality towards the refugees had had the required effect.

5. A close examination of Pol Pot's speeches in Peking had, according to Causeret, revealed a slight modification of previous statements and perhaps a new realism in Phnom Penh. Pol Pot had said that 95% of the population supported the present leadership's policies and that of the remainder, 4% were amenable to re-education. Pol Pot said that a major problem concerned the 1% of "die-hards". For these, renewed efforts would be undertaken to re-educate them in order that they too might see the light, but that if all this failed the leadership would have no choice but to resort to the ultimate sanction. Pol Pot had also said that amongst the 4% who had come around to support the leadership, there were reactionaries and former feudal lords. Causeret saw this as a clear reference to Prince Sihanouk.

Sihanouk and Penn Nouth

6. It was Causeret's view that the recent references to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth on Phnom Penh radio provided another possible indication that repressive measures were easing and that an attempt was being made to woo unreconstructed Sihanoukists. Causeret mentioned the letters from Sihanouk which had been read over Phnom Penh radio on 25 October. He said that these were initially greeted with much scepticism at the Quai d'Orsay but that upon studying the letters, a touch of sarcasm had been detected which spoke in favour of the letter's authenticity.

7. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to our missions in Hanoi, Peking, Vientiane, Bangkok, Washington and the JIO.



(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

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C.C.

Australian Embassy

HANOI

Memo: OP.

(Copy for your information)

Australian Embassy

PEKING

Memo OP:

(Copy for your information)

Australian Embassy,

VIENTIANE

Memo OP:

(Copy for your information)

Australian Embassy

WASHINGTON

Memo OP:

(Copy for your information)

The Director,

J.I.O.,

Defence,

CANBERRA.

Memo OD:

(Copy for your information)

RR

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary



CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
4, RUE JEAN REY
75724 PARIS CEDEX 15
TEL. 575.62.00

1/11/77

INWARDS

30/6/77

Memo: 1159
File: 225/7/4/2
19 December, 1977

25/1/4/37.

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

CAMBODIA - FOREIGN RELATIONS

When I spoke to Causeret (Cambodia, Laos desk officer, Foreign Ministry) on 15 December he made some brief comments on Cambodia's foreign relations.

Relations with China

2. Causeret said that the 2 December communique between Hanoi and Bangkok whereby it was agreed to exchange Ambassadors, was in line with Chinese policy in Indochina. The next step, Causeret said, could be the establishment of ties between Thailand and Cambodia and in this regard talks between the two countries may soon begin in Vientiane. Causeret said that China was probably influencing the Cambodian leadership to move in this direction.

3. There was, however, a limit to Chinese influence over Cambodian policy, Causeret continued. The speeches by Pol Pot made in the course of his visit to Peking had given observers a hint that all was not well bilaterally, particularly over ideological matters. In this regard, Causeret said that it was noteworthy that Pol Pot had implicitly rejected the Chinese "three worlds" theory. In his speeches Pol Pot had tended to divide the world into reactionary and progressive camps. Causeret said that there also existed differences over the theory of the inevitability of a global conflict.

Relations with Thailand

was should be?

4. Causeret repeated the French view that the border conflicts between Thailand and Cambodia did not add up to a major problem. He said that there was no logical rationale in a supposed official Cambodian policy of harassment of Thailand. Causeret was of the view that Bangkok was largely responsible for the conflict, which tended to add support for its internal policies. Other reasons for the frontier skirmishes included the activities of expatriate Cambodian guerilla movements, and also smuggling activities on both sides.

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5. There was a possibility that the new Thai Government would be prepared to reach an understanding with Phnom Penh, Causeret said. This was also the line taken by Le Monde of 4-5 December in an editorial entitled "Detent between Hanoi and Bangkok". The editorial argued that France would have a part to play here by accepting for migration, expatriate Cambodian guerillas operating from Thai territory. Le Monde said that one such guerilla fighter, General Sek Sam Iet, a former Governor of Battambang Province, had recently come to France. I sought a view from Causeret on this. He said that there was some validity in the argument but that French refugee policy nevertheless required that the individuals be genuine refugees and that they be innocent of serious non-political crimes. Causeret was surprised to hear that Sek Sam Iet had come to France. He was familiar with this case because his section of the Quai d'Orsay had several times refused to give its agreement for Sek Sam Iet to be granted a visa. The problem was that whilst Sek Sam Iet was reputed to be a guerilla fighter, strong evidence existed that he was in fact a smuggler of precious guns and that his forays into Cambodia were motivated solely by this reason. Causeret admitted however that experience had shown that if a "refugee" had important friends in France then ways and means of obtaining a visa could be found.

now about "guns" ?

Relations with Vietnam

6. Causeret said that there was some evidence that serious battles between Vietnam and Cambodia were continuing in the Hatien area. The evidence had come in part from a French plantation owner who had recently left Vietnam and also from "indiscretions" by some East European reporters and diplomats. Causeret stressed that, unlike the Thai border incidents, these battles provided a major cause for concern, mainly because there was every indication that they would continue and perhaps even escalate in intensity.

7. Causeret said that one could theorise over the causes of the conflict between these "fraternal" States but that in the final analysis the problem always came back to territorial disagreements. Causeret said that this question was worthy of in-depth study. He advised that a useful starting point would be a doctoral thesis by a former Cambodian Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Sarin Chhak, entitled "Les Frontières du Cambodge". Causeret said that Sarin Chhak was not in favour with the present leadership but that his arguments were nevertheless adopted by them. Accordingly it may be the case, Causeret said, that Cambodian policy was based on reinstituting the former boundaries. Causeret concluded by noting that a Cambodian official, in a recent conversation with the Swedish Ambassador accredited to Phnom Penh, had given a figure for Cambodia's surface area equivalent to "greater" Cambodia as delineated in Sarin Chhak's thesis.

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8. In case you do not already have a copy we attach (Canberra only) for your information a copy of Sarin Chhak's thesis with accompanying maps. You will note that the thesis has a preface by Norodom Sihanouk and another preface by Professor Paul Reuter, the distinguished French jurist and member of the International Law Commission.

9. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to our missions in Hanoi, Peking, Vientiane, Bangkok, Washington and the JIO.

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

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OCT 25 10 56 AM '77

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
4, RUE JEAN REY
75724 PARIS CEDEX 15
TEL. 575.62.00

INWARDS

File 225/7/4/2

Memo No: 934

12 October 1977

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

→ 225/1/4/37

CAMBODIAN EXPATRIATES' PUBLICATION
SEREIKA

We attach for your information the September issue of Sereika, a monthly publication put out by Cambodian expatriates resident in France.

2. Please advise if you wish to receive the publication on a regular basis.

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
R

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

Copy of memo
plus attachment
Sent to Indo China
Section for action

M
26x.

CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.F.A.

SEP 14 10 35 AM '77



INWARDS

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
84-86, AVENUE DIÉNA
75116 PARIS

File No: 211/1/11

Memo No: 812

8 September 1977

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

FRENCH STATEMENTS ON CAMBODIA

ENCLOSURES ATTACHEES

We attach for your information our translation of a question on notice in the National Assembly and its answer concerning human rights in Cambodia which was printed in the Journal Officiel of 3 September. Also attached is our translation of an article which appeared in the Communist Party's daily L'Humanité of 5 September dealing with the same question.

2. On this issue, at least, there appears to be a consensus in France as both the Government and the Communists reach the conclusion that France can only condemn the Cambodian authorities for their disregard of human rights.

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

Mr. Sergio
Copy Indochina
done VB
K-9



CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.F.A.

JUN 21 11 55 AM '77

INWARDS



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PEKING

In reply quote No. 840/76

Memorandum No. 527

16 June 1977

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

cc: Assistant Secretary, North Asia Branch

KAMPUCHEAN PROTEST TO FRENCH EMBASSY IN PEKING

Attached is a protest note sent to the French Embassy in Peking by the Kampuchean Embassy. Copies of the note were circulated to all diplomatic missions and press agencies in Peking.

2. The note lodges a protest with the French Embassy over, what the Kampucheans refer to as, defamatory statements published in the French Embassy's daily bulletin "Nouvelles du Jour". The note denies French claims that Kampuchea has received Thai aid; and that the Khmer Rouge massacred one million people following "liberation".

WHICH COPIES ATTACHED

S. E. Gerovich
(S.E. Gerovich)
Second Secretary

HONG KONG Comm OP No. 270

SRG:rj

Mr. Seeger Sent in 23 vii
Copy to Indo-China Section
19



CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.F.A.

AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT MISSION
GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL

S2

JUN 16 2 56 PM '77

INWARDS

FILE REFERENCE NO: 252/4/4
MEMORANDUM NO: 551

8 June 1977

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

KAMPUCHEA : O.GE 24503 OF 8 JUNE 1977

.... We attach for your attention a copy of a Record of Conversation with a Dr Thaing Chanthou, "Minister and Co-ordinator of Resistance against the Khmer Rouge."

2. Dr Thaing Chanthou rang the Ambassador's Secretary on the morning of 6 June requesting a meeting with the Ambassador to discuss "problems in Cambodia".

3. The Ambassador checked out this approach with the British Ambassador (Bottomley) and the United States Chargé d'Affaires a.i. (Sorenson). Bottomley said that the man could be the same one who tried to make an appointment with him some six months or so ago. Bottomley thought that he had been Counsellor to Lon Nol when he was head of state and arranged for his Counsellor to see him. After Thaing had enquired about the age of the Counsellor he finally accepted a timing for an appointment but did not turn up. The United States Chargé, Sorenson, did not have any information.

4. The Ambassador's Secretary rang Dr Thaing and said that although the Ambassador would be unable to see him because of other engagements, if he wished he could call on White, the Counsellor of the Mission. When he was asked what he wished to discuss he said it was far too secret to tell over the phone and concerned his country Cambodia. He asked for the address of the Mission which was given to him. He asked if White was the Deputy Permanent Representative and was informed accordingly.

5. We should stress that we volunteered no information to Dr Thaing and confined our participation in the interview to questions and listening. Dr Thaing seemed anxious to speak and did so in reasonable English although we felt that there was some scope for misunderstanding of some words. We have not been able to check out as yet the veracity of the series of claims made by Dr Thaing in the interview. The claim about the interview with President Carter in particular seems extravagant but as we have suggested in our cable O.GE 24503 of 8 June 1977 this probably would be best checked out in Washington.

6. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to our High Commission in London.

A.G.D. White
(A.G.D. White)
Counsellor

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52 B

Record of Conversation with Dr Thaing Chanthou

and Mr A.G.D. White, Counsellor,
Australian Permanent Mission, Geneva

Mr K.B. Cowden, Consul, Australian
Permanent Mission, Geneva

on 7 June 1977

at the Australian Permanent Mission,
Geneva

Subject Kampuchea

Instructed by the Ambassador (see covering memorandum 551 of 8 June), Mr Cowden and I received Dr Thaing Chanthou today, following his approaches on Monday 6 June. He was seen in the Mission's Conference Room and the interview was conducted on the basis of White and Cowden asking questions and listening.

2. Dr Thaing Chanthou, who left his visiting cards, describes himself as a diplomat of the Asian Department. He explained that this was his cover and that his real title was Minister and Co-ordinator of the Government of Resistance against the Khmer Rouge.

3. He began the interview by showing us a whole series of photographs taken in Thailand and Cambodia in recent months. The photographs show Dr Thaing Chanthou with armed resistance soldiers as well as photographs of Cambodians working in the fields under armed guard and some photographs of Cambodians apparently being shot by soldiers of the Government of Kampuchea.

4. He claimed that he had 50,000 followers in Cambodia as well as 16,000 supporters in neighbouring Laos. The main problem they faced was to obtain sufficient arms and food. They were, he claimed, in receipt of financial support from a number of sources, including the United Arab Emirates and the United States. He said that he had already called on the Ambassador /Mr Fahim Al-Qasim/ of the United Arab Emirates in Geneva on three occasions and was to call on him again this afternoon. He said that he hoped that as a result of this afternoon's interview to get an appropriate introduction to the President of the United Arab Emirates who is the father of their Ambassador here. He said that he also hoped that he would visit Saudi Arabia, whose Ambassador (Dr Medhart Sheikhelard) here he claimed to have called on, and Qatar.

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.....

He provided us with a list of the main members of the political wing of the resistance against the Khmer Rouge and this is attached. He said that three of these men were in the car in which he had come to make his call on us at the Mission, namely, Sim Var, a former Cambodian Prime Minister and former Cambodian Ambassador to Japan, Mr Tep Phan, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr In Tam, a former Prime Minister. All Cambodians on the attached list live in Paris except Mr In Tam who lives in New York.

6. Dr Thaing Chanthou claimed that he had seen President Carter, seemingly in Geneva during his recent one day visit. He had got to President Carter via the CIA and the latter had provided him with 50,000 dollars, sufficient to purchase 4,000 arms. According to Dr Thaing Chanthou, President Carter had stressed the need to keep Lon Nol out of their resistance movement. His record would not bring the resistance movement into any favour. Dr Thaing Chanthou commented that Lon Nol was in regular contact with him and suggested that the resistance did not want him either. (Lon Nol now lives in Honolulu).

7. Dr Thaing Chanthou claimed that he had been in contact with the French and had seen Chirac in Paris where he had put a request for helicopters. He also showed a purportedly recent photograph of himself with the French Ambassador in Thailand. He claimed to have had contact with the British.

8. In answer to a question, he said he held a Swiss "Titre de Voyage" which is a Swiss Travel document. He said that although he was based in Switzerland, he made monthly visits to Cambodia through Thailand where the authorities permitted him to transit. He showed us the copy of a bill from the Swiss firm, A.R. Murie de Bastions S.A. for SF. 3.5 million worth of arms dated 22 April 1977.

9. Dr Thaing Chanthou said that he was a former Colonel in the Cambodian Army and that the resistance movement now had 25 battalions in the field. He claimed that the Khmer Rouge were concerned about the strength of the resistance and this explained their reluctance to have much contact with the outside world.

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- 3 -

10. The main purpose of his visit as explained by him was to get the name and address of the Australian Prime Minister so that he could address a letter to him. We gave him this and he indicated that he would contact us again. The implication appeared to be that he might ask that the Mission provide the channel for such a communication. We did not give Dr Thaing reason to believe that we would be able to oblige him in this way.

11. We also gave him a copy of the question and answer in the Senate Hansard of 25 May 1977 about Australia's position with regard to the Government of Kampuchea.

12. Dr Thaing Chanthou came to the door of the Mission with a European man who, he said, was his bodyguard, a necessity as a result of being followed on three known occasions by representatives of the Chinese Mission in Geneva.

Report prepared by *Ammy* (A.G.D. White)
Counsellor

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SI.



APR 5 3 46 AM '77

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENA
75116 PARIS

File No: 225/21/2/3

Memo No: 307
24 March, 1977

INC section

copy pln to
INC section

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

25/1/4/37

FRENCH VIEWS ON CAMBODIA

During the course of my conversation with Causeret (Laos, Cambodia desk officer, MFA) on 23 March, I asked him for his views on the three books on Cambodia which have recently been published in France (Paris memorandum no. 203 of 23 February 1977).

2. Causeret agreed with Le Monde's review which had argued that Ponchaud's book "Cambodge, Année Zéro" was an authoritative and important work on the new Cambodia. He had recently spoken to Ponchaud and had been impressed by the depth of Ponchaud's knowledge of Cambodia and by his dispassionate and objective assessments. Causeret also said that Debré's book, "Cambodge. La révolution dans la forêt", was essential reading for the serious student of Cambodian affairs. Causeret noted however that Debré's book contained several glaring errors, including a reference to a meeting between Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan which supposedly took place in the 1970s in Seoul. Causeret has not yet read Hamel's book.

A Cambodian Policy of Genocide?

3. On Causeret's desk was a cutting from the Paris International Herald Tribune of 22 March 1977. Comments had been scribbled all over the page. The article was by Anthony Lewis and entitled "Cambodia: Where Terror is King". Attached is a copy of the article.

....

4. Causeret was quick to comment on several aspects of the article. He dismissed the book "Murder of a Gentle Land" by John Barron and Anthony Paul as little better than sensationalism. Ponchaud had told Causeret that when he had met Barron and Paul, their ill-informed questions had betrayed a sparse understanding of Indochinese affairs. Causeret concluded that the book, which appeared in a condensed version in February's Reader's Digest, was written to cash in on the terror stories circulating about Cambodia and it could not be accepted as a serious and well-researched work.

CONFIDENTIAL .. / 2

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5. The article by Jean Lacouture which appeared in the 31 March issue of the New York Review of Books could not so easily be dismissed, Causeret said. Lacouture had been a staunch critic of American policy during the war and his definitive study of Vietnam was a highly responsible work. Given Lacouture's credentials, his accusation of Cambodian "auto-genocide" must be taken seriously, Causeret said. But Causeret was concerned about Lacouture's penchant for "painting Vietnam all white and Cambodia all black". After all, Causeret continued, both were repressive societies which cared little for human rights and in both countries many years of war had cheapened the value of life.

6. Causeret said that the considered assessment of the MFA was that the Cambodian leadership had not taken a decision to kill all the soldiers and public servants who had worked for Lon Nol. He said that an exhaustive study of the Cambodian refugees' accounts disclosed two facts which tended to support the French assessment. First, many Lon Nol cadres and even some soldiers had not been killed, but had been "re-educated". These included some from Phnom Penh. Second, it appeared that systematic executions had taken place only in Phnom Penh and in Battambang province. These two areas had been the last to fall to the Khmers Rouges and had provided the strongest support for the Lon Nol regime. Causeret said that generally the Western provinces bordering Thailand had fared worse than the Eastern provinces. I asked Causeret whether this conclusion merely reflected the fact that most refugees escaped to Thailand from the Western provinces. Causeret said that this factor had been considered but that the MFA had also taken testimony from many refugees who had escaped to Vietnam from Eastern provinces of Cambodia and had then found their way to France.

7. Causeret said that he did not want to defend the Khmers Rouges but that it was important to view the situation factually. He said that if Cambodian policy of massive, exhaustive and systematic capital retribution was conducted only in two provinces then this may show that the Khmers Rouges leaders possessed a milligram of mercy after all and that decisions were taken for logical reasons albeit based on grotesque premises. There was also the possibility that province governors were acting independently of Phnom Penh and Causeret said that there was even some evidence that the governors of the Eastern provinces were not Khmers Rouges but old-time nationalists.

Opposition Movements

8. There exists in Paris a self-styled "Cambodian government-in-exile" but Causeret said that this was just a maverick group of about 10 to 15 persons who represented little more than themselves. They did however have the use of considerable funds which allowed them to conduct press conferences and produce literature. There also existed larger and more serious groups of Cambodians in Paris whose aim was not the overthrow of Angkar but rather to put pressure on it for moderation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

9. Causeret said that there had been a lot of exaggeration about the anti-Angkar guerilla movements operating in Cambodia and that this was the one point on which he and Ponchaud disagreed. Le Figaro was in the van of newspapers publishing stories about Cambodian terror tactics and internal dissension and on 28 February and on 1 March this year two articles by a Dr Grauwin appeared in the paper. Grauwin claimed to have recently entered Cambodia and to have made contact with the guerillas. Causeret said that Grauwin had had a close association with Lon Nol in the past and that his articles were therefore suspect.

10. Causeret conceded that there were armed bands operating in Cambodia. He doubted that their membership numbered many more than a thousand in total and thought the number of politically motivated guerillas was far smaller. The majority of the armed Cambodian outlaws were, Causeret said, basically smugglers dealing in precious stones, salt and rare but basic foodstuffs. Causeret concluded that Angkar was firmly established and it would take more than a handful of smugglers and Le Figaro to displace it.

Recent Developments in Cambodia

11. Causeret said that there had been some interesting recent developments in Cambodia. The evidence came mainly from the news sheets handed out by the Cambodian Embassy in Peking which were usually reprints of Phnom Penh radio announcements. It was a crashing bore to pore over these papers Causeret said but it could nevertheless provide some insights into Angkar's thinking.

12. The biggest development, Causeret said, was that recent radio broadcasts no longer spoke of the danger of an imminent foreign invasion. This could indicate, Causeret said, that the first phase of the campaign for control over the country was now over.

13. Another development evident from the radio broadcasts was that Angkar had now begun to rewrite Cambodian history. Emphasis had been placed on the history of Angkar and the radio broadcasts had spoken of the different phases of this history including the transition of Angkar from a group working within the system yet with a revolutionary arm to the policy of armed retaliation against the central government and finally by 1968 to a fully-fledged revolutionary movement taking the offensive. Sihanouk was never mentioned as belonging to Cambodian history and the best Orwellian tradition Lon Nol has become the arch enemy from as early as 1966. Several dates were given prominence; the 17 April 1975 final victory and the 18 March 1970 coup by Lon Nol which "created a revolutionary consciousness in all classes of Cambodian society". Another date thought to be important was the date of the severing of supply lines between Phnom Penh and Battambang.

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- 4 - **CONFIDENTIAL** *51c*

14. Causeret said that the radio broadcasts had also begun to talk about food production figures for the whole of Cambodia rather than just mentioning individual events such as the completion of a dyke or the opening up of a new field. These figures could be pure inventions Causeret said, but he felt that they reflected the fact that control over the country was now established and that communications had improved.

15. The radio broadcasts also claimed that Cambodia was now self-sufficient in rice and was able to export some and also stockpile some. A US diplomat who had spoken to Causeret had disagreed with this claim and had told Causeret that the satellite pictures disclosed that the surface area of cultivated land had recently diminished. Causeret said that these two facts were not mutually exclusive. The cultivated surface area had increased dramatically when the Cambodian cities were emptied but a lot of this land was not productive and had since been abandoned. Furthermore, the Cambodians were now using a form of miracle rice which produced more rice from less land. I asked where the fertilizer was obtained from and Causeret said that as far as the MFA was aware the only fertilizer available was human excrement. In conclusion, Causeret said that it was not so surprising that Cambodia could now produce sufficient rice to support itself as virtually all the country's labour was utilised for this task.

16. Copies of this memo and attachment have been sent to the posts listed below.

Roland Rich
(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

Memo No: OP 147

cc	Australian Embassy,	PEKING
	"	BANGKOK
	"	HANOI
	"	VIENTIANE
	"	WASHINGTON

Memo No: OD

cc JIO, Dept of Defence, CANBERRA

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International Herald Tribune

22 March, 1977

51D

Cambodia: Where Terror Is King

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON—Vietnam and Laos welcomed President Carter's commission on Americans missing in Indochina, but the government of Cambodia would not allow a visit. It was a decision to be expected from "the most tightly locked up country in the world, where the bloodiest revolution in history is now taking place."

That description of Cambodia today comes from an article by Jean Lacouture in the March 31 issue of the New York Review of Books. It is an article whose painful honesty lends ghastly conviction to its terrible conclusions.

'Genocide'

"Genocide," Lacouture writes, "usually has been carried out against a foreign population or an internal minority. The new masters of Phnom Penh have invented something original, autogenocide."

"After Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had produced the ultimate horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse: in the name of socialism."

"A group of modern intellectuals, formed by Western thought, primarily Marxist thought, claim to seek to return to a rustic golden age, to an ideal rural and national civilization. And proclaiming these ideals, they are systematically massacring, isolating and starving city and village populations whose crime was to have been born when they were."

There have been many reports of mass killing and brutality in Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge took over in April, 1975. A book

on the subject, "Murder of a Gentle Land" by John Barron and Anthony Paul, was condensed in the February Reader's Digest.

The smell of horror was too strong to be ignored by any fair-minded person, and it has not been ignored. But in this country, and the West generally, there has been less outcry about the savagery in Cambodia than its dimensions might have suggested. Why?

The reports from a sealed country were necessarily second-hand—largely from refugees—and may have seemed exaggerated. Americans generally were weary of everything about Indochina. And those of us who had been critics of the war may have felt skeptical about some of the Cambodian reports because they came from rightist quarters that had been indifferent to the misery inflicted on Cambodia by U.S. bombers. When Henry Kissinger cries for Cambodia, there is reason for skepticism.

But those explanations wither in the presence of Jean Lacouture. He is a leading French expert on Indochina. And he was a profound critic of the U.S. war. He has no reason of ideology or ignorance to exaggerate the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge.

Lacouture's article is in form a review of "Cambodge, Année Zéro," a book just published in Paris. It is by François Ponchaud, a priest who was in Cambodia for 10 years, until three weeks after the Khmer Rouge took Phnom Penh—an informed and sympathetic witness.

Among other things, Ponchaud

quotes from orders by the revolutionary government itself. Texts it distributed to local officials, he says, urged them to "cut down" corrupt elites and "carriers of germs," including "their offspring until the last one." Lacouture comments: "The strategy of Herod."

Cambodia may have lost as many as 1 million of 7 million in the war. Some have estimated, on the basis of both refugee accounts and statements by Khmer Rouge leaders themselves, that another 1 million have been killed since. Lacouture sees that scale of killing when he asks: "What Oriental despot or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated . . . one-quarter of their own population?"

U.S. policy helped bring disaster on Cambodia, and Lacouture knows it. Today's reality, he says, should shame "those in the Nixon administration who bombed and laid waste Cambodia, undermining Sihanouk's regime, and refused to pursue negotiations with him in Peking, making an unmitigated Khmer Rouge victory all the more likely." But he rightly sees that as no reason for silence about Cambodia today.

Not Much Hope

It is true also that there is not much hope of effecting the Cambodian government. Among the world's tyrannies, it may be the least likely to be moved by outside protest. Those of us in the West who are particularly concerned about human rights may naturally incline to exert influence where it may have an effect: in countries sensitive to our criticism or dependent on relations with us. But utility cannot be the only standard in these matters.

To remain silent in the face of barbarism as enormous as Cambodia's would be to compromise our own humanity. It would be to say that hundreds of thousands of Cambodians do not count in the human scale. It would be to repeat the West's corrupting mistake in 1972 of ignoring tribal genocide in Burundi. In today's world, we ignore mass murder anywhere at our own peril.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

INWARDS

Files: 225/21/2/7
225/21/1
221/1/10

Memo No. 270.

16 March 1977.

mn 8029 Sent Biv.
(F) copy to INC station.

And

25/1/4/37

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

FRANCE / INDO-CHINA

....

Attached for your information is a record of a conversation with the Sous-Directeur in charge of the Branch of the Foreign Ministry which deals with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The conversation covered the general state of France's relations with the three countries.

2. A copy of this memorandum, with attachment, is being forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Hanoi.


(C.R. Jones)
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Files: 225/21/2/7
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Record of Conversation with M. François Dopffer, Sous-Directeur in charge of the Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam Branch of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr C.R. Jones, Chargé d'Affaires, Australian Embassy, Paris on Monday, 14 March 1977.

INDO-CHINA

I made an initial call on Mr Dopffer on 14 March. The main part of the conversation was a general review by Mr Dopffer of the state of France's relations with the countries of Indo-China.

Cambodia

2. Mr Dopffer said that France had no dealings with Cambodia and had no direct information about what was happening there. The Cambodians appeared to have no interest in contact with France. The sources of what information the French had were refugees and some diplomats based in Phnom Penh - the Yugoslavs and the Chinese. Not a great deal of significance came however from these sources. France had some interests to pursue in Cambodia, particularly concern about missing persons. At this stage it seemed that there was nothing for France to do about Cambodia but to await developments.

Laos

3. Mr Dopffer said that France had quite a large aid program in Laos. However, the Lao were not well disposed towards the French and relations were cool. As was well-known, the main foreign influence in Laos was the USSR. The Chinese, while not being pleased about this, could do nothing about it. The Lao were cautious about the North Vietnamese although they did receive North Vietnamese assistance.

4. Mr Dopffer said the French were concerned about the situation in Laos and saw it as an unstable factor in the region which could have an adverse effect on neighbouring countries. He noted the rebel activity in Laos and the imprisonment of the King.

5. Asked about the return of Lao students from France (Vientiane's memorandum 79 of 25 February), Mr Dopffer said that the Lao had told the French that they intended to encourage students to return. The French had not done anything to assist or interfere with this effort. A Lao mission had been sent to France to encourage the students to go back to Laos. Approximately 150 had done so.

Vietnam

6. In Vietnam, Mr Dopffer said, the French were quite active and relations between the two countries were developing well. A date had been fixed for Pham Van Dong's visit which would take place within the next couple of months. France had a substantial

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aid program in Vietnam. Negotiations were under way about air traffic rights for Air France between Paris and Hanoi.

7. Mr Dopffer said that France was anxious to contribute as much as possible to Vietnam's reconstruction and economic development and to encourage others to do likewise. They felt that if progress were not made in these areas, the Vietnamese might well turn to military adventurism and interfere with their neighbours.

8. I asked about the proposed code on foreign investment and Mr Dopffer replied that while the Vietnamese had indicated some months ago that it was about to appear nothing had been heard of it since. He put this down largely to delays in the Vietnamese bureaucracy which he viewed as inexperienced, disorganised and inefficient. I asked whether there were any French concerns interested in investing in Vietnam in any case and the reply was negative. Mr Dopffer noted that there was some French investment in the south, left over from the old days - approximately half a dozen concerns of no great size. These were continuing to operate. It seemed that a few of them would be nationalised but would nevertheless be managed as private businesses.

9. In reply to a question Mr Dopffer said that the French Foreign Ministry continued to have an officer of senior counsellor level in Saigon. This officer was not accorded formal diplomatic or consular status. The main reason for the withholding of formal status was Vietnamese concern to avoid having to accept a Russian or Chinese official presence in Saigon. The French official was able to have discussions with Vietnamese officials in Saigon and was in daily communication with Paris.

10. Mr Dopffer said that there was a weekly French humanitarian flight to Saigon from Bangkok which was mainly used for the evacuation of French nationals. So far 7,000 had been evacuated. There remained a further 3,000 who were likely to leave in due course as the Vietnamese did not want to keep them. These people were mostly Vietnamese with French nationality. Only approximately 100 French citizens of European extraction remained in Vietnam and most of these were expected to leave in due course.

DISTRIBUTION:

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
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75116 PARIS

File No: 225/21/2/7

Memo No: 1342

20 December 1976

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

25/1/4/37

CAMBODIAN APPEAL

... We attach for your information the text of a motion from the General Association of Khmers living Abroad (AGKE), together with our translation.

2. The AGKE was founded by a group of Cambodians which includes three former Cambodian Prime Ministers (Son Sann being one) and several Ministers, Ambassadors and high-ranking military personnel of former Cambodian governments. The aims of the organisation are stated to be the preservation of Cambodian culture, religion and civilisation as well as the consolidation of the spirit of unity and mutual assistance amongst the tens of thousands of Cambodian refugees abroad.

3. In October 1976 the AGKE sent an appeal to Mr Waldheim requesting him to send an impartial U.N. commission of enquiry to Democratic Kampuchea to verify the reports of atrocities from thousands of Cambodian refugees.

4. A copy of this memorandum and its attachment is being sent to the posts listed below.

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

MEMO NO: OF

Australian Embassy: PEKING

Australian Mission to the United Nations: NEW YORK

*Copy to Capital, 25/1/77
20/1/77*

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Paris, le 06 Décembre 1976

A Son Excellence l'Ambassadeur

du Commonwealth d'Australie

Son Excellence,

Nous avons l'honneur de vous remettre ci-dessous avec prière de bien vouloir transmettre à votre gouvernement le texte de notre motion:

Texte de la motion:

Les membres fondateurs de l'Association Générale des Khmers à l'Etranger, se référant

- aux articles parus dans la presse française relatant les tragiques péripéties de la remise de 26 réfugiés cambodgiens par les autorités Thailandaises aux autorités khmères rouges de Phnom Penh (Le Monde des 27.11, 30.11 et 02.12.76; l'Aurore des 02.12 et 04 Décembre 76);
- à la fuite des centres d'hébergement en Thaïlande de 250 réfugiés cambodgiens qui ont peur d'être amenés et remis comme les 26 sus-indiqués aux bourreaux khmères rouges,
- aux lettres écrites à la hâte par les réfugiés et contenant des appels pressants et désespérés à des amis ou connaissances vivant à l'étranger pour attirer l'attention de l'opinion internationale sur leur sort douloureux

seront reconnaissants aux gouvernements et peuples des pays épris de paix et de justice et des organismes internationaux de bien vouloir poursuivre leur intervention pour que des mesures de refoulements des réfugiés cambodgiens ne soient plus renouvelées afin qu'ils puissent vivre en toute quiétude sur le sol étranger conformément à la déclaration sur les droits de l'homme.

Fait à Paris, le 05.12.1976

Pour les membres fondateurs de l'A.G.K.E

SON SANN

45bis, rue des Acacias, 75017 Paris.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Excellence, l'expression de nos sentiments très reconnaissants.

Pour les membres fondateurs de l'Association Générale des Khmers à l'Etranger et pour ampliation,

TRUONG Méaly, 24 rue d'Enghien, 75010 Paris

TRANSLATION

49B

Excellency,

We have the honour to submit to you, with our request to forward it to your government, the text of our motion, as follows:

The foundation members of the General Association of Khmers Abroad, referring to

- articles appearing in the French press relating the tragic episodes of the handing-over of 26 Cambodian refugees by the Thai authorities to the Red Khmer authorities in Phnom Penh (Le Monde of 27.11, 30.11 and 2.12.76; l'Aurore of 2.12 and 4.12.76);
- the flight from camps in Thailand of 250 Cambodian refugees who are afraid to be brought and handed over to the Red Khmer torturers like the 26 mentioned above;
- letters written in haste by refugees and containing urgent and desperate appeals to friends and acquaintances living abroad to draw the attention of international opinion to their distressing fate

would be grateful to the governments and peoples of countries that revere peace and justice and to international organisations for continuing their intervention so that measure to force back Cambodian refugees will not occur again so that they can live peacefully on foreign soil in accordance with the declaration on human rights.

PARIS

5 December 1976

On behalf of the foundation members of the AGKE,
Son SANN

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25/1/4/37⁴⁸

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

M.T.
col. ~~to INC~~ P's

Memo No. 1001

File No. 225/21/2/3
225/21/2/7

30 September 1976.

Rosemary
~~pl's sent copy~~
to INC
MT 13₆

25/1/4/37

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

CAMBODIA

M. Noiville (Director of Asia/Oceania in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) said in conversation on 29 September that the French were still without any reliable information on what was going on in Cambodia. They had no factual basis for trying to assess the significance of Pol Pot's replacement as Prime Minister by Nuon Chea or for evaluating the speculative reports coming out of Bangkok (our memorandum 991 of 29 September 1976). Noiville added that the French had no recent information on Sihanouk's position either, beyond noting that his name had not appeared among those sending condolences to Peking on Mao's death.

2. Noiville also said that there had been no development of any kind towards a resumption of diplomatic relations between France and Cambodia.

3. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to posts at Bangkok and Peking.

H.D. Anderson
(H.D. Anderson)
Ambassador

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(H.D. Anderson)

of Bangkok and Peking.

3. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to posts between France and Cambodia.

of any kind towards a resumption of diplomatic relations.

3. Notable also said that there had been no development in the subject.

not appeared among those sending condolences to Peking on the occasion of the death of the Emperor, saying nothing that his name had appeared among those who had sent condolences on the occasion of the death of the Emperor (only memorandum dated 23 September 1951). It is noted that for evaluating the significance of the absence of the French representative as Prime Minister they had no specific basis for saying to assess the relative information on what was going on in Cambodia. 23 September that the French were still without any Ministry of Foreign Affairs) said in conversation on 11.10.51 (Director of the Ministry of the

CAMBODIA

CAMBODIA.

Department of Foreign Affairs.
The Secretary.

30 September 1951.

File No. 332/37/51/3

Memo No. 1001

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY



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PA Registry 14.10.76



File 25/1/4/37
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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

47.

File Nos: 225/21/2/3
225/21/2/7

Memo No: 991

29 September, 1976

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

25/1/4/37

CAMBODIA

We attach for your information the following recent press reports on Cambodia:

- a) Article from Le Monde of 18 September 1976 detailing Cambodian refugee reports and their reasons for fleeing Cambodia.
- b) Article from Le Monde of 24 September noting the absence of a condolence message from Prince Sihanouk on the occasion of Mao's death.
- c) Article from Le Monde of 28 September concerning Cambodian resistance movements and the internal administration of the country.
- d) Article from Le Monde of 29 September speculating on the reasons for the temporary replacement of Prime Minister Pol Pot.

Franco-Cambodian Relations

The weekly magazine Le Point, in its 20 September 1976 issue, makes the following statement:

"The Khmer Rouges hope for a reconciliation with France. Ieng Sary, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs, is attributed with the intention - if he receives the green light from France - to visit Paris on his return from New York where he will attend the forthcoming session of the UN".

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

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AT 14.10.76

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 25/1/4/37 PART 2

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File No: 225/21/2/7

Memo No: 898

25/1/4/37

6 September 1976

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

M. Thawley
w/ B INC.

FRENCH STATEMENT ON CAMBODIA.

On 27 April 1976, a French Senator, Mr Louis Jung asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what initiative the French government would take in order that a U.N. commission of enquiry visit Cambodia to determine the truth of the reports of reprisals coming out of that country.

2. On 2 September the following reply by the Minister was published in the "Journal Officiel":

"...Information on the present situation prevailing in Cambodia remains rare and fragmented, but if we put aside a certain number of contradictory and fabricated testimonies, it nevertheless confirms that the Cambodian people have, for more than a year, experienced a series of cruel ordeals. The fate of these people, for whom we foster a long and profound friendship, deserves our sympathy the more so because the unjustifiable sufferings imposed upon a population, by brutal and shocking government methods, never serve any purpose. The honourable member's suggestion merits consideration and is presently being studied. It however runs the risk of being difficult to put into practice, in as much as such a commission could only go to Cambodia with the authorisation of the Phnom Penh government". (Embassy translation)

3. The reply demonstrates that the MFA is continuing to take a tough stand towards the Cambodian government, previously evidenced by their recent treatment of the GRUNK mission in Paris. It also demonstrates the MFA's sensitivity to adverse public reaction to the Cambodian atrocity stories.

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
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Memo No. 225/21/2/7

File No. 835.

20 August 1976.

MT.
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The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

25/1/4/37 ← F.

CAMBODIA

In conversation on 19 August, M. de Laboulaye (Director of Political Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry) referred in passing to France's lack of contact with Democratic Kampuchea. He said that Khieu Samphan had stated in Colombo (although not to the French themselves) that the Cambodians had been preparing to establish diplomatic relations with France but that this had been thrown out of gear when the French withdrew privileges from the Cambodian mission in Paris.

2. Laboulaye said that the French decision to withdraw privileges had been taken mainly because of the internal activities of the mission staff - who had never gone near the Quai d'Orsay - but also because the French had been told in Peking that the officials concerned, who were caretakers rather than diplomats, belonged to the GRUNK but could not be regarded as representatives of the present Cambodian Government. (The mission nevertheless described itself in a public statement on 29 July as "the Mission of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea in France" - see our telegram OPA24522.) At the same time Laboulaye acknowledged that the French had been "rather vexed" by the priority the new regime had been giving to other countries, which had no particular ties or associations with Cambodia, over France. (I have little doubt that pique was a major factor in the French decision and that there is a certain amount of rationalization in the various accounts the French have given us.)

3. Putting the best face on it, Laboulaye said - as other French officials have done - that the French Government would in fact have been embarrassed if the Cambodians had sought a reopening of diplomatic relations at this stage. French public opinion was still upset by the atrocity stories coming out of Cambodia. The Quai d'Orsay had itself had some hair-raising stories not only from Swedish visitors to Phnom Penh but also from a Tunisian diplomat who had visited Cambodia recently.

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4. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to posts at Peking, Bangkok, Washington, Hanoi and Vientiane.

H.D. Anderson
(H.D. Anderson ^{Here})
Ambassador

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

INWARDS

File No: 225/21/2/7

Memo No: 762

4 August, 1976

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

ENCLOSURES ATTACHED

... 64


CAMBODIAN MISSION IN PARIS

P 25/1/4/37

We refer to our O.PA24522 and attach
a copy of the Cambodian statement of 29 July
together with our translation.

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

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រដ្ឋាភិបាល កម្ពុជា ប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ

MISSION DU GOUVERNEMENT
DU KAMPUCHEA DEMOCRATIQUE
2, place de Barcelone, PARIS 16^e
TÉL. 527.17-21

DECLARATION DE
LA MISSION DU GOUVERNEMENT
DU KAMPUCHEA DEMOCRATIQUE
EN FRANCE

Le 12 Juillet 1976, les autorités françaises ont informé la Mission du Gouvernement du Kampuchea Démocratique en France de leur décision de mettre fin à ses activités. Il s'agit d'un nouvel acte inamical des autorités françaises à l'égard du Kampuchea Démocratique et à son peuple.

Dans le passé, durant la guerre d'agression de l'impérialisme américain, les autorités françaises se sont placées du côté des ennemis du peuple du Kampuchea depuis le début jusqu'à la fuite des américains de Phnom Penh, en privilégiant leurs relations avec le régime des traîtres que l'histoire a condamné. Après la libération du Kampuchea, elles continuent à accorder aide et protection aux traîtres et à soutenir les activités de ces derniers contre le Kampuchea Démocratique. En même temps, elles ont encouragé sinon activement inspiré les viles campagnes de basses calomnies et de mensonges sans précédent contre le nouveau Kampuchea.

Le Kampuchea Démocratique, fidèle à sa politique de paix, d'indépendance, de neutralité et de non-alignement, ne s'ingère en aucune façon dans les affaires intérieures d'autres pays, y compris la France. Il respecte scrupuleusement le principe selon lequel chaque pays est souverain et dispose du droit de décider lui-même de ses propres affaires sans ingérence étrangère. Mais le Kampuchea Démocratique s'oppose résolument à toute ingérence sous quelque forme que ce soit dans ses affaires intérieures.

A l'égard de la France, le Kampuchea Démocratique est toujours animé d'une bonne volonté dans ses efforts en vue de promouvoir des relations amicales avec elle sur une base nouvelle de respect réciproque et d'égalité, et de non-ingérence, et a œuvré en conséquence. Mais ses efforts se sont heurtés aux actes inamicaux de la part des autorités françaises et des milieux qui les ont inspirés.

La Mission du Gouvernement du Kampuchea Démocratique en France tient à renouveler, au nom du peuple du Kampuchea, les remerciements sincères et profonds au peuple français et ses organisations démocratiques qui ont toujours accordé au peuple du Kampuchea, leur sympathie et leur soutien indéfectible à sa juste lutte contre l'agression impérialiste ainsi qu'à ses efforts pour défendre et édifier le Kampuchea Démocratique. Elle saisit cette occasion pour remercier également les nombreux amis français qui, dans le passé comme actuellement, n'ont pas ménagé leurs efforts pour œuvrer en vue de promouvoir une amitié véritable entre nos deux peuples basée sur le respect réciproque et stricte de l'indépendance nationale, la souveraineté, la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures, l'intégrité territoriale, ainsi que l'égalité et l'intérêt réciproque.



Paris, le 29 Juillet 1976

DECLARATION BY THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHIA IN FRANCE

On 12 July 1976, the French authorities informed the Mission of the Government of Democratic Kampuchia in France of their decision to terminate its activities. This is another unfriendly action by the French authorities towards Democratic Kampuchia and its people.

In the past, during the war of aggression by American imperialism, the French authorities placed themselves on the side of the enemies of the Cambodian people until the flight of the Americans from Phnom Penh, by privileging their relations with the regime of traitors that history has condemned. After the liberation of Cambodia, they continue to grant aid and protection to the traitors and to support the activities of the latter against Democratic Kampuchia. At the same time, they have encouraged if not actively inspired vile campaigns of base slanders and lies without precedent against the new Cambodia.

Democratic Kampuchia, faithful to its policy of peace, independence, neutrality and non-alignment, does not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of other countries, including France. It scrupulously respects the principle by virtue of which each country is sovereign and retains the right to decide itself about its own affairs without foreign interference. But Democratic Kampuchia is resolutely opposed to any form of interference whatsoever in its internal affairs.

With regard to France, Democratic Kampuchia is still actuated by good will in its efforts to promote friendly relations with it on a new basis of mutual respect and equality, and of non-interference, and has worked accordingly. But its efforts have encountered unfriendly actions by the French authorities and the milieux they inspired.

The Mission of the Government of Democratic Kampuchia in France wishes to renew, in the name of the Cambodian people, its sincere and profound thanks to the French people and its democratic organisations which have always given the people of Cambodia their sympathy and unfailing support in its just struggle against imperialist aggression as well as in its efforts to defend and build Democratic Kampuchia. It seizes this opportunity to also thank the many French friends who, in the past and at the present time, have not stinted their efforts to work towards promoting a real friendship between our two peoples based on mutual and strict respect for national independence, sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, territorial integrity, as well as equality and mutual interest.

29.7.76

CENTRAL REGISTRY

D.F.A.

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INWARDS

*R. [unclear] to INC pls.
copy M/T 18/8*

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE DIENA
75116 PARIS

File No: 225/21/2

Memo No: 747

30 July, 1976

25/1/4/37

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

FRENCH VIEWS ON CAMBODIAN FOREIGN POLICY

I spoke to Causeret, Cambodia/Laos desk officer, MFA, on 28 July 1976 about recent developments in Cambodian foreign policy.

2. Causeret said that he could see no logic behind the Cambodian initiatives of the last couple of months and that some decisions were nothing short of bizarre. Causeret said that a possible explanation for the illogicality could be that whereas some of the Cambodian moves were independent and original others were inspired from Peking. Causeret warned that this was only a hypothesis at this stage, but the examples seemed to fit the theory rather neatly.

ASEAN

3. The correct relations between Thailand and Cambodia are seen by the French as being Peking's handiwork. A Thai diplomat recently confirmed this to us and said how indebted the Thais are to the Chinese for this diplomatic assistance. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and the three other ASEAN states could also be cited as evidence of the Chinese connection as they each followed a thaw in relations between the PRC and each of these countries.

Chile

4. Causeret cited the "Chile Affair" to advance his hypothesis. Causeret's version of this affair is that the establishment of diplomatic relations between Chile and Cambodia was announced in Peking and not in Phnom Penh. The Cambodian representative at the Algiers non-aligned countries preparatory meeting was taken by surprise by the announcement and denied it as soon as the preparatory meeting put it to him that such relations were unacceptable to the non-aligned movement. Causeret said that this episode could well be interpreted as Chinese high-handedness in directing Cambodian foreign policy.

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Fretilin

5. I asked Causeret how he interpreted the recent visit by a Fretilin delegation. Le Monde of 25-26 July reported that a Fretilin delegation led by Aberio Ario arrived in Phnom Penh on 23 July and was warmly received by Ieng Sary. Causeret was inclined to believe that this was an independent Cambodian initiative as the Cambodian leaders were deeply suspicious of Indonesia and had not forgiven Indonesia for allowing Lon Nol to stop over in Bali after his escape from Phnom Penh.

France

6. Causeret was at a complete loss to explain why the Cambodians had singled out France for their 13 June "warning against the campaign of denigration and calumny^{accusations} towards Democratic Kampuchea". Causeret pointed out that Paris was the site of the only Cambodian Government office in the western world and that the atrocity stories had been carried by most western newspapers. (It seems particularly unlikely that Peking influenced this particular initiative. At the same time as the "warning" was issued in Paris, the chief of the French general staff, General Guy Méry, was being given extraordinarily warm treatment in China.)

Europe

7. We admitted to Causeret that we were quite baffled by some of Cambodia's recent overtures to European countries. Causeret confessed a similar reaction. The Cambodians were not even seeking to enhance their status with the non-aligned movement as they had approached not only the Swiss and the Austrians, but had also made overtures towards the NATO member-states of Denmark and Italy. This could only hurt Cambodia's non-aligned credentials as these moves had come before relations had been established with many leaders of the non-aligned movement. Causeret said the Quai d'Orsay had been taken completely by surprise over the overtures towards Italy which had no ties with or interest in Cambodia and which did not even have Cambodians living in the country.

USSR

8. I raised the question of the establishment of a USSR Embassy in Phnom Penh, which was referred to in your memorandum 355 of 8 June 1976. Causeret said that as far as he knew the discussions between Cambodia and the USSR had in fact broken down.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to the posts listed below.

Roland Rich

(Roland Rich)
Third Secretary

cc Australian Embassy, PEKING
cc " " BANGKOK
cc " " HANOI

Memo No: OP
Memo No: OP
Memo No: OP

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43.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TOR 0123 31.7.76

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/113

RP.
RR PEKING/46 BANGKOK/65 WASHINGTON/533
RR HANOI (VIA VIENTIANE)/43 VIENTIANE/13

FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/21/2/7

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIAN MISSION IN PARIS

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA MISSION IN PARIS ISSUED STATEMENT
29 JULY WHICH IN PART STATES:

BEINGS

ON 12 JULY 1976, THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
INFORMED THE MISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA IN FRANCE OF THEIR DECISION TO PUT AN END
TO ITS ACTIVITIES. THIS IS A NEW UNFRIENDLY ACT
ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES TOWARDS
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA AND ITS PEOPLE ...
ENDS.

NOTE GOES ON TO ATTACK FRANCE FOR HAVING BEEN "ON THE SIDE OF THE
ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE" FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF THE AMERICAN
"AGGRESSION" AGAINST CAMBODIA AND FOR CONTINUING TO PROTECT TRAI-
TORS AND HELP THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA.

2. CAUSERET, CAMBODIA/LAOS DESK OFFICER, MFA, GAVE US A
DIFFERENT VERSION OF THE AFFAIR TODAY 30 JULY. HE SAID FRANCE HAD
NEVER RECOGNISED THE MISSION AS AN EMBASSY: IT HAD ALWAYS REMAINED
THE GRUNK MISSION. IN APRIL 1975 FRANCE HAD GIVEN KEYS TO
PROPERTY OF EMBASSY OF KHMER REPUBLIC TO GRUNK MISSION BUT HAD NOT
RECEIVED RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO FRENCH PROPERTY
IN PHNOM PENH. GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN GIVEN QUASI-DIPLOMATIC
STATUS AND HAD ENJOYED SOME PRIVILEGES INCLUDING TAX EXEMPTIONS AND
SPECIAL IDENTITY CARDS.

3. CAUSERET SAID THAT GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES HAD ABUSED
THEIR POSITION. THEY WERE DRIVING THE KHMER REPUBLIC'S DIPLOMATIC
CARS AND WERE PERFORMING CONSULAR FUNCTIONS. THEY HAD ALSO
CONDUCTED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AMONGST CAMBODIAN RESIDENTS, TO
WHICH FRENCH HAD PREVIOUSLY TURNED A BLIND EYE. FURTHER, THE
FRENCH HAD RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION ON THEIR REQUEST TO SEND
SOMEONE TO LOOK AFTER FRENCH PROPERTY IN PHNOM PENH.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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4. ON 12 JULY MFA INFORMED GRUNK MISSION THAT IN FUTURE ALL PRIVILEGES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, THUS REDUCING GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES TO STATUS OF ALIENS WHO MUST REGISTER PERIODICALLY AND PROVE THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES.

5. CAUSERET SAID CAMBODIAN DECISION TO PUT AN END TO THEIR ACTIVITIES HAD CAUGHT MFA BY SURPRISE. (THE DELAY IN RESPONSE SINCE 12 JULY HE ATTRIBUTED TO TIME NEEDED TO COMMUNICATE WITH PHNOM PENH VIA PEKING). GRUNK MISSION ITSELF TRIED TO NEGOTIATE ITS STATUS ON 15 AND 19 JULY BUT MFA REGARDED THIS AS HAVING BEEN AT THE MISSION'S OWN INITIATIVE. IN FACT HE DOUBTED THAT THE MISSION WOULD CLOSE AND COUNSELLED US TO WAIT AND SEE IF CAMBODIAN DEEDS MATCHED THEIR WORDS.

6. CAUSERET ALSO MENTIONED THAT IN ANY CASE THERE WAS STILL A FUNK 'MOVEMENT' HERE, THOUGH MFA BELIEVED THIS WAS COMPOSED PURELY OF RESIDENT CAMBODIANS WHO COMMUNICATED WITH PHNOM PENH SOLELY THROUGH THE GRUNK MISSION.

7. THE KAMPUCHEA MISSION HERE IS OF COURSE THE ONLY ONE REMAINING IN THE WEST, AND PROBABLY MORE SIGNIFICANTLY THERE IS A SIZEABLE KHMER COMMUNITY IN FRANCE. THE FRENCH HAVE PRESUMABLY BEEN USING THIS AS LEVERAGE ON THE CAMBODIANS TO GET SOME PRESENCE (HOWEVER NOMINAL) BACK INTO PHNOM PENH. IT MAY BE THAT THE LATTER WILL EVENTUALLY DECIDE THIS IS WORTH CONTINUED ACCESS TO THE CAMBODIAN COMMUNITY HERE, WHICH SEEMS TO BE WHY MFA DOUBTS THAT THE MISSION WILL IN FACT CLOSE DOWN.

8. TEXT OF STATEMENT BY BAG.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JIO
PM AND C

ACTION : SA / EUR

SEC DEP SECS EX MCO FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) NA FAS(WES)
ASP FAS(DEF) DP DC HOCI FAS(IOC) IO FAS(PCF)
INF FAS(MFS) FAREP(S-M-P)

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JUN 25 10 24 AM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

Memo No: 574

File No: 225/21/2/7

14 June 1976

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA, ACTCAMBODIA

In recent months the non-Communist French press has carried a lot of articles on the present situation in Cambodia, most of them based on refugee reports and for the most part strongly critical of the reported excesses of the present regime. "France-Soir" recently ran a series of articles on anti-Communist guerilla bands which one of its correspondents claimed to have visited inside Cambodia.

2. The Mission of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea in Paris has reacted in two ways. Some weeks ago, it organized a voluntary return to Phnom Penh by a group of Cambodian residents in France - most of them students and young men, although they included one former provincial governor. The group were interviewed on French television before departure and in answer to questions dismissed or played down the atrocity reports.

3. Since then, the Mission has issued a statement dated 13 June "warning" French and international opinion "against the campaign of denigration and calumny towards Democratic Kampuchea being undertaken at present by a few journalists who are debasing their profession ...". The statement as reported in Le Monde goes on to say that the French authorities "bear a large part of the responsibility for these activities which are a serious attack on the honour and dignity of Democratic Kampuchea. This attitude belies completely the oft repeated affirmations of those same authorities to the effect that they are disposed to normalize their relations with the government of Democratic Kampuchea". The statement also stresses that the present government's authority extends over the whole of the national territory, that security is "totally assured" and that the establishment of the new institutions has received the enthusiastic and unanimous approval of the population which is deeply attached to the new society of Kampuchea "where happiness, equality, justice and genuine democracy reign".

2/5 to the R/S in the Woodward on return 2/6
Mr. Shand - Mr. Woodward might be interested in this.
Mr. Vell - copies to WC, IUP, JO. 11/6/76, 10/6/76

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
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4. Le Monde, which has at times taken a rather apologetic line over the present regime and the atrocity stories, but has felt obliged to do a little back-tracking in recent months, comments that the best way for the authorities in Phnom Penh to combat the "campaign of denigration" would be to authorize foreign journalists to visit Cambodia and work normally there.

5. The French do not seem to have heeded the Cambodian Mission's "warning". In a statement on foreign affairs made to the French Senate on 15 June, Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues had this to say:

"On Cambodia, I can only be brief. The new authorities in the country have turned in on themselves and are pursuing with singular brutality plans which they developed during an all too long war. Our emotion at the sufferings of this people is commensurate with the affection we bore it and which we still have".

6. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the Australian Embassies, Bangkok and Hanoi.



(H.D. Anderson)
Ambassador

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with Mr P. Amiot, Consellor, French Embassy
 on 5 May 1976
 Officers Present Mr T.D. Wilson, Head, Indo-China Section

25/1/4/37

S-1

(F)

MAIN SUBJECTS (S): SITUATION IN INDO-CHINA : FRENCH RELATIONS
WITH THE INDO-CHINESE STATES

Mr Amiot called at his own request to discuss Indo-Chinese matters. His initiative was prompted by his earlier, introductory call on Mr Woodard. He was well prepared with information on French views and policies and seemed to be anxious to develop a regular exchange of views. His interest in the Indo-China area seemed partly motivated by the fact of a previous posting in Phnom Penh.

Cambodia

2. Mr Amiot said that the French Government was appalled by what had happened in Cambodia since the fall of Phnom Penh. It was very bitter news for Frenchmen to hear that such things occurred in a former French colony and the Government had to take cognisance of this. He volunteered the French estimate that 300,000 people, including most of the officials and army officers of the former regime, had been killed in Cambodia since April last year. The French view was that the Khmer Rouge had simply not been ready to take over the administration of the whole country and that the tragedy that had occurred could be attributed to this.

3. Mr Amiot then went on to say that the French Government nevertheless had formed the opinion that the situation in Cambodia was improving. The Khmer Communist Party was gradually consolidating its bases and the recent rice harvest had, fortunately, been a good one. For the moment, however, Cambodia's foreign policy seemed to be irretrievably tied to China and he thought it would be some time before the country became much

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Report prepared by

(T.D. Wilson)

Mr. Lang
M

- 2 -

more outward-looking.

4. Mr Amiot said that, like Australia and many other countries, France had no formal relations with Cambodia. The French Foreign Minister had, however, recently stated publicly in Paris that France was ready to enter into diplomatic relations with the new Cambodian Government. Although this did not in fact represent a change of policy, its significance lay in the fact that the French view was in this way at this time. Realistically, the French did not expect that they would be high up on the Cambodian's list of priority countries and indeed they were not particularly anxious to open a mission in Phnom Penh until the situation there improved further. Nevertheless, it was not possible, Mr Amiot said, for the French to forget very easily a relationship that went back over a century and he was optimistic that in due course relations between the two countries would be good. In reply to my question, Mr Amiot thought that aid would follow as a matter of course after France resumed relations with Cambodia, but for the moment there was no aid and no prospect of it. Mr Amiot then cited "an interesting incident" at the FUNK/GRUNK mission in Paris. The head of the mission had invited about 3,000 Paris intellectuals, etc. to a meeting to which he had sought, not with much success, to correct the current image of the Cambodian regime. The Quai d'Orsay, though not invited formally, had sent a reasonably senior official to the meeting.

5. I told Mr Amiot that Australia was in many respects in a similar position to France and we shared many of their views on the internal situation. We had almost no first-hand information on which to base our assessments but the holding of elections, the reshuffling of the Government and the removal of Prince Sihanouk, together with signs of a slightly more outward looking foreign policy all pointed to the growing confidence of the regime. Our informal contacts with Cambodian officials had declined in frequency in recent months and we were interested in reviving some sort of contact, but we had no indication whether this might lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. Public opinion in Australia had reacted fairly strongly to reports of Cambodian atrocities and we too had to take account of this. I drew his attention to recent statements in Parliament on this subject by the Minister. I commented on the fact that his figure for the number of deaths was significantly lower than

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others which had been published and which varied between 500,000 and 1,500,000.

Laos

6. Mr Amiot presented a rather gloomier picture of Laos than is generally accepted to be the case. He said there was widespread opposition to the Government with a Meo rebellion in the north, insecurity elsewhere, and considerable popular unrest because of harsh political and social constraints, re-education "seminars" and food shortages. The Soviet Union has assumed a position as principal benefactor to the new Lao regime and there were a number of indications of difficulties in relations with China. Despite all this, he claimed that French relations with Laos remained good, although confidentially he expected that French aid to Laos this year would be lower than the 25 million francs given last year.

7. I told Mr Amiot that our assessment of the internal situation in Laos was not as pessimistic as his own, although this may have been because of a slight improvement in the situation inside the country. Even before my own departure from Vientiane it had been widely accepted that the Meo insurgency in the north-east had been brought under control and in mid-April the Lao Minister for Information had gone so far as to claim that it had been completely suppressed. We did not necessarily accept that this was the case, but nevertheless were of the opinion that the continuing insurgency in various areas was not a significant threat to the Government. At the same time Pathet Lao efforts to control dissidence had not so far proved very effective. We did not see the Pathet Lao regime as being as harsh as was the case in the other Indo-Chinese countries although they often pursued policies rather ineptly and in apparent ignorance of the likely consequences. In our view the recent clamp down was more surprising for how late it had come in view of stated Pathet Lao policies. Speaking frankly, our own feeling was that French/Lao relations had deteriorated significantly since the take-over of the Vientiane branch of the Bank of Indo-China in September last year. French aid credits to Laos had been frozen and the Lao were becoming more openly critical of French policy, for example, in respect of refugees. (Mr Amiot did not comment on this but indicated his appreciation of our views). We too saw the Soviet influence as predominant in Laos. They had seized the opportunity to gain a key position of influence, but the Chinese seemed to feel that Laos would eventually succumb

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to Chinese influence as a matter of natural evolution.

Viet-Nam

8. At Mr Amiot's suggestion the conversation did not go into a great deal of detail about the internal situation in Viet-Nam. Mr Amiot had some information about the next Vietnamese economic plan, including many statistics, which he proposed to fill out and let us have. I expressed interest in receiving these. I said our own impression was that for the moment the Vietnamese were concentrating on their twin priorities of national reunification and post-war reconstruction.

9. Mr Amiot said that Vietnamese foreign policy seemed to be aimed at preserving as many options for Viet-Nam as possible and in diversifying its sources of aid, technical assistance, technology and capital. Although the Soviet influence in Hanoi was undeniable, the French had noticed a number of issues on which the Vietnamese chose to differ with the Russians. The Vietnamese attitude to ASEAN had initially been very hostile but in recent weeks their attitude seemed to have softened considerably in the French view. The Vietnamese also seemed to be disposed to join regional organisations and their presence at the ADB Council meeting in Jakarta was significant, he thought. I told Mr Amiot that our thinking on Viet-Nam coincided closely with the French. We had been particularly struck by the absence of any evidence so far of increased Vietnamese support to insurgent movements in the area, although their verbal support had of course continued. We had been told by the Indonesians that their Ambassador would soon return to Hanoi with an invitation to the DRV Foreign Minister to visit Indonesia. We saw this as an encouraging sign. (Mr Amiot questioned this and said that he thought this initiative by the Indonesians had "failed"). Mr Amiot asked about the Soviet collective security scheme which had been mentioned in passing by Mr Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress. I said that as far as we knew the Vietnamese had not endorsed it although the Lao seemed to have, judging by statements made during Lao Prime Minister Kaysone's current visit to the Soviet Union.

10. French relations with Viet-Nam were improving, Mr Amiot said. The recent visits of senior French officials to Hanoi had contributed to this and negotiation of an agreement on cultural and technical cooperation was "well-advanced". The Vietnamese had indicated quite specifically

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that they wanted French cultural associations to be re-established on an active basis in the South and Mr Amiot thought that there was considerable room for development of a cultural exchange program. French aid to Viet-Nam was thus continuing, although he could not yet give me details. France was optimistic about French/Vietnamese relations in the long term, but he thought that the progress would be slow in the first instance.

11. I sketched briefly the state of Australian/Vietnamese relations. We would continue to give aid to Viet-Nam but the nature and time-frame of this had not yet been decided. Mr Amiot was interested to hear that the new Ambassador had arrived and agreed that this seemed to constitute a deliberate policy of maintaining relations on a good basis.

12. Mr Amiot asked about the Australian Government's policy towards China and the visit of Mr Fraser to China and Japan. I suggested that he speak to Mr Sadlier on these matters.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
84-86, AVENUE D'IÉNA
75116 PARIS

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CENTRAL REGISTER
D.E.A.

File No: 225/21/2

NOV 10 4 25 PM '75

Memo No: 1186

ADM. INDEX SUBJECT

3 November 1975

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

N. H. K. INC AL
PR 5/1/4/37

FRANCE-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS.

Our cable PA17188 of 16 October 1975 replying to your circular memorandum of 25 September 1975 crossed with your further memorandum 649 of 15 October. Following your O.CH283344 of 28 October we spoke again (31 October) to MFA, on this occasion with M. Causeret who has just taken over the Cambodia/Laos desk at the Quai d'Orsay.

2. Causeret's comments on French-Cambodian relations followed the same lines as those made the previous week by Directeur for Asia-Oceania, Noiville, (see PA17188) although in referring to French interests in Cambodia Causeret drew a clear distinction between French property (both public and private) and the credits granted to the Sihanouk government just before it was overthrown. Causeret said that whilst the French were prepared to forget about compensation for property, they considered that Sihanouk still had responsibility for paying back the government debt incurred under his previous régime. Causeret stressed however that the French were not setting this as a pre-condition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. He agreed with the comment that the chances of getting the new Cambodian government to accept responsibility for the debt were virtually non-existent, but said that the French Ministry of Finance was "demanding satisfaction" before agreeing to consider giving aid to Cambodia - not that he thought a request for aid would be forthcoming in the near future.

3. With reference to the question in paragraph 2 of your circular memorandum 649, Causeret said he did not think the Cambodians would make a distinction between establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of missions. He imagined that both would be covered in the one set of negotiations. He added that before concluding any such negotiations (which had not even begun) the French would want to send some sort of exploratory mission to Phnom Penh to check on the condition of the former Embassy premises.

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
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In any case it was up to the Cambodians to take the first step. Causemet commented that Sihanouk's estimation that relations between the two countries might be established in one or two years or possibly sooner (O.PA17067) probably reflected the Prince's personal regard for France rather than official Khmer policy.



(Sue Baldwin)
Second Secretary.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37

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TO.
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE AND CAMBODIA

FRENCH NATIONALS FROM THE FIRST CONVOY OUT OF PHNOM PENH ARRIVED IN PARIS ON 6 MAY. THE PRESS REPORTED THE SECOND CONVOY, BRINGING THE REMAINING 250 OR SO PEOPLE FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH, TO BE IN SISOPHON THAT DAY.

2. ON 7 MAY BOUFFANDEAU (CAMBODIAN DESK, MFA) SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO LOCAL PRESS SPECULATION ARISING FROM THE EVACUEES' PACT NOT TO DISCLOSE WHAT THEY HAD SEEN AND EXPERIENCED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ALL OCCUPANTS OF THE PHNOM PENH EMBASSY WERE SAFELY OUT OF CAMBODIA, AS FAR AS THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY KNEW THEY HAD WITNESSED NO ATROCITIES. AGAIN CONTRARY TO PRESS REPORTS, HE DID NOT EXPECT THE SECOND CONVOY TO REACH THE THAI BORDER FOR ANOTHER 24 OR 48 HOURS. THE FIRST CONVOY HAD TAKEN TWO DAYS TO REACH KOMPONG CHHNANG, BY BACK ROADS, THE MAIN ROAD (RN5) BEING UNUSABLE. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRIP HAD TAKEN A FURTHER 30 HOURS OR SO. ONE THEREFORE HAD TO ALLOW AT LEAST 7 DAYS FOR THE TRUCKS TO MAKE THE TWO-WAY JOURNEY.

3. BOUFFANDEAU SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE FRENCH VICE-CONSUL (DYRAC) HAD TOLD ANYONE ON THE FIRST CONVOY OF HIS FUTURE INTENTIONS BUT BOUFFANDEAU'S HUNCH WAS THAT HE WOULD BE A MEMBER OF THE SECOND PARTY. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO REMAIN IN PHNOM PENH FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND, ACCORDING TO THE EVACUEES, FOOD, ALTHOUGH OF POOR QUALITY AND IN BARELY ADEQUATE QUANTITIES, WAS BEING SUPPLIED TO THE EMBASSY COMPOUND BY THE KHMERS ROUGES. HOWEVER BOUFFANDEAU SAID THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT DYRAC COULD STAY WOULD BE MADE BY THE KHMERS ROUGES. NEVERTHELESS, HE CORRECTED US WHEN WE REFERRED TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE EVACUEES AS AN "EXPULSION": IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER, HE SAID, OF THEIR HAVING BEEN TOLD THAT THERE WAS NO PRESENT ROLE FOR THEM IN CAMBODIA AND THAT TRUCKS WERE BEING PROVIDED TO CONVEY THEM TO THE BORDER.

4. BOUFFANDEAU SAID THAT THE GRUNC FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS FUNCTIONING IN PEKING LIKE A NORMAL FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THAT FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH IT WERE NORMAL. HE CONCEDED HOWEVER THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN

Mr. Keffau

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JB 13/11

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE GRUNC, DESPITE FRENCH EFFORTS TO DO SO THROUGH ALL THE CAPITALS WHERE THE GRUNC IS REPRESENTED. THE FRENCH HAD NO INFORMATION ON THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GRUNC MINISTERS IN PEKING AND THE IN-COUNTRY AUTHORITIES.

5. THE FRENCH HAD GIVEN THE KEYS OF THE CAMBODIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS TO THE GRUNC MISSION HERE, WHICH HAD "PRESUMABLY" OCCUPIED THE PREMISES (ACCORDING TO THE PRESS IT HAS DONE SO). NO MEMBER OF THE GRUNC MISSION HOWEVER HAD YET BEEN FORMALLY DESIGNATED CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OR OTHERWISE ACCREDITED TO THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES AS A MEMBER OF A GRUNC EMBASSY. THE HEAD OF THE GRUNC MISSION, OK SAKUN, WAS CURRENTLY IN PEKING FOR THE QUEEN MOTHER'S CREMATION. HIS FUTURE STATUS IN FRANCE MIGHT BE MADE CLEARER BY THE GRUNC WHEN HE RETURNED TO PARIS.

6. BOUFFANDEAU SAID THAT THE EVACUEES HAD BROUGHT VIRTUALLY NO INFORMATION ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. PHNOM PENH APPEARED TO BE UNDER A TEMPORARY, PROBABLY MILITARY, ADMINISTRATION THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF ANY FIGHTING OR STRUGGLE. IN CASUAL CONVERSATION SOME KHMER ROUGE TROOPS HAD REFERRED TO PRINCE SIHANOUK SIMPLY AS "SIHANOUK" WHEREAS OTHERS REFERRED TO HIM AS "SAMDECH" (I.E. THE HONORIFIC CUSTOMARILY APPLIED TO HIM). ONE COULD NOT HOWEVER DEDUCE ANYTHING VERY RELIABLE FROM SUCH SLIGHT INDICATIONS. BOUFFANDEAU SAID THAT THE FRENCH DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER ANY OF THE GRUNC MINISTERS WERE IN PHNOM PENH.

7. BOUFFANDEAU SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD NO REASON TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE REPORT RECENTLY PUBLISHED HERE, AND ATTRIBUTED (ERRONEOUSLY BOUFFANDEAU SAID) TO THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY, THAT OTHER (UNSPECIFIED) DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN PHNOM PENH WERE BEING LEVELLED TO THE GROUND. THE EVACUEES FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY KNEW NOTHING BEYOND WHAT THEY HAD SEEN FROM THE EMBASSY COMPOUND OR FROM THE TRUCKS.

8. SEE ALSO OUR O.PA12978 ON THE REPORT BY A JOURNALIST EVACUEE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

39B

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ACTION: SA/EUR

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) NA FAS(WES) ASP
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BANGKOK HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW
NEW YORK UN PARIS EMB PEKING RANGOON SINGAPORE TEHRAN TOKYO VIENNA
VIENTIANE WARSAW WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

38

O.PA12978 ST13
TOR 0913 8.5.75

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/275

FM. PARIS EMB /

R E S T R I C T E D

CAMBODIA

THE FOLLOWING ARE POINTS OF INTEREST FROM AN ARTICLE BY DE BEER, LE MONDE (UNDERLINE TWO) CORRESPONDENT WHO WAS ON THE FIRST CONVOY OF EVACUEES FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH. (THE SILENCE PACT AMONGST THE EVACUEES HAS APPARENTLY BROKEN DOWN). THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY TELLS US THAT THIS ACCOUNT TALLIES WITH THAT PROVIDED BY EMBASSY STAFF WHO WERE ALSO IN THE CONVOY.

2. THE ONLY REFERENCE TO THE NATURE OF THE " REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES" IS MENTION OF A " VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE MILITARY COMMAND OF THE CITY OF PHNOM PENH IN CHARGE OF FOREIGNERS' AFFAIRS".

3. THE REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITIES HAD REFUSED TO LET THE FRENCH EVACUATE BY AIRCRAFT BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO ARRANGE THE EVACUATION BY THEIR OWN MEANS WITHOUT ANY EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE AND TO SHOW THAT THEY DID NOT APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGNERS ON THEIR SOIL IN VIEW OF KHIEU SAMPHAN'S SOLEMN DEMAND SOME THREE MONTHS AGO THAT THEY SHOULD LEAVE THE COUNTRY.

4. THE CONVOY HAD PASSED IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY WHICH, CONTRARY TO SOME RUMOURS, HAD NOT BEEN BURNT.

5. THE CITIES OF PHNOM PENH AND KOMPONG CHHNANG WERE COMPLETELY DESERTED APART FROM SOME KR SOLDIERS. MANY REFUGEES WERE SEEN ON THE ROADS, FEW PEASANTS WERE WORKING THE FIELDS IN FORMER REPUBLICAN ZONES. THE PEASANTS IN LIBERATED ZONES OF LONG-STANDING APPEARED MUCH HEALTHIER AND BETTER FED THAN PEOPLE OF FORMER REPUBLICAN AREAS. REPUBLICAN BANKNOTES HAVE BEEN DEMONETIZED.

6. THE CONVOY TOOK ON ONE FRENCH CITIZEN AND APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED PAKISTANIS IN BATTAMBANG. SOME PAKISTANIS WHO HAD NO PAPERS WERE TURNED BACK BY THE THAI AUTHORITIES AT THE BORDER.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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BANGKOK DACCA GENEVA HANOI HONG KONG ISLAMABAD JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR
LONDON MANILS MOSCOW NEW YORK UN PEKING RANGOON SINGAPORE TOKYO
VIENTIANE WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37.

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TO.
RR CANBERRA/277

FM. PARIS EMB /

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FRANCE AND CAMBODIA

FRENCH NATIONALS FROM THE FIRST CONVOY OUT OF PHNOM PENH ARRIVED IN PARIS ON 6 MAY. THE PRESS REPORTED THE SECOND CONVOY, BRINGING THE REMAINING 250 OR SO PEOPLE FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH, TO BE IN SISOPHON THAT DAY.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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PRIME MINISTER
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MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ACTION: SA/EUR

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BANGKOK HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW
NEW YORK UN PARIS EMB PEKING RANGOON SINGAPORE TEHRAN TOKYO VIENNA
VIENTIANE WARSAW WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

25/1/4/37

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
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FM. PARIS EMB

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIA

DE LABOULAYE (DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA) SAID ON 22 APRIL THAT THE FRENCH WERE GETTING REPORTS FROM THEIR VICE CONSUL IN PHNOM PENH BUT THAT HE WAS WORKING UNDER CONDITIONS OF EXTRAORDINARY DIFFICULTY, HE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEAVE THE EMBASSY PREMISES AT ALL SO FAR AND IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A RELIABLE PICTURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE VICE CONSUL HAD HAD SOME CONTACT BY TELEPHONE WITH AN UNNAMED MEMBER OF THE NEW " CITY COUNCIL " WHO HAD ARRANGED TO RESTORE THE INTERRUPTED WATER SUPPLY TO THE EMBASSY PREMISES AND HAD HELD OUT SOME PROSPECT OF SEEING HIM OR GIVING HIM AN INTERVIEW.

2. LABOULAYE SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN THE FRENCH EMBASSY PREMISES AND GARDEN - WHICH THE KHMERS ROUGES WERE RESPECTING - HAD GONE DOWN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS FROM SOMETHING NEAR 1,000 TO A TOTAL OF 584 ON 21 APRIL OF WHOM 526 WERE FRENCH NATIONALS. IN RECENT DAYS MORE THAN 600 CAMBODIANS, CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE HAD LEFT THE EMBASSY QUIETLY AND IN GOOD ORDER BUT ABOUT 100 NEW REFUGEES, MOSTLY FRENCH EURASIANS, HAD COME IN. THE FRENCH DOCTOR FROM CALMETTE HOSPITAL, WHO HAD BEEN EARLIER ORDERED OUT OF THE CAPITAL AND WAS NOT ALLOWED TO PRACTISE HAD ALSO TURNED UP THERE IN A SHAKEN CONDITION. THERE WERE ALSO SOME 20-ODD JOURNALISTS (26 ACCORDING TO LE MONDE (UNDERLINE TWO)) THERE WHO WERE UNABLE TO FILE STORIES. THE VICE CONSUL DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN STORIES EMANATING FROM BANGKOK ABOUT THE ALLEGED SHOOTING LAST WEEK OF A PARTY OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS TRYING TO MAKE THEIR WAY FROM THE HOTEL LE PHNOM TO THE EMBASSY. NOR DID HE KNOW HOW MANY JOURNALISTS HAD STAYED.
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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3. THE VICE CONSUL HAD GATHERED THAT THE EVACUATION OF THE CITY ORDERED BY THE KHMERS ROUGES HAD BEEN VERY LARGELY CARRIED OUT BUT THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE WERE NOW COMING BACK FOR A VICTORY PARADE TO BE HELD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND THAT KHIEU SAMPHAN WAS EXPECTED IN THE CITY. OTHERWISE, AND APART FROM THE PRESUMPTIVE EXISTENCE OF A CITY COUNCIL, HE HAD NO INFORMATION WHATEVER ON WHO WAS IN CONTROL IN THE CITY OR THE WHEREABOUTS OF MEMBERS OF GRUNK. NOR DID HE KNOW WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO MEMBERS OF THE FORMER REGIME.

4. AT THE LEVEL OF THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF ASIA/OCEANIA AND BELOW WE HAVE FOUND FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS VERY RETICENT AND GUARDED IN ANY REFERENCES TO THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA OR THE PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIET NAM. I SHOULD BE GLAD THEREFORE IF LABOULAYE COULD BE SAFEGUARDED AS THE SOURCE OF THE INFORMATION IN THIS AND MY IMMEDIATE PRECEDING MESSAGE.

ANDERSON.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
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ACTION: SA

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HANOI HONGKONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW
NEW YORK UN PEKING RANGOON SAIGON SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENNA
VIENTIANE WARSAW WELLINGTON

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
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FM. PARIS EMB / FILE 225/21/2 REF O.CH200696

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIA: FRENCH ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE GRUNK

WHEN CONTACTED AGAIN 14 APRIL BOLLE (ACTING DIRECTOR FOR ASIA-OCEANIA, MFA) WOULD ONLY SAY THAT THERE WAS A " CONTINUOUS EVOLUTION " IN POLICIES, ESPECIALLY IN SITUATIONS WHICH MOVED AS FAST AS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN CAMBODIA " DURING THE COURSE OF LAST WEEK ".

2. THOUGH BOLLE HAD APPEARED ON 8 APRIL NOT TO EXPECT ANY EARLY CHANGE, WE HAD OF COURSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (PA 11736 PARA 4 AND PA 11900) FRENCH MOVEMENT TOWARDS GRUNK. " LE MONDE " REPORTS THAT OTHER COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN DUBLIN OVER WEEKEND REPROACHED FRENCH FOR HAVING ACTED WITHOUT CONSULTING THEM, AND THAT SAUVAGNARGUES REPLIED THAT TIME HAD NOT ALLOWED AS EVENTS HAD MOVED SO FAST.

3. INCIDENTALLY BOOLE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS NOT A CASE OF RECOGNITION OF THE GRUNK. FRANCE RECOGNIZED ONLY CAMBODIA, BUT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ENTER INTO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GRUNK. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH HE SAID THERE IS NO CURRENT INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A MISSION TO THE GRUNK, AS THE LATTER'S SEAT IS IN CAMBODIA. AT DESK LEVEL MFA SAYS THAT GRUNK HAS NOT YET TAKEN STEPS TO ACCREDIT ANYONE (EITHER FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION IN PARIS, OR FROM ELSEWHERE) TO FRANCE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN. AND DEPT. DEFENCE
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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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BANGKOK HANGI HONGKONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA
MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) PEKING RANGOON SAIGON
SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENTIANE WARSAW WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 25/1/4/37 PART 2

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
PP PARIS/9235

FM. CANBERRA / FILE 3016/10/1 REF O. PA12373

C O N F I D E N T I A L

RECOGNITION OF GRUNK

GLAD EARLY ADVICE OF WHY FRENCH CHANGED POLICY ADVISED
IN YOUR O. PA12256.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
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~~Mr Leader~~
The Bruch have stated
a march on us !!

ACTION: SA/EX

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BANGKOK HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON
MANILA MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) PEKING RANGOON
SAIGON SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENTIANE WARSAW WASHINGTON
WELLINGTON

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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FM. PARIS EMB /

U N C L A S S I F I E D

CAMBODIA

FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THIS EVENING 12 APRIL THAT IT HAS ESTABLISHED RELATIONS WITH THE GRUNK.

2. COMMUNIQUE TO PRESS STATED ONLY ABOVE. CABINET OF SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT KHMER REPUBLIC EMBASSY IN PARIS HAS BEEN ASKED TO CLOSE.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
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BANGKOK HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA
MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) PEKING RANGOON SAIGON SINGAPORE
TOKYO VIENTIANE WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

29/1/4/37

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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TO.
PP CANBERRA/1792

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RR SAIGON/002 HANOI/001 BANGKOK/005
RR WASHINGTON/063 WELLINGTON/008 OTTAWA/019
RR JAKARTA/011 KUALA LUMPUR/009 LONDON/232
RR TOKYO/018 PARIS/094 MANILA/005

FM. BONN / FILE 520/3/2 REF. O.CH194212

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VIET-NAM : HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

THE FRG GOVERNMENT HAS CHARTERED TWO VESSELS FROM THE GERMAN HAPAG LLOYD LINE FOR THE EVACUATION OF REFUGEES, SHOULD THIS BECOME POSSIBLE. THE SHIPS WERE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND CHANGED COURSE FOR VIETNAM. ONE IS NOW OFF THE COAST AND THE OTHER IS EXPECTED TO REACH VIETNAMESE WATERS TOMORROW (APRIL 2). THE SHIPS (WHICH ARE CONTAINER VESSELS) CANNOT, FOR OBVIOUS COMMERCIAL REASONS, BE HELD THERE LONG AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS HOPING THAT PROSPECTS FOR AN EVACUATION WILL BECOME CLEAR SOON.

2. HAPAG LLOYD IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND HAS ASKED FOR A SECURITY FORCE TO BE PLACED ON BOARD THE VESSELS. THE FRG GOVERNMENT, BEING UNABLE TO PROVIDE SUCH A FORCE, HAS ASKED FOR HELP FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAS NOW REPLIED THAT "SECURITY IS NO PROBLEM". THE FOREIGN MINISTRY DOES NOT FIND THIS ASSURANCE FULLY CONVINCING AND IS EXAMINING THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FURTHER.

3. WE PASSED SUBSTANCE OF YOUR O.CH193938 TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 29 MARCH. INITIAL REACTION TO THE UNITED STATES' GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST WAS TO INSTRUCT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN SAIGON TO BOOK ANY AVAILABLE AIR CHARTER SPACE FOR REFUGEE EVACUATION. THESE INTENTIONS WERE OVERTAKEN BY THE FALL OF DAMANG THE SAME DAY. THE FRG IS OBVIOUSLY LIMITED IN WHAT IT CAN DO BY THE LACK OF ANY MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THERE IS ALSO SOME FEELING WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THE SITUATION MUST HAVE BEEN FORESEEABLE TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT MEASURES COULD HAVE BEEN CONCERTED IN BETTER TIME. WE WILL CABLE FOREIGN MINISTRY THINKING ON POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL

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per Hecker.

Th. Vincent
We dealt with para 4.

in relation BLG-01

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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RELIEF ACTION AS IT DEVELOPES. AT MIDDLE LEVEL THERE, U N ACTION IS THOUGHT TO BE "IMPROBABLE".

CDU CHAIRMAN KOHL HAS ASKED SCHMIDT (PERHAPS LARGELY FOR LOCAL POLITICAL PURPOSES) TO DISCUSS WITH EEC HEADS OF GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE EUROPEAN AID FOR VIETNAM REFUGEES.

COMMENT (UNDERLINE)

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE OF OUR INTENTIONS, AND EXPRESSED A KEEN INTEREST IN ANY AUSTRALIAN ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

UNFORTUNATELY WE HAVE HAD ONLY PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND OUR OWN PRIVATE SPECULATION TO GO ON AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THE QUALITY OF OUR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IF WE COULD RECEIVE REGULAR CABLED ASSESSMENTS FROM YOU, PARTICULARLY ON THE SCOPE OF HANOI'S PRESENT OBJECTIVES AND SAIGON'S CAPACITY TO OFFER ANY ASSISTANCE TO THE INVASION.

ASSESSMENTS ON THE KHMER REPUBLIC WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL.

... BORDER.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
ADAA
TREASURER AND TREASURY
PM AND C

ACTION : EX

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SEP SEA PNG FAS(NSA) NA
FAS(WES) ASP EUR AME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IOP) IO PC
FAS(PCR) INF FAS(ER) EO EP FAS(LT) FAS(MFS) SVC DIROP FSA
FAREP(S)(P)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

O.CH194472

JPG2

O.CH194472 1902 01.4.75 CLA

TO.
PP PARIS/8940

FM. CANBERRA / REF O.PA11971

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM

WE ARE COPYING TO YOU THE MOST RECENT CABLED ASSESSMENTS
OF THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM. THEY ARE
CONTAINED IN CABLES O.SA2173, O.BK6073, O.BK5928, O.WH16966.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
PM AND C

Satur

ACTION: SA

SEC DEPSECS EX FAS(SEP) SEA FAS(NSA) NA FAS(WES) ASP EUR
FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(IOP) FAS(PCR) INF FAS(ER) FAS(LT) FASMFS)
FAREP(S)(P)

BANGKOK HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW
NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) OTTAWA PEKING RANGOON SAIGON SEOUL
SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENNA VIENTIANE WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

F30

ECLIPSE

O.PP843 MAC4
TOR 1530 10.1.75

O.PP843 1100 10.1.75 CLA ECLIPSE

25/1/4/37

TO.
RR CANBERRA/867

RP.
RR PEKING/014 WASHINGTON/026 PARIS/009

FM. PHNOM PENH / FILE 201/2/12

S E C R E T

CAMBODIA - NEGOTIATIONS

NEITHER AMERICAN NOR FRENCH EMBASSY HERE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT ANY PEACE INITIATIVE MIGHT BE UNDER WAY. AMERICANS HAVE REACTED VERY SENSITIVELY TO CONTINUED LOCAL PRESS STORIES OF PEACE OFFERS BY SIHANOUK INVOLVING PRE-CONDITIONS (O.PP849) AND THE NEWSPAPER THAT HAS PERSISTED IN RUNNING THESE STORIES MAY EVEN BE SUSPENDED. SIHANOUK'S LATEST DECLARATION, OFFERING SIRIK MATAK AND SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ A PLACE IN AN ENLARGED GRUNK (SUBJECT TO KHMER ROUGE AGREEMENT), HAS IRRITATED BOTH RECIPIENTS, BUT THE AMERICANS ARE COUNSELLING AGAINST "DIGNIFYING" THE DECLARATION BY A DENIAL. PERKINS (COUNSELLOR, POLITICAL/MILITARY AFFAIRS) COULD OFFER NO INTERPRETATION OF SIHANOUK'S MOTIVES IN ISSUING HIS RECENT STATEMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME HE EVINCE INTEREST IN LOCAL PRESS REPORT OF POSSIBLE FRENCH MEDIATION AND DESCRIBED MANAC'H AS AN IDEAL GO-BETWEEN.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10

ECLIPSE

ACTION: MR MILLER

MR RENOUF MR PARKINSON MR ROWLAND MR WILLIAMS MCO MR FEAKES
MR JOSEPH MR COOK MR BRADY MR EVANS MR PEACHEY MR BROOK
MR SCHULTZ MR LANG MR MARTYN MR CURTIS MR LAURIE MR TRUSCOTT
MR ROBERTSON MR FERNANDEZ MISS MCPHERSON MR PETERS MR HUME

SECRET

SECRET

25 1/4/37

29

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

O.PA5485 SGL7
TOR 0446 17.7.74

O.PA5485 1815 16.7.74 CLA

TO.
RR CANBERRA/4062

RP.
RR WASHINGTON/114
RR PHNOM PENH/03

FM. PARIS / FILE 225/21/2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAMBODIA: FRENCH VIEWS

BOLLE (SOUS-DIRECTEUR, INDO-CHINA, MFA) SAID ON 16 JULY THAT LON NON WAS STILL IN FRANCE. THE FRENCH HAD APPROVED OF THE AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO KEEP HIM OUT OF CAMBODIA AS LONG AS POSSIBLE: BUT HE IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WERE DOING NOTHING TO PROLONG HIS STAY HERE, ALTHOUGH "HE IS A WELCOME GUEST". THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH HIM. BOLLE UNDERSTOOD FROM THE KHMER CHARGE HERE THAT LON NON INTENDED TO RETURN TO CAMBODIA IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS TIME.

2. SURVEYING THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION MORE GENERALLY, BOLLE COMMENTED THAT PHNOM PENH'S RECENT CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS WAS NO DOUBT RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF CAMBODIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. (CONCURRENTLY PHNOM PENH HAD SENT A NUMBER OF THEIR HIGH-RANKING PERSONALITIES TO AFRICAN AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHOSE VOTES THEY HAD SOME HOPE OF INFLUENCING). PHNOM PENH'S CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, ALSO REFLECTED A GENUINE DESIRE ON THE PART OF PHNOM PENH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE GRUNK PREDICTABLY HAD REJECTED THE INVITATION BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE WINNING. IN THIS THEY WERE MISTAKEN, BOLLE SAID: AS LONG AS IT CONTINUED TO RECEIVE AMERICAN SUPPORT, THE REPUBLICAN REGIME WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT. IN FACT THE SITUATION REMAINED COMPLETELY BLOCKED.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 - 0.PA5485 PASSED

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION MN/ECSA

SEC DEPSECS EX MCO STE FAS(SA) SEA FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW)
PC FAS(DEF) DP IC ICR FAS(IO) UNIA FAS(MS)
BANGKOK HANOI HONG KONG JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA
MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK (UN) PARIS OTTAWA PEKING RANGOON
SAIGON SEOUL SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENNA VIENTIANE WELLINGTON



Jan 15 2 21 PM '74

28
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'ENNA
75116 PARIS

File No.: 211/1/10 + 225/21/2

Memo No.: 25

Date: 7 January 1974

ENCLOSURE

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

25/1/4/37
39

France: Relations with Cambodia and Viet-Nam

....

Attached are questions and answers asked and given in the National Assembly concerning the French Government's attitude towards recognition of the GRUNK and the position of Prince Sihanouk and the Government's intentions in regard to recognising the PRG in Viet-Nam.

2. The questions were asked by M. Odru, who is a Deputy and member of the French Communist Party. As with such replies, it can be taken that the answers have been approved by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. The questions appeared in the official record of the Proceedings of the National Assembly dated 14 December 1973.

4. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Saigon and Washington.

(G. J. Price)
Minister

Indochina Section

To see.

de/ky

Mr. Howe
Mr. Costello

this is useful - copy for our files
mt.
Done

28A1

problème cambodgien doit prendre en considération les positions du gouvernement du prince Sihanouk. C'est dans cet esprit que le gouvernement entretient depuis plus de trois ans des contacts avec le G.R.U.N.C., tant à Pékin qu'à Paris où, comme le sait M. Odru, fonctionne une mission du gouvernement royal, et qu'il a défini sa position dans le récent communiqué publié à Pékin à l'issue de la visite de M. le président de la République. De plus, comme veut bien le rappeler l'honorable parlementaire, la France s'est abstenue lors du vote sur l'inscription de la représentativité de la délégation cambodgienne à l'ordre du jour de l'Assemblée générale de l'O.N.U. La France souhaite que le Cambodge auquel la rattachent tant de liens, retrouve son unité, son intégrité territoriale et sa pleine indépendance et qu'il puisse exercer une politique de véritable neutralité, conformément aux accords de Genève de 1954.

X

Viet-Nam (reconnaissance par la France du gouvernement révolutionnaire du Sud Viet-Nam).

5795. — 7 novembre 1973. — M. Odru rappelle à M. le ministre des affaires étrangères que l'acte final de la conférence internationale de Paris sur le Viet-Nam, dont la France est cosignataire, précise dans ses articles 4 et 5 que : « les parties au présent acte respectent strictement l'accord et les protocoles en s'abstenant de toute action qui ne serait pas conforme à leurs dispositions ». Or les différents articles de l'accord du 27 janvier 1973 placent sur un pied d'égalité l'administration de Saigon et le gouvernement révolutionnaire provisoire du Sud Viet-Nam, ce dernier étant considéré comme une composante politique à part entière du Sud Viet-Nam, avec son pouvoir administratif et ses forces armées entièrement libres de gérer et de défendre les territoires placés sous son contrôle. En renouant des relations diplomatiques avec l'administration de Saigon seulement et en n'effectuant pas la même démarche avec le G.R.P., le Gouvernement français, délibérément ou non, contredit les engagements qu'il a pris à la conférence internationale de Paris sur le Viet-Nam. Il lui demande s'il peut lui exposer les fondements juridiques et politiques de la position actuelle du Gouvernement à l'égard du G.R.P. et quelles mesures il compte prendre pour respecter l'acte final de la conférence internationale de Paris sur le Viet-Nam en reconnaissant sans plus tarder le gouvernement révolutionnaire provisoire du Sud Viet-Nam.

Réponse. — La position que le Gouvernement, depuis la signature des accords de Paris, a adoptée sur le sujet évoqué par l'honorable parlementaire ne contrevient nullement aux dispositions de ces accords. Au surplus, aucun des signataires de l'acte de la conférence internationale de Paris n'a tiré les conséquences juridiques ou pratiques que M. Odru croit pouvoir en tirer. Au demeurant, il est rappelé que le Gouvernement, qui a offert l'hospitalité aux consultations entre les deux parties sud-vietnamiennes, souhaite, pour ce qui le concerne, maintenir les contacts qu'il a établis avec le G.R.P. depuis plusieurs années.

5462. — 20 octobre 1973. — M. Odru rappelle à M. le ministre des affaires étrangères le refus du Gouvernement français de reconnaître le gouvernement royal d'union nationale du Cambodge et les propos qu'il a tenus à ce sujet devant l'Assemblée nationale lors de la séance du mercredi 20 juin 1973. Or, les événements survenus depuis cette date apportent un démenti flagrant aux raisons invoquées en cette occasion pour justifier l'attitude de la France. En effet, tandis que le G.R.U.N.C. contrôle effectivement la plus grande partie du territoire cambodgien, et que le gouvernement soviétique vient de le reconnaître officiellement, c'est maintenant le bureau de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies qui a décidé par 11 voix contre 2 et 10 abstentions, dont celle de la France, de recommander la discussion par l'Assemblée de l'attribution du siège du Cambodge au G.R.U.N.C. En conséquence, il lui demande pour quel motif le Gouvernement français persiste dans une position contraire aux réalités et s'il n'entend pas la modifier en prenant toutes dispositions utiles pour la reconnaissance immédiate du G.R.U.N.C.

Réponse. — Contrairement à ce que pense l'honorable parlementaire, la politique du Gouvernement répond aux réalités actuelles de la question cambodgienne et témoigne qu'il en suit l'évolution avec attention. Aux termes des accords de Paris de janvier, les affaires intérieures du Cambodge doivent être réglées par le peuple cambodgien, sans ingérence extérieure. D'autre part, les événements qui ont marqué cet été l'évolution de la question et National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 25/1/4/37 PART 2

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY - Third Session of 14 December 1973

Question No. 5462, 20 October 1973 - Mr Odru reminds the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the refusal of the French Government to recognise the Royal Government of National Union in Cambodia and of his statements on this subject before the National Assembly during its sitting on Wednesday 20 June 1973. But events since that date have provided a clear contradiction of the reasons given at that time to justify France's attitude. In fact, whilst the GRUNK effectively controls the greater part of Cambodia and the Soviet Government has just officially recognised it, now the bureau of the General Assembly of the United Nations has decided by 11 voices to 2 with 10 abstentions, including France, to recommend for discussion by the General Assembly the allocation of Cambodia's seat to the GRUNK. Consequently, the Minister is asked why the French Government persists in an attitude contrary to the facts and whether he does not intend changing it by taking all necessary steps to recognise the GRUNK immediately.

Answer: Contrary to what the honorable member thinks, the Government's policy is in accord with present realities in the Cambodian question and shows that it follows developments carefully. According to the Paris agreements in January, the internal affairs of Cambodia are to be handled by the Cambodian people, without outside interference. Furthermore, the events that this summer marked developments in the question and that Mr Odru brought up show that a solution to the Cambodian problem must take into account the positions of the Government and of Prince Sihanouk. It is with this in mind that for over three years the Government has maintained contact with the GRUNK, both in Peking and in Paris, where, as Mr Odru knows, the Royal Government maintains a mission, and that it defined its position in the recent communiqué issued in Peking after the visit of the President. And, as the honorable member points out, France abstained in the vote on the inclusion of the question of the representativity of the Cambodian delegation on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. France would like to see Cambodia regain its unity, its territorial integrity and its complete independence and be able to exercise a policy of real neutrality, in accordance with the Geneva agreements of 1954.

28C

Question No. 5795, 7 November 1973 - Mr Odru reminds the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the final act of the international conference on Viet-Nam in Paris, which France signed, states in articles 4 and 5 that "parties to the present act strictly respect the agreement and protocols by refraining from any action that would not conform to its provisions". In fact the various articles of the agreement of 27 January 1973 place on an equal footing both the Saigon administration and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam, the latter being considered a valid political component in South Viet-Nam, with its administrative power and its armed forces quite free to manage and defend the territory placed under its control. By resuming diplomatic relations with the Saigon administration alone and not doing the same with the PRG, the French Government, deliberately or not, is contradicting commitments it undertook at the Viet-Nam talks in Paris. He asks the Minister if he can explain the legal and political basis of the present position of the Government as regards the PRG and what steps it intends to take to comply with the final act of the international conference on Viet-Nam in Paris by recognising without further delay the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Viet-Nam.

Answer: The position adopted by the Government since the signing of the Paris agreements is in no way contrary to the terms of these agreements. Furthermore, none of the signatories of the Paris agreement has drawn the legal or practical conclusions that Mr Odru believes he can draw. After all, he is reminded that the Government, which offered hospitality for the consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties, wishes, for its part, to maintain the contacts it has established with the PRG over several years.

27

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

MA3

I.100601

FROM

TOD 07.9.73...1116 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

TOR 07.9.73...1453 LT

905 UNCLASSIFIED

FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS : KHMER GOVERNMENT STATEMENT.

MY 878.

FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT
OF A STATEMENT PUBLISHED BY THE KHMER GOVERNMENT ON 6 SEPTEMBER :
" HAVING ADHERED SINCE FEBRUARY 1972 TO THE NUCLEAR NON
PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE KHMER REPUBLIC FEELS MORALLY OBLIGED
TO INDICATE ITS CONCERN AT THE SERIES OF ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR
TESTS THE FIRST OF WHICH HAVE RECENTLY TAKEN PLACE.

THESE TESTS CARRIED OUT IN SPITE OF UNANIMOUS INTERNATIONAL
OPINION ADVOCATING THE PROHIBITION OF SUCH TESTS WILL NOT FAIL TO
SERIOUSLY HARM COUNTRIES OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN BY DESTROYING THE
RESOURCES AVAILABLE FROM THE SEA WHICH PROVIDE A PRINCIPAL SOURCE
OF FOOD FOR THEIR POPULATION AND OF THEIR ECONOMIC WELL BEING.

WE ATTACH GREAT VALUE TO THE WISE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE RECOMMENDING THE IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF THESE TESTS
PENDING A FINAL DECISION OF THEIR LEGALITY."

PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER OF STATE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

25/1/4/37

ACTION MN LT

SEC DEP SEC(A) DEP SEC(B) PR MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN
FAS(NWA) NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS
(DVP) ICR FAS(10) EP UNIA FAS(CL) LT CPI FAS(MS)

BANGKOK HONG KONG KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW NEW DELHI
UN NEW YORK OTTAWA PARIS PEKING RANGOON SAIGON SEOUL
SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENTIANE WASHINGTON WELLINGTON



W E 26
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
64-66, AVENUE D'IÉNA
PARIS (16^e)

Memo No.: 819

16 July, 1973

File No.: 225/21/2

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Cambodia: French Policy

.... Attached is a photocopy of the answer to a written question in the National Assembly concerning the French Government's attitude towards recognizing the GRUNK. The question was put by M. Le Foll, who is a member of the United Socialist Party (PSU).

2. M. Le Foll asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs if the Government was contemplating recognizing the GRUNK as the sole authentic representative of the Cambodian people. He pointed out that the GRUNK was run by Sihanouk and that according to observers, it controlled 90% of Cambodian territory and had its troops within 2 kilometres of Phnom Penh. M. Le Foll claimed that Lon Nol did not have the support of the population and relied wholly and solely on American bombardments. M. Le Foll went on to ask whether the French Government would break off all relations with the present Government of Cambodia and condemn the continuation of the bombing.

3. The written reply from the Minister was as follows:

"In so far as it has often, and again recently, had the occasion to state, the Government hopes that Cambodia will soon be able to enjoy the benefits of a long awaited peace in this region within the framework of its re-found neutrality in conformity with the 1954 Geneva Agreements. It is in this spirit that the Government is following with the greatest attention the evolution of the situation in Cambodia. As the Honourable Member knows, the Government has not ceased, since the first day of the conflict, to maintain close contacts with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, not only because of his faithful friendship for France but also because of his position as a representative of Cambodia. The Government hopes strongly that these contacts may be able to contribute to a settlement of the Cambodian problem and the Government is ready to spare no effort to this end. With regard to the bombing, the Paris Agreements of 27 January signed by the USA and the DRV contain an article no. 20 which foreshadows that all foreign military activity

..../..

M. Brodie
25/1/4/37

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must cease in Cambodia and this article has just been confirmed by the joint communiqué of 13 June. The Government would hope that this provision will be carried out by all parties. In this way conditions favourable to the re-establishment of peace will be created."



(G. J. Price)
Minister

26 B

Journal Officiel - Assemblée Nationale
7.7.73

*Cambodge (reconnaissance par la France
du gouvernement dirigé par le prince Sihanouk).*

2126. — 7 juin 1973. — M. Le Foll demande à M. le ministre des affaires étrangères s'il envisage de reconnaître comme seul représentant authentique du peuple cambodgien le G. R. U. N. C. (Gouvernement révolutionnaire d'union nationale du Cambodge), dirigé par le prince Sihanouk, alors même que, de l'avis de tous les observateurs, ce dernier contrôle désormais plus de 90 p. 100 du territoire cambodgien, les troupes se trouvant à moins de 2 kilomètres de la capitale Phnom-Penh. Le gouvernement du maréchal Lon Nol n'apparaissant plus soutenu par une population qui multiplie les manifestations d'hostilité à son égard, et s'appuyant uniquement sur la reprise d'une campagne de bombardements américains d'une violence inégale, il lui demande s'il entend en prendre acte et cesser toutes relations avec le gouvernement actuel du Cambodge et de condamner la reprise des bombardements qui aboutissent au massacre des populations.

Réponse. — Ainsi qu'il a souvent, et récemment encore, eu l'occasion de le déclarer, le Gouvernement espère que le Cambodge pourra bientôt jouir, dans une neutralité retrouvée, conformément aux accords de Genève de 1954, des bienfaits d'une paix si longtemps attendue dans cette région. C'est dans cet esprit que le Gouvernement suit avec la plus grande attention l'évolution de la situation au Cambodge. Comme le sait l'honorable parlementaire, il n'a cessé, depuis le premier jour du conflit, de maintenir avec le prince Norodom Sihanouk, en raison non seulement de son amitié fidèle pour la France, mais aussi de sa représentativité, des contacts étroits. Il souhaite vivement que ces contacts puissent contribuer à un règlement du problème cambodgien et il est disposé à ne ménager aucun effort en ce sens. Pour ce qui est des bombardements, il existe dans les accords de Paris du 27 janvier, signés par les Etats-Unis et le Nord-Vietnam, un article 20 qui prévoit que toutes les activités militaires étrangères doivent cesser au Cambodge et qui vient d'être confirmé par le communiqué commun du 13 juin. Le Gouvernement souhaite que cette disposition soit appliquée par toutes les parties. Ainsi seront créées des conditions favorables au rétablissement de la paix.

25

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAM10

I.83784

FROM

TOD 26.7.73...1400 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PEKING

TOR 26.7.73...1738 LT

626 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 626, REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP169, WASHINGTON
OP170, PARIS OP171, MEXICO CITY OP172, HONG KONG 275.

CAMBODIA (UNDERLINED)

FRENCH AMBASSADOR (MANAC'H, PLEASE PROTECT) HAS INFORMED US THAT PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI ASKED HIM ON 14 MAY TO INITIATE SOME MOVEMENT IN WHAT CHOU CONSIDERED DEADLOCKED POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS ON CAMBODIA. CHOU ASKED MANAC'H, FIRST, TO PERSUADE HIS GOVERNMENT TO SUPPORT SIHANOUK AND GRUNK AND TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S POSITION THAT THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA WITHOUT SIHANOUK. CHOU SAID THERE WAS ALREADY A COALITION, BETWEEN SIHANOUK AND THE KHMERS ROUGES, AND THIS WAS THE ONLY COALITION IN CAMBODIA ACCEPTABLE TO GRUNK, OR INDEED POSSIBLE, A POSITION SHARED BY CHINA. SECONDLY, CHOU ASKED MANAC'H TO ASK THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO USE ITS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON TO PERSUADE THE UNITED STATES TO NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH SIHANOUK AND GRUNK, COMMENTING THAT CHINA HAD ALREADY TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO DO SO.

2. MANAC'H SAYS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED A LITTLE, AND WHILE STILL NOT ACCEPTING COMPLETELY THE CHINESE POSITION, AT LEAST CONCEDES A ROLE FOR SIHANOUK/GRUNK IN ANY SETTLEMENT. HE ATTRIBUTES THIS PARTLY TO FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT (WHOM HE ASSERTS IS MORE OPEN-MINDED THAN HIS PREDECESSOR SCHUMANN), AND ANTICIPATES FURTHER SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY IN FRANCE'S POSITION. IN RESPONSE TO CHOU'S OTHER REQUEST (AND ALSO A MEASURE OF THE CHANGE IN FRANCE'S ATTITUDE) FRENCH HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN A NUMBER OF TIMES TO THE UNITED STATES, MOST RECENTLY DURING THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE.

3. MANAC'H COMMENTED SEPARATELY THAT ON HIS RECENT RETURN FROM LEAVE IN PARIS HE WAS TOLD BY GRUNK PRIME MINISTER PENN NOUTH THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD INFORMED NORTH VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE IT WAS NOW WILLING TO TALK TO SIHANOUK AND WAS URGING BOTH TO PERSUADE HIM TO NEGOTIATE A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT, IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A ROLE FOR HIM. MANAC'H PURSUED THIS WITH CHINESE VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER CH'IAO KUAN-HUA (INTERESTINGLY, IN THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTER CHI PENG-FEI WHO APPARENTLY DID NOT PARTICIPATE) WHO CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS THE CASE BUT ASSERTED THAT CHINA HAD FLATLY REFUSED THE REQUESTS.

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25/1/4/37

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.83784

CH'IAO SAID THAT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HE BELIEVED ALSO REPRESENTED AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR, WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COALITION BETWEEN US-BACKED LON NOL REPRESENTATIVES, SOVIET-BACKED MINORITY OF KHMER ROUGES WHO WERE PRO-SOVIET, AND, HOPEFULLY, CHINA-BACKED SIHANOUK PLUS THE MAJORITY OF KHMER ROUGES. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO CHINA. THE POSITION ON A COALITION WHICH CHINA SUPPORTED WAS THAT OUTLINED BY CHOU EN-LAI (PARA 1 ABOVE). CHINA WOULD NOT BE PRESSING SIHANOUK TO COMPROMISE.

4. MANAC'H BELIEVES CHOU EN-LAI HAS INFLUENCE TO COMPEL SIHANOUK TO CHANGE HIS POSITION, BUT THAT FOR THE TIME BEING CHINESE ARE MORE CONCERNED TO ESTABLISH BEYOND CHALLENGE, PARTICULARLY FOR THE UNITED STATES, THAT SIHANOUK IS NOT A "CHINESE SATELLITE" BUT A HEAD OF STATE WHO MUST BE DEALT WITH DIRECTLY IN HIS OWN RIGHT. HE SUGGESTS THIS IS PARTLY ALSO A TACTICAL POSITION, AND THAT CHOU COULD CHOOSE TO EXERT PRESSURE ONCE THE TACTICAL GOAL IS ACHIEVED.

5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MANAC'H DOES NOT BELIEVE KISSINGER WILL MEET SIHANOUK NEXT MONTH, BUT SUGGESTS THERE WILL BE A LATER MEETING. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A MEETING HE OFFERED A LINE OF THINKING WHICH INVOLVES JUDGMENTS ABOUT DOMESTIC US POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS ON WHICH WE ARE NOT IN THE BEST POSITION TO COMMENT. MANAC'H SAYS HE RECEIVED YESTERDAY A TELEGRAM FROM SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD INFORMING HIM THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING PEKING AFTER THE KISSINGER VISIT. HE SAYS THAT IN FEBRUARY 1971 HE PERSONALLY ARRANGED WITH CHOU EN-LAI FOR A VISIT TO CHINA BY MANSFIELD, WHICH HAD THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT NIXON ON THE UNDERTAKING THAT MANSFIELD WOULD REPORT TO HIM AND TO THE CONGRESS ON RETURN. IN THE EVENT MANSFIELD PROCRASTINATED AND HIS VISIT WAS OVERTAKEN BY THAT OF KISSINGER IN JULY. MANAC'H SAYS HE BELIEVES THAT ON THIS OCCASION ALSO MANSFIELD HAS THE BLESSING OF THE PRESIDENT. HE SAYS THAT MANSFIELD'S VIEWS ON CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK MIGHT ENABLE HIM TO BRIDGE THE GAP. MANAC'H ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT THIS BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT IT MAY BE MORE THAN SPECULATION.

COMMENT (UNDERLINED)

...3/

25B

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 3 -

I.83784

6. WE AGREE WITH MANAC'H'S VIEW ABOUT THE CHINESE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE INDEPENDENCE OF SIHANOUK'S POSITION. BOLSTERED BY THIS TREND, AND BY THE STRONG SUPPORT HE HAS RECEIVED IN THE LAST THREE DAYS FROM KHIEU SAMPHAN AND HU NIM, SIHANOUK HIMSELF MIGHT EVEN BE TEMPTED TO RESUME THE ZIGZAG DIPLOMACY HE PURSUED BEFORE HE WAS TOPPLED, BY DRAWING AWAY FROM THE CHINESE. THERE HAS BEEN GOSSIP TO THIS EFFECT IN PEKING AND HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE SOMETHING OF THAT FLAVOUR. BUT HE OWES TOO MUCH TO CHINA AND CHOU EN-LAI, HE SEEMS MOST ILL-DISPOSED TOWARDS THE USSR, AND THE SUPPORT FROM KHIEU SAMPHAN AND HU NIM, WHILE STRENGTHENING HIS HAND IN ONE DIRECTION, ALSO SEEM TO RESTRICT HIS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN REGARD TO THE UNITED STATES. THIS SEEMS TO PUT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN A STRONG POSITION, SINCE IF THE US WANTS A SETTLEMENT CHOU EN-LAI IS ONE PERSON WHO BOTH SEEKS A SETTLEMENT AND, APPARENTLY, HAS SOME MEANS OF INFLUENCING THE GRUNK. CHOU EN-LAI COULD USE THIS POSITION TO BARGAIN ON OTHER QUESTIONS, BUT THE DIFFICULTY FOR THE US IS THAT HE MAY DECIDE TO SIT TIGHT, IN ORDER TO SECURE FOR CHINA A STRONG POSITION IN POST-WAR INDO-CHINA.

7. WE ARE AS LIKELY TO OBTAIN HINTS OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM GRUNK AS WE ARE FROM THE CHINESE, AND WE ARE OURSELVES MORE THAN 'SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED AT THE FEW OPPORTUNITIES THAT HAVE ARISEN TO DEVELOP CONTACTS' (YOUR 650), HENCE OUR WISH TO TAKE NEW INITIATIVES SINCE OUR BRIEF AND THE HABITS OF GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES ARE HARDLY COMPATIBLE. IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE EASY TO ENGINEER THE 'SOCIAL OCCASIONS' TO WHICH OUR INSTRUCTIONS CONFINE US AND WE HAD TAKEN INITIATIVES TO THAT END. BUT THE GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES IN WHOM WE ARE INTERESTED AND WHO HAVE ANY FREEDOM TO SPEAK DO NOT APPEAR SOCIALLY OR 'DIPLOMATICALLY' EXCEPT ON PLATFORMS, AND DO NOT ATTEND PRIVATE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS. FOR SENIOR MEMBERS OF GRUNK ONE HAS TO ASK FOR A FORMAL AUDIENCE AND NOTIFY THE PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE MFA WHEN VISITS ARE TO BE MADE. UNOFFICIAL AND UNPUBLISHED CONTACTS ARE MORE THAN POSSIBLE, INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTACTS ARE NOT. THAT LEAVES THE GRUNK AMBASSADOR TO THE PRC, WHOM WE SEE QUITE OFTEN BUT WHO SAYS VIRTUALLY NOTHING THAT IS WORTH REPORTING.

...4/

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 4 -

I.83784

8. IF WE WANT TO TALK TO GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES WE WILL HAVE TO ASK DIRECTLY TO CALL ON THEM, WHICH IS ONE REASON WHY WE HAVE SUGGESTED (OUR 600 AND 612) A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH THAN SIMPLY ASKING FOR THEIR VIEWS WHICH MAY POSSIBLY YIELD SOME INFORMATION BUT WHICH WILL NOT GET US VERY FAR WITH GRUNK. WE ALSO NEED TO BE ABLE TO SUGGEST FLEXIBILITY IN OUR POSITION, SINCE DESPITE SIHANOUK'S STATEMENT TO BURCHETT ABOUT THE FUTURE (OUR 612), WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS THAT GRUNK SUSPECTS THAT IN OUR ATTEMPTS TO MAKE CONTACT OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS WE ARE SIMPLY ACTING AS A STALKING-HORSE FOR THE US ON NEGOTIATIONS.

9. YOUR 650, PARA 2. SIHANOUK'S FUTURE PROSPECTS WOULD SEEM TO BE NO MORE UNCERTAIN THAN THOSE OF LON NOL, AND WE SHOULD BE NO MORE INTERESTED IN MAKING A COMMITMENT (UNDERLINE ONE) TO HIM THAN WE ARE TO LON NOL. WE HAVE OURSELVES REPORTED DOUBTS ABOUT HIS FUTURE POSITION IN CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK HIMSELF HAS TOLD MANAC'H SINCE HIS RECENT TRIP THAT HE SEES HIS FUTURE ROLE AS BEING "LIKE THE QUEEN OF ENGLAND", RECEIVING VISITORS AND MAKING STATE VISITS ABROAD. BUT HE IS FOR THE TIME BEING SUPPORTED BY THE CHINESE, AND BY THE SO-CALLED KHMER ROUGES AND ACCEPTED BY BOTH AS HAVING A PRACTICAL DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL ROLE TO PLAY.

MANAC'H'S INFORMATION ALSO TEND TO LEND SUBSTANCE TO OUR VIEW (OUR 600) THAT THE US APPEARS TO ACCEPT HIM AS A "LEGITIMATE" PARTY, IN THE SENSE OF ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE HAS A CLAIM TO BE A PARTY PRINCIPAL (WHICH IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS IMPLIED BY "ACCEPTANCE OF HIS LEGITIMACY" YOUR 650).

10. WE STILL BELIEVE SIHANOUK REPRESENTS A POINT OF CONTACT WHERE PAST ASSOCIATIONS MAY BE USEFUL AND THAT THE ARGUMENTS IN OUR 612 PARA 4 ARE VALID. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THIS SHOULD BE OUR ONLY APPROACH AND WE ALSO SEE VALUE IN TALKING TO PENN NOUTH AND IENG SARY (ALTHOUGH ALL THREE ARE PRESENTLY OUT OF PEKING). WITH YOUR APPROVAL, WE SHOULD LIKE TO CALL ON GRUNK REPRESENTATIVES AND WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR POSITION ON CAMBODIA, ON THE CONTENDING PARTIES, AND THE "MEDIATORY ROLE" REFERRED TO BY PHNOM PENH.

FITZGERALD.

...5/

25D
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 5 -

I.83784

A/PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER OF STATE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

ACTION: NA

SEC DEPSECS(A) (B) PR MCO MR BODY FAS(SA) SEA MN FAS(NWA)
NA WAME FAS(PW) PC ECSA FAS(DEF) DP IO FAS(DVP) AID ICR
FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(CL) LT CPI FAS(MS)

BANGKOK JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW NEW DELHI
NEW YORK UN OTTAWA RANGOON SEOUL SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENNA
WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

24

MB10

0.41449

TO

TOD 27.4.73...1803 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS...2231

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH...414

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED PARIS 2231, REPEATED PHNOM PENH 414

KHMER REPUBLIC

WE SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN HAVING A FRENCH ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN THE KHMER REPUBLIC AND WOULD LIKE YOU TO SEEK AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR A GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN SO DOING, YOU COULD DRAW ON TELEGRAM 404 FROM PHNOM PENH, WHICH WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU SEPARATELY, AND, AT YOUR DISCRETION, ON TELEGRAM 51 FROM WASHINGTON.

PRIME MINISTER
MINISTER OF STATE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (3016/2/1)
MIN. AND DEPT DEFENCE
J.I.O.
P.M.'S

25/1/4/37

ACTION: SA

SEC DEP SEC(A) DEP SEC(B) PR MCO MR BODY FAS(A) SA
FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(IO) FAS(CL)
CPI FAS(MS) PER

BANGKOK JAKARTA HONG KONG KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA MOSCOW
NEW DELHI U.N. NEW YORK OTTAWA PARIS RANGOON SAIGON SEOUL
SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENNA VIENTIANE WASHINGTON PEKING

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

FRG/Vietnam 23
file 29/1/4/37

MA4

I.115453

FROM

TOD 06.11.72...1805 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BONN

TOR 07.11.72...0549 LT

1030 RESTRICTED

VIETNAM RECONSTRUCTION UNDERLINED

DOEPFER (ECONOMIC AND FINANCE MINISTRY) TOLD HOLLWAY 3RD
NOVEMBER NO PLANNING HAD YET BEEN DONE FOR OFFICIAL FRG
PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME.
IN PRINCIPLE, THE FRG FAVOURED MULTILATERAL AID OR BILATERAL
AID IN A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK.

2. PRESIDENT FRG RED CROSS HAS PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT BY THE
IRC OF AN ORGANISATION FOR HUMANITARIAN AND REUINON OF FAMILIES
IN VEIT-NAM.

I AM WELCOMING THIS PUBLICLY.

HARRY

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION SA/AID

SEC	DEP	SEC(A)	DEP	SEC(B)	PR	MCO	FAS(A)	NA	SA	SEA
FAS(PW)	PC	EAME	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	FAS(DVP)	AID	ICR		
FAS(10)	UNIA	FAS(CL)	FAS(MS)							



CONFIDENTIAL ²²

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

Tel: 01-836 2435

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE,
LONDON

In reply quote No. ^{3/12/86} 8/8

Memorandum No.

23 August 1972

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA

25/1/4/37

Visits by Sihanouk.

We presume you have already received from other sources such copies of communiques, joint statements, etc as you require from the recent visits to Eastern Europe and African countries by Sihanouk. Shakespeare, Assistant, South East Asian Department, FCO on 22 August had little to say on these visits. He said the British had noted that in all countries visited by Sihanouk that the French Ambassador had been present at the airport to welcome the FUNK delegation, showing that the French were "continuing to play a double game". Items of interest in statements issued during the various visits included claims by Sihanouk to control eight/tenths of the territory and seven/tenths of the population in the Khmer Republic. He also expressed opposition to an international conference to settle Indochinese problems, and in Algiers stated that he was putting his hopes in the Paris Peace Talks, the successful conclusion of which would "ipso facto" lead to a settlement of the Cambodian and Laos problems.

2. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Phnom Penh.

(C A Edwards)
First Secretary

Am. Hughes

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



WA 27/4

31 AUG 1972

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE
LONDON

Ref: 01-236 2432

Memorandum No. 418
In reply quote No. 31/2/80

23 August 1972

22/11/72

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
Canberra

Visits by Sihanouk.

The premises you have already received from other sources such copies of commentaries, joint statements, etc. as you require from the recent visits to Western Europe and Africa undertaken by Sihanouk. Sihanouk, Assistant, South East Asian Department, IOU on 22 August had little to say on these visits. He said the British had noted that in all countries visited by Sihanouk that the French Ambassador had been present at the airport to welcome the King's delegation, showing that the French were "continuing to play a double game". Items of interest in statements issued during the various visits included claims by Sihanouk to control eight tenths of the territory and seven tenths of the population in the Kingdom of Cambodia. He also expressed opposition to an international conference to settle Indochinese problems, and in Algeria stated that he was waiting his hopes in the Latin American States, the unsuccessful conclusion of which would "two facts" lead to a settlement of the Cambodian - Laotian problem.

2. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to France.
Perh.

(U A Sihanouk)
First Secretary

Mr. [unclear]

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

21

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

File : 221/5/1
Memo : 714
19 June 1972

Cambodian Relations with France

There have been a few developments recently in relations between Cambodia and France which are perhaps worth reporting. They include:-

(a) Son Ngoc Thanh's Appointment

As you know, the French have long distrusted and disliked Mr Son Ngoc Thanh. He was their most important opponent during the last years of the protectorate and his co-operation with the Japanese during their occupation of Cambodia, when a number of Frenchmen lost their lives at Japanese hands (including such prominent figures as the then curator of Angkor, Mr Georges Groslier), has embittered relations ever since. Against this background, most people felt that Mr Son Ngoc Thanh's formal entry into the government in March as first minister and foreign minister would not make the relations with the French any easier. And so it seemed to be for a time, as the French chargé d'affaires pointedly failed to make a courtesy call on the foreign minister after his appointment.

(b) Son Ngoc Thanh's Statement on Relations with the French

Mr Son Ngoc Thanh himself took the initiative to ease matters. On 1 May he issued the report of a press interview in which he spoke in warm terms of the French. He said that he was a friend of France, that he had been educated in French high schools and had been a university student in France. There was nothing in his past for which Gaullist France could reproach him. He looked forward to the most friendly relations with France and he hoped that there would be increasing French cultural and technical assistance to Cambodia.

(c) Call by French Chargé d'Affaires

The French chargé d'affaires has now called on Mr Son Ngoc Thanh, whether as a result of this statement or for other reasons is not clear.

.../2

— S Weston Europe Section
(to retain)

INC.
26/6

File 25/1/4/37

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL(d) Fuss over French Experts

There has been a good deal of fuss in the local press about a meeting of the association of French advisers and experts here at which a small group of the French experts sought to have adopted a motion deploring the American bombardment of North Viet Nam. The motion failed for want of a majority, but the Cambodians were incensed that the teachers should have held a meeting in defiance of the provisions of the emergency regulations and that some of the teachers should have sought publicly to support the Cambodians' enemies by putting forward the motion in question. The French embassy was able to explain matters satisfactorily to the minister for national education and the embassy acted promptly to abolish the experts' association. It is not clear whether the culprits are being sent home, as the season has begun for the exodus of the French experts back to France for their summer holidays. In the wake of press criticism of the French experts, one of them assaulted a newspaper editor and this has led in turn to a further criticism in the press.

(e) French Representation

French representation here continues to decline. The commercial counsellor, who was well-known and well-liked by the Cambodians, has left and is not being replaced. The same goes for the cultural counsellor. A small military mission remains here, headed by a Capitaine de Frégate (that is somebody of Lt. Colonel rank) and at least some members of the mission are still engaged in intelligence work in FANK headquarters.

2. What all this adds up to is unclear. There has been some feeling both within the French embassy here and among Cambodians to whom we have spoken that, despite the occasional upset, there has been an improvement in French relations with Cambodia over the last few months. One senior member of the embassy has expressed the view to us that this improvement resulted from a visit which Mr Froment-Maurice made to Moscow where the Russians told him that, in their view, Prince Sihanouk had no future in Cambodia. The French here also suggest that their Foreign Ministry now has a more favourable view of the strength of the South Vietnamese government than it did in the past.

3. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Paris and Washington.

Australian Embassy
PARIS

Australian Embassy
WASHINGTON

G.B. Feakes
(G.B. Feakes)
Ambassador

Memo : 13

Memo : 24

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

20

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GMG 1

I. 129247

FROM

TOD 21.12.71...1010 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
VIENTIANE

TOR 21.12.71...1421 LT

1007 RESTRICTED

F.E.O.F.

F.E.O.F. WILL RE-OPEN TOMORROW 22ND DECEMBER.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
TREASURER AND TREASURY
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: AID

SEC	DEP	SEC(A)	PR	SLA	A/FAS(A)	NA	SA	SEA	A/FAS(PW)
PC	EAME	DP	IC	FAS(DVP)	AID	FAS(IO)	EP	UNIA	
SAS(LGL)	LTB	UNL		FAS(MS)					

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM (F)

(19)
25/1/4/37
~~25/1/4/37~~

DJS12

0.104397

TO

TOD 10.12.71...1906 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
DJAKARTA...4984

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
KUALA LUMPUR....4577

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
SINGAPORE...5079

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BANGKOK...2613

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
MANILA...2551

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED DJAKARTA 4984, KUALA LUMPUR 4577, SINGAPORE 5079,
BANGKOK 2613, MANILA 2551.

CAMBODIA : E.S.F. (UNDERLINED).

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CABLE 1688 FROM PHNOM PENH.

BEGINS:-

CAMBODIA : ESF (UNDERLINED).

RESIDENT IMF REPRESENTATIVE TOMASSON CALLED TODAY TO INFORM
US OF ACTION CAMBODIANS PROPOSE FOLLOWING PARIS MEETING. HE SAID
THAT INVITATIONS WOULD SHORTLY BE ISSUED TO MEETING IN PHNOM PENH
ON FRIDAY 14 JANUARY. FOLLOWING COUNTRIES WOULD BE INVITED:

(A) THE PARIS EIGHT (UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND,
UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIUM, ITALY AND SOUTH KOREA).

(B) THE ASIAN FIVE (INDONESIA (INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE,
THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES).

(C) CANADA, DENMARK, NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE.

INVITEES WOULD BE ASKED TO SAY BY SATURDAY 8 JANUARY WHETHER
THEY WERE COMING OR NOT.

.... /2

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

0.104397

2. MAIN PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN NOW AND MEETING WAS SHORT FALL IN LIKELY CONTRIBUTIONS TO BRING SUM UP TO TOTAL OF US DOLLARS 25 MILLION. WITHOUT COMMITMENT AND ON INFORMAL BASIS, TOMASSON (PLEASE PROTECT) GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING TABLE OF HOW CAMBODIANS THOUGHT TOTAL MIGHT NOW BE MADE UP:

COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE	CONTRIBUTION IN DOLLARS U.S.
UNITED STATES	50	12.5 MILLION
JAPAN	30	7.5 MILLION
AUSTRALIA	12	3 MILLION
NEW ZEALAND	1	0.3 MILLION
BRITAIN	2	0.5 MILLION
INDONESIA, MALAYSIA	ABOUT 4	
SINGAPORE, THAILAND, PHILIPPINES	ALTOGETHER	0.25 MILLION

I TOLD TOMASSON THAT HE AND CAMBODIAN MINISTERS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IT WAS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS 3 MILLION TO ESF. WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR 1371 IN MIND, I SAID IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A SOMEWHAT GREATER CONTRIBUTION THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED, IF THIS WAS NECESSARY TO BRING ESF INTO BEING AND IF OTHER DONORS (AS NOW SEEMED TO BE PLANNED) INCREASED THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. TOMASSON REACTED TO THIS BY ASKING WHETHER, IF WE WERE ABLE TO INCREASE CONTRIBUTION WE ORIGINALLY HAD IN MIND, WE COULD USE THIS FACT TO PERSUADE JAPANESE TO MAKE FURTHER ADDITION TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION. JAPANESE HAD ENVISAGED DOLLARS US. 5 MILLION AT PARIS MEETING (ON BASIS OF A TOTAL ESF OF DOLLARS US.20 MILLION). PRESENTATION AT PARIS MEETING HAD PROBABLY CONVINCED JAPANESE THAT ESF OF DOLLARS US.6.25 MILLION WHICH, HE FELT, COULD BE PUSHED UP TO AT LEAST DOLLARS US.7.5 MILLION. I GATHERED FROM TOMASSON THAT IDEA OF INCLUDING THE ASIAN FIVE (B) IN FIRST PARAGRPH ABOVE) WAS BASICALLY JAPANESE. JAPANESE DO NOT NOW WANT SOUTH KOREA (OR ANY OTHER DIVIDED ASIAN NATION) TO CONTRIBUTE.

3. ACCORDING TO TOMASSON, GOVERNOR OF NATIONAL BANK, HING KUNTHEL, IS TO VISIT INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE TO PRESENT CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION TO ESF. TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: INDONESIA 15-17 DECEMBER: MALAYSIA 18-19 DECEMBER: SINGAPORE 20-21 DECEMBER. IN ADDITION COMMISSIONER FOR PLANNING, PHLEK CHHAT, WOULD PROBABLY VISIT THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES ABOUT SAME TIME. CAMBODIANS FELT THAT INDONESIANS WOULD BE KEY TO CONTRIBUTIONS BY ASIAN FIVE.

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

-3-

0.104397

GOVERNOR OF NATIONAL BANK HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDONESIAN IMF GOVERNOR, WHO ALSO LOOKS AFTER CAMBODIA (AND TOMASSON SEEMS TO KNOW WIDJOJO WELL). CAMBODIANS CONSIDERED THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS INDONESIA OF THE FIVE WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION. TOMASSON SAID THAT, IN CONSIDERING CONTRIBUTION, INDONESIANS WOULD NEED TO HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THEIR MAJOR DONORS THEY SAW NO OBJECTION TO IT AND WELCOMED IT. AS MAJOR DONORS TO INDONESIA, AMERICANS AND JAPANESE WOULD BE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO INDONESIANS, ABOUT THE TIME OF KING KUNTHEL'S VISIT TO DJAKARTA OR JUST AFTERWARDS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME SMALL INDONESIAN CONTRIBUTION TO ESF. TOMASSON ASKED WHETHER WE, AS MAJOR DONORS TO INDONESIA, WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH REPRESENTATIONS.

4. TOMASSON COMMENTED THAT, IF INDONESIANS WERE TO COME INTO FUND MALAYSIANS FOR POLITICAL REASONS WOULD BE INCLINED TO FOLLOW. I SAID THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT MALAYSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CAMBODIA WAS DIFFERENT FROM INDONESIAN POLICY SO FAR AND THAT I WOULD NOT BE HOPEFUL THAT MALAYSIANS WOULD FOLLOW INDONESIANS IN THIS MATTER. I ASKED TOMASSON WHY IT WAS NOW FELT THAT THE SINGAPOREANS, HAVING EARLIER REFUSED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, COULD NOW BE INDUCED TO AGREE TO ONE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT CAMBODIANS AND ALSO JAPANESE WOULD BE TALKING QUITE FIRMLY TO THE SINGAPOREANS TO POINT OUT THAT, AS MUCH OF THE IMPORTS UNDER ESF WOULD COME THROUGH OR FROM SINGAPORE, SINGAPOREANS STOOD TO GAIN BY IT. IF THEY WERE NOT CONTRIBUTORS IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR THE CAMBODIANS AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO SEEK WAYS OF DIVERTING IMPORTATIONS FROM SINGAPORE UNDER THE ESF. SIMILARLY THE JAPANESE WOULD USE WITH THAIS LEVERAGE PROVIDED BY PROSPECT OF FURTHER JAPANESE PURCHASES OF THAI RICE FOR CAMBODIA. SOK CHHONG WOULD BE SEEING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE IN PHNOM PENH TODAY.

5. TOMASSON HOPED THAT RELEVANT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DONORS AND CAMBODIA COULD BE CONCLUDED STRAIGHT AFTER 14 JANUARY MEETING AND THAT ESF COULD BE INAUGURATED AS FROM 1 MARCH 1972. IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT ESF WOULD BE MANAGED BY FILLINGHAM OF FEOF, WHO WANTED A CHANGE FROM VIENTIANE AND WHO WAS REGARDED AS HAVING DONE WELL THERE.

6. TOMASSON, WHO IS LEAVING PHNOM PENH TOMORROW ON HOLIDAYS UNTIL 1 JANUARY, SAID THAT SOK CHHONG WOULD PROBABLY BE CALLING JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND ME IN TO GO OVER SITUATION IN NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE FROM YOU ANY REACTIONS TO FIGURES THAT ARE BEING MENTIONED AND TO IDEA OF OUR APPROACHING INDONESIANS IN SENSE

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OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

-4-

0.104397

SUGGESTED AT END OF PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, AND ANY THOUGHTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS SAY FROM MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND THE PHILIPPINES. I REGRET CABLING AT SUCH LENGTH BUT TIME IS RELATIVELY SHORT BETWEEN NOW AND 14 JANUARY TO GET ESF OFF THE GROUND.

FEAKES...

ENDS.

2. WE SHOULD LIKE IF POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN CASE BUT WITHOUT ADMINISTERING THE KISS OF DEATH (WE HAVE PARTICULAR DOUBTS ABOUT POSSIBLE MALAYSIAN REACTIONS) AND WITHOUT BEING ASSOCIATED IN ANY WAY WITH HINTS ABOUT DIVERTING IMPORTS FROM NON-CONTRIBUTORS.

WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER TO RAISE THE MATTER DIRECTLY BUT IF YOU ARE ASKED FOR YOUR VIEWS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT AUSTRALIA SUPPORTS THE FUND, WOULD LIKE TO SEE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND WILL ITSELF CONTRIBUTE AROUND DOLLARS US 1 MILLION IF THE FUND IS ESTABLISHED.

3. GLAD YOUR COMMENTS REPEATED TO PHNOM PENH, TOKYO AND WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN. AND DEPT. DEFENCE
MIN. AND DEPT. T. AND I.
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: SA AID

SEC	DEP SEC(A)	DEP SEC(B)	PR	LA	FAS(A)	FAS(MS)	NA	SA
SEA	FAS(PW)	PC	EAME	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	FAS(DVP)	AID
ICR	FAS(IO)	EP	UNIA	SAS(LGL)	FAS(PS)			

(A) 25/1/4/37 18

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

PMB5

I.125266

FROM

TOD 09.12.71...0925 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

TOR 09.12.71...1409 LT

1688 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1688 REPEATED TOKYO 022, WASHINGTON 221.

CAMBODIA : ESF (UNDERLINED).

RESIDENT IMF REPRESENTATIVE TOMASSON CALLED TODAY TO INFORM US OF ACTION CAMBODIANS PROPOSE FOLLOWING PARIS MEETING. HE SAID THAT INVITATIONS WOULD SHORTLY BE ISSUED TO MEETING IN PHNOM PENH ON FRIDAY 14 JANUARY. FOLLOWING COUNTRIES WOULD BE INVITED:

(A) THE PARIS EIGHT (UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, UNITED KINGDOM, BELGIUM, ITALY AND SOUTH KOREA).

(B) THE ASIAN FIVE (INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES).

(C) CANADA, DENMARK, NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE.

INVITEES WOULD BE ASKED TO SAY BY SATURDAY 8 JANUARY WHETHER THEY WERE COMING OR NOT.

2. MAIN PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BETWEEN-NOW AND MEETING WAS SHORT FALL IN LIKELY CONTRIBUTIONS TO BRING SUM UP TO TOTAL OF US DOLLARS 25 MILLION. WITHOUT COMMITMENT AND ON INFORMAL BASIS, TOMASSON (PLEASE PROTECT) GAVE ME FOLLOWING TABLE OF HOW CAMBODIANS THOUGHT TOTAL MIGHT NOW BE MADE UP:

COUNTRY	PERCENTAGE	CONTRIBUTION IN DOLLARS U.S.
UNITED STATES	50	12.5 MILLION
JAPAN	30	7.5 MILLION
AUSTRALIA	12	3 MILLION
NEW ZEALAND	1	0.3 MILLION
BRITAIN	2	0.5 MILLION
INDONESIA, MALAYSIA	ABOUT 4	0.25 MILLION
SINGAPORE, THAILAND, PHILIPPINES	ALTOGETHER	

../2.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 2 -

I.125266

I TOLD TOMASSON THAT HE AND CAMBODIAN MINISTERS SHOULD BE AWARE THAT IT WAS QUITE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT AUSTRALIA WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION OF DOLLARS 3 MILLION TO ESF. WITH PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR 1371 IN MIND, I SAID IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT WE WOULD MAKE A SOMEWHAT GREATER CONTRIBUTION THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED, IF THIS WAS NECESSARY TO BRING ESF INTO BEING AND IF OTHER DONORS (AS NOW SEEMED TO BE PLANNED) INCREASED THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. TOMASSON REACTED TO THIS BY ASKING WHETHER, IF WE WERE ABLE TO INCREASE CONTRIBUTION WE ORIGINALLY HAD IN MIND, WE COULD USE THIS FACT TO PERSUADE JAPANESE TO MAKE FURTHER ADDITION TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION. JAPANESE HAD ENVISAGED DOLLARS US. 5 MILLION AT PARIS MEETING (ON BASIS OF A TOTAL ESF OF DOLLARS US.20 MILLION). PRESENTATION AT PARIS MEETING HAD PROBABLY CONVINCED JAPANESE THAT ESF OF DOLLARS US.6.25 MILLION WHICH, HE FELT, COULD BE PUSHED UP TO AT LEAST DOLLARS US.7.5 MILLION. I GATHERED FROM TOMASSON THAT IDEA OF INCLUDING THE ASIAN FIVE (B) IN FIRST PARAGRAPH ABOVE) WAS BASICALLY JAPANESE. JAPANESE DO NOT NOW WANT SOUTH KOREA (OR ANY OTHER DIVIDED ASIAN NATION) TO CONTRIBUTE.

3. ACCORDING TO TOMASSON, GOVERNOR OF NATIONAL BANK, HING KUNTHEL, IS TO VISIT INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE TO PRESENT CASE FOR CONTRIBUTION TO ESF. TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: INDONESIA 15-17 DECEMBER: MALAYSIA 18-19 DECEMBER: SINGAPORE 20-21 DECEMBER. IN ADDITION COMMISSIONER FOR PLANNING, PHLEK CHHAT, WOULD PROBABLY VISIT THAILAND AND PHILIPPINES ABOUT SAME TIME. CAMBODIANS FELT THAT INDONESIANS WOULD BE KEY TO CONTRIBUTIONS BY ASIAN FIVE. GOVERNOR OF NATIONAL BANK HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDONESIAN IMF GOVERNOR, WHO ALSO LOOKS AFTER CAMBODIA (AND TOMASSON SEEMS TO KNOW WIDJOJO WELL). CAMBODIANS CONSIDERED THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS INDONESIA OF THE FIVE WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO MAKE SOME CONTRIBUTION. TOMASSON SAID THAT, IN CONSIDERING CONTRIBUTION, INDONESIANS WOULD NEED TO HAVE ASSURANCES FROM THEIR MAJOR DONORS THEY SAW NO OBJECTION TO IT AND WELCOMED IT. AS MAJOR DONORS TO INDONESIA, AMERICANS AND JAPANESE WOULD BE MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO INDONESIANS, ABOUT THE TIME OF HING KUNTHEL'S VISIT TO DJAKARTA OR JUST AFTERWARDS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME SMALL INDONESIAN CONTRIBUTION TO ESF. TOMASSON ASKED WHETHER WE, AS MAJOR DONORS TO INDONESIA, WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH REPRESENTATIONS.

4. TOMASSON COMMENTED THAT, IF INDONESIANS WERE TO COME INTO FUND, MALAYSIANS FOR POLITICAL REASONS WOULD BE INCLINED TO FOLLOW. I SAID THAT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT MALAYSIAN POLICY TOWARDS CAMBODIA WAS DIFFERENT FROM INDONESIAN POLICY SO FAR AND THAT I WOULD NOT BE HOPEFUL THAT MALAYSIANS WOULD FOLLOW INDONESIANS IN THIS MATTER. I

.. /3.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

- 3 -

0.125266

ASKED TOMASSON WHY IT WAS NOW FELT THAT THE SINGAPOREANS, HAVING EARLIER REFUSED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION, COULD NOW BE INDUCED TO AGREE TO ONE. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT CAMBODIANS AND ALSO JAPANESE WOULD BE TALKING QUITE FIRMLY TO THE SINGAPOREANS TO POINT OUT THAT, AS MUCH OF THE IMPORTS UNDER ESF WOULD COME THROUGH OR FROM SINGAPORE, SINGAPOREANS STOOD TO GAIN BY IT. IF THEY WERE NOT CONTRIBUTORS IT WOULD BE NATURAL FOR THE CAMBODIANS AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO SEEK WAYS OF DIVERTING IMPORTATIONS FROM SINGAPORE UNDER THE ESF. SIMILARLY THE JAPANESE WOULD USE WITH THAIS LEVERAGE PROVIDED BY PROSPECT OF FURTHER JAPANESE PURCHASES OF THAI RICE FOR CAMBODIA. SOK CHHONG WOULD BE SEEING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE IN PHNOM PENH TODAY.

5. TOMASSON HOPED THAT RELEVANT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DONORS AND CAMBODIA COULD BE CONCLUDED STRAIGHT AFTER 14 JANUARY MEETING AND THAT ESF COULD BE INAUGURATED AS FROM 1 MARCH 1972. IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT ESF WOULD BE MANAGED BY FILLINGHAM OF FEOF, WHO WANTED A CHANGE FROM VIENTIANE AND WHO WAS REGARDED AS HAVING DONE WELL THERE.

6. TOMASSON, WHO IS LEAVING PHNOM PENH TOMORROW ON HOLIDAYS UNTIL 1 JANUARY, SAID THAT SOK CHHONG WOULD PROBABLY BE CALLING JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND ME IN TO GO OVER SITUATION IN NEXT FEW DAYS. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE FROM YOU ANY REACTIONS TO FIGURES THAT ARE BEING MENTIONED AND TO IDEA OF OUR APPROACHING INDONESIANS IN SENSE SUGGESTED AT END OF PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE, AND ANY THOUGHTS YOU MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS SAY FROM MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE AND THE PHILIPPINES. I REGRET CABLING AT SUCH LENGTH BUT TIME IS RELATIVELY SHORT BETWEEN NOW AND 14 JANUARY TO GET ESF OFF THE GROUND.

FEAKES...

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: AID

SEC DEP SECS(A)(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA SEA PC EAME FAS(DEF)
DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA SAS(LGL) FAS(MS)

BONN DJAKARTA LONDON PARIS OECD OTTAWA PARIS WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

1801 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036



EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA

IN REPLY QUOTE: 221/11/8/2/2/4

Memorandum No. 4603/71

3rd December, 1971

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA

French Representation in Cambodia

Please refer to recent telegrams on this subject to you from both the Australian Embassies in Paris and Phnom Penh. In view of his recent trip to Paris for the ESF meeting, we discussed this with Mr Frank Tatu, Cambodia desk officer, in the State Department on the 3rd December. Tatu said that his time had been so limited in Paris that unfortunately, he had been unable to call on the Quai d'Orsay to discuss Cambodian affairs and, in particular, to talk about the plans for Ambassador Dauge. The State Department had no additional information on these moves apart from that already reported by Paris and Phnom Penh.

2. However, Tatu told us that Henry Kamm of the "New York Times" discussed this with him at a dinner with Michel Tatu, ("a long lost cousin" of Frank Tatu) and Anatole Shub. Kamm said that he had been told of these moves by Ambassador Dauge which he, Kamm, felt were unfortunate. Neither Michel Tatu or Shub made any specific comment on the proposals but Kamm intimated that he might write an article about this question. We have not yet seen any such article in the "New York Times".

3. We are forwarding copies of this memorandum to Paris and Phnom Penh.

(M.G. Williams)
First Secretary

→ Mr MILNE - W.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Mike - V.E. →

(M.G. Williams)
First Secretary

3. We are forwarding copies of this memorandum to Paris and Phnom Penh.

4. However, Tatu told us that Henry Kamm of the "New York Times" discussed this with him at a dinner with Michael Tatu, "a long lost cousin" of Frank Tatu (and Anatole Simb. Kamm said that he had been told of these moves by Ambassador Dange which he, Kamm, felt were unfortunate. Neither Michael Tatu or Simb made any specific comment on the proposals but Kamm intimated that he might write an article about this question. We have not yet seen any such article in the "New York Times".

Paris and Phnom Penh. Information on these moves apart from that already reported by plans for Ambassador Dange. The State Department had no additional discuss Cambodian affairs and, in particular, to talk about the unfortunately, he had been unable to call on the Quai d'Orsay to December. Tatu said that his time had been so limited in Paris that Frank Tatu, Cambodian desk officer, in the State Department on the 2nd recent trip to Paris for the IMF meeting, we discussed this with Mr both the Australian Embassies in Paris and Phnom Penh. In view of his Please refer to recent telegram on this subject to you from

French Representation in Cambodia

CAMBODIA
Department of Foreign Affairs,
The Secretary,

IN REPLY QUOTE

22/1/4/8/2/1

EMBASSY OF AUSTRALIA



CONFIDENTIAL

1801 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

TELEPHONE: (202) 757-2000
TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: AUSTRALIA
TELEX: 11 060501

Memorandum No. 463/11

2nd December, 1971

17
22/1/4/37

Handwritten signature

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

PT7

FROM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

I. 123487

TOD 03.12.71...1745 LT

TOR 04.12.71...1057 LT

6628

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 6628, REPEATED PHNOM PENH 142, OECD PARIS 28,
LONDON 584, TOKYO OP.1483.

CAMBODIA - EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND.

ON 3 DECEMBER WE DISCUSSED OUTCOME OF PARIS MEETING WITH STATE
DEPARTMENT AND AID.

BOTH WERE DISAPPOINTED AT FAILURE OF MEETING TO PRODUCE ADDIT-
IONAL FIRM COMMITMENTS TO ESF.

THEY WERE CONSIDERING FURTHER MEANS OF OBTAINING NECESSARY
CONTRIBUTIONS.

THEY WOULD WELCOME ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE IN THIS REGARD.
MIYAKI OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN DIVISION OF GAIMUSHO IS NOW IN
WASHINGTON AND STATE AND AID WILL BE DISCUSSING SAME QUESTION WITH
HIM.

2. AT THIS STAGE, STATE AND AID SAW LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO ACTIVE
LOBBYING BY UNITED STATES FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR ESF.

THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO DO THIS BUT CAMBODIANS DID NOT SEEM TO BE
CAPABLE OF ADEQUATE EFFORT TO GAIN NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR ESF.

STATE DEPARTMENT RECOGNISED THAT TASK MIGHT NOW ALSO BE BEYOND
UNITED STATES BUT NEED WAS SO URGENT THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO TRY.

3. ACCORDING TO AID, JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT DURATION OF ESF
(PARAGRAPH 4A OF OECD PARIS NO. 281 TO CANBERRA) WAS BASED ON PARL-
IAMENTARY CONSIDERATIONS.

IF FUND WAS TO BE CONSTITUTED AT OUTSET ON LONG TERM BASIS
JAPANESE WOULD HAVE TO SEEK DIET APPROVAL BEFORE CONFIRMING PART-
ICIPATION.

JAPANESE HAD ASSURED UNITED STATES THAT ONCE ESF WAS ESTABLISHED
THEY COULD BE RELIED UPON TO KEEP UP ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AS LONG
AS NECESSARY.

...2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

16A

2.

1. 123487


FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT TR AND IND
JIO
PM'S

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: AID

A/SEC A/DEPSECS(A)(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA SEA FAS(PW)
PC EAME DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA FAS(MS)



Dated: 1 December 1971

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FR

The Australian Embassy
PHNOM PENH.

INWARD SAVINGRAM

123625
25/1/4/37

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

The Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs,
CANBERRA.

SAVINGRAM NO. 42 - CONFIDENTIAL

REPEATED: Bangkok 36, Bonn 20, Djakarta 25, Hong Kong (for Foreign Affairs) 30, Kuala Lumpur 30, London (for Foreign Affairs) 25, Manila 27, Paris 26, Saigon 52, Singapore 41, Vientiane 30, Washington 29.

Cambodia: Second Half of November 1971

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Summary

Enemy military activity in Cambodia reached its highest point for six months, with continuing attacks particularly in the area west of Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese at last began operations in the eastern border areas; but despite the understanding between the leaders of the two countries underlying elements of hostility and tension persist in relations between Cambodia and Viet Nam. There were no domestic political developments of note. The Cambodians sent a former minister to observe the conference in Kuala Lumpur of foreign ministers from ASEAN countries; and they held a successful APU meeting in Phnom Penh. A meeting on the Exchange Support Fund took place in Paris on 29 November as scheduled but no decisions were reached.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

-6-

CONFIDENTIAL

Relations with France

INWARD SAVINGRAM

I.123625

20. A change in arrangements for French representation in Cambodia became more or less public knowledge in the second half of November. Although the French will neither address ambassador's credentials to, nor receive them from, Mr Cheng Heng as head of state, they maintained the ambassador in Phnom Penh that they had here at the time of Prince Sihanouk's downfall (that is, with his credentials addressed to the Prince). The ambassador, Mr Louis Dauge, has been on leave in Paris since July and the French have now apparently decided that he should not come back here to live, although he will remain accredited as ambassador and may visit Phnom Penh from time to time in the course of visits to other Asian capitals. We understand from the French embassy here that Prince Sihanouk in Peking has been informed of these new arrangements, which bring French representation here closer to that of the European Communists, who maintain only chargés d'affaires in Phnom Penh. The new arrangements also give the French a great deal of flexibility: they can have their ambassador here either full-time or not at all or somewhere in between the two. In explaining this change to us the French embassy here has referred primarily to the entry of the Chinese into the United Nations, and more generally into normal political and diplomatic international life, as the main reason for it. For their part the Cambodians have taken the change with no apparent rancour. With reason, they regard Mr Dauge as a friend of Cambodia who should be a good advocate for the Cambodian cause in Paris. The Cambodians maintain only a chargé d'affaires in Paris, as the French will not accept credentials from Mr Cheng Heng for an ambassador.

Relations with Australia

21. The chairman of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr H.B. Turner, concluded his visit here for the APU meeting on 20 November. As an observer at the meeting, Mr Turner followed deliberations very closely and was able on some occasions to intervene in them. Like other participants in the meeting he was received and entertained by the Cambodian head of state and the prime minister.

22. During the second half of November, representations were made to the Cambodians at ministerial level on the question of training of Cambodian troops in Viet Nam and on the ASEAN meeting. On both these subjects no difficulties arose. The Cambodians in particular shared our wish to see that Australia was included in any arrangements for consultation affecting the future stability of the area, such as the group ten on Indo-China which it seemed possible might emerge from the ASEAN meeting.

American Under-Secretary of State's Visit

23. The American under-secretary of state in charge of political affairs, Mr U. Alexis Johnson, visited Phnom Penh on 19 and 20 November. According to the Americans here his visit had no particular purpose and was rather one of observation. While he was here he saw the prime minister: it seems likely that the desirability of a South Vietnamese military intervention in eastern Cambodia would have been touched upon in this interview.

Relations with Laos

24. A Laotian posts and telecommunications delegation visited Phnom Penh between 22 and 24 November and signed an agreement providing for an improvement in services between the two countries. We understand that it is hoped to establish a telephone link between Vientiane and Phnom Penh.



CONFIDENTIAL

14

CENTRAL REGISTRY
D.E.A.

DEC 4 2 52 AM '71

NOM. INDEX. SUBJECT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS

Memo No. 1176

File No. 225/21/2

18 November, 1971

The Secretary
Department of Foreign Affairs
CANBERRA


25/1/4/37

France/Cambodia : Diplomatic Representation

In the course of a conversation with Bolle (MFA) on 17 November, he confirmed, for what it is worth, that the Cambodian request for agrément for Truong Cang had never been withdrawn so that the formal position remained as ever, that the request was under study.

2. We asked if he knew when the French Ambassador to Cambodia M. Dauge would be returning to Phnom Penh. Bolle said that Dauge had very long leave entitlements which explained his protracted stay in France but that the question of his return was to be discussed shortly. Nothing Bolle said, gave any indication that more was involved than the question of allowing M. Dauge as long a leave as possible after a difficult period when he had been able to take very little, but Bolle was guarded in his reply and there could be more to it than this.

3. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to Phnom Penh.


(K. R. Douglas-Scott)
Minister

Copy sent to INC

for 7/12.

CONFIDENTIAL

m mlye 6/12

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

(F) 25/1/4/37
(13)

EMS2

I.121304

FROM

TOD 29.11.71...1745 LT

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO OECD
PARIS

TOR 30.11.71...0645 LT

272 UNCLASSIFIED PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA (PRIORITY) 272 AND REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP60
LONDON (FOR FOREIGN) 42 TOKYO OP61 WASHINGTON 39 WELLINGTON OP62
AND SAVINGRAMS TO: BRUSSELS OP49 OTTAWA OP50 ROME OP51 AND
SEOUL OP52.

CAMBODIA : EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND. (UNDERLINED)

THE FOLLOWING PRESS COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF TODAY'S MEETING:

"A CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCHANGE
SUPPORT FUND FOR THE KHMER REPUBLIC, CONVENED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, MET IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 29, 1971, UNDER
THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF HIS EXCELLENCY SOK CHHONG, VICE PREMIER
IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER
REPUBLIC. THE CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, ITALY, JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC
OF KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
ALSO ATTENDED AS OBSERVERS.

THE CONFERENCE WELCOMED THE ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM
INTRODUCED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC ON OCTOBER 29,
1971. HAVING CONSIDERED THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE KHMER
REPUBLIC AND THAT COUNTRY'S NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
TO SUPPORT THE STABILIZATION MEASURES, THE CONFERENCE EXAMINED
THE KHMER PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING AN EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND
FOR FINANCING NECESSARY IMPORTS. SEVERAL COUNTRIES INDICATED
THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN AN E.S.F. ON A MULTINATIONAL
BASIS. THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE STATED
THAT THEY WOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THE PROPOSAL.
IT IS HOPED THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MAY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN DUE
COURSE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC EXTENDED AN
INVITATION TO A FURTHER MEETING TO BE HELD IN PHNOM PENH IN
JANUARY, 1972."

2. OUR REPORT OF THE MEETING WILL FOLLOW BY CABLE.

.../2

13 A

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

-2-

I.121304

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
JIO
PMS

ACTION: AID

A/SEC A/DEP SEC(A) A/DEP SEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA SEA
FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO)
EP UNIA SAS(LGL) FAS(MS)

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

(F) 25 | 1 | 4 | 37
17

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ESW 6

0.100090

T O

TOD 29.11.71...1902 LT

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO OECD
PARIS...329

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH...1371

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...5959

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON...15187

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
WELLINGTON...1870

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TOKYO...3059

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
OTTAWA...1149

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BONN...932

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS...5659

CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE

ADDRESSED O.E.C.D. PARIS 329, REPEATED PHNOM PENH 1371, WASHINGTON 5959, LONDON 15187, WELLINGTON 1870, TOKYO 3059, OTTAWA 1149, BONN 932, PARIS 5659.

KHMER REPUBLIC - EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND (UNDERLINED)

FOR WALKER (UNDERLINED)

IT IS IMPORTANT TO OUR STANDING WITH OUR ALLIES AND OUR SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER REPUBLIC THAT THE SCHEME SHOULD NOT FAIL FOR LACK OF AUSTRALIAN BACKING, OUR BASIC APPROACH TO THE QUESTION IS DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 OF OUR 331.

FOR OBVIOUS REASONS HOWEVER WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AS MANY DONORS AS POSSIBLE.

INDEED, THE TREASURER HAS STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC PERSUADING AT LEAST FIVE OTHER COUNTRIES, BESIDES AUSTRALIA, TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE FUND.

.../2.

(11)

(F) 25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

ERJ3

I.121334

FROM

TOD 29.11.71...2015 LT

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO OECD
PARIS

TOR 30.11.71...0755 LT

276 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 276 REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP63 LONDON
45 WASHINGTON 40 AND TOKYO OP64 AND SAVINGRAMS TO:
BRUSSELS OTTAWA ROME SEOUL WELLINGTON.

FROM WALKER.

CAMBODIA EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND. (UNDERLINED)

YOU WILL SEE FROM PRESS COMMUNIQUE THAT MEETING REACHED
NO SUBSTANTIVE DECISION IN THAT NO NEW CONTRIBUTIONS WERE
PLEGGED. UNITED KINGDOM, NEW ZEALAND, BELGIUM, ITALY AND
KOREA ATTENDED AS OBSERVERS ONLY AND COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT.
THE "SEVERAL" COUNTRIES WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE ON A MULTINATIONAL
BASIS WERE THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, BUT NO FIGURES
FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS, OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES,
WERE MENTIONED. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE SITUATION I MADE IT CLEAR
THAT AN AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE IN A GENUINELY
MULTINATIONAL FRAMEWORK, AND THAT WHILE THE AMOUNT WOULD HAVE TO
BE FIXED BY MINISTERS, IT MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE OF THE ORDER
OF ABOUT ONE SIXTH THE JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION OR ONE TWELFTH
THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION.

2. THE HOPE IS THAT FIRM DECISIONS CAN BE REACHED BY THE NEXT
MEETING (TO BE HELD ABOUT JANUARY 17) BY WHICH TIME POSSIBILITY
OF OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD BE CLEAR.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT I AND I
JIO
PMS

ACTION: AID

A/SEC A/DEPSEC(A) A/DEPSEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA SEA
FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR
FAS(IO) EP UNIA SAS(LGL) FA(S)

CONFIDENTIAL

(F) 25/1/4/37 10
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CA1

I.121266

FROM

TOD 29.11.71...1845 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

TOR 30.11.71...0622 LT

5462 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 5462 REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP325 AND
WASHINGTON 155.

FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN CAMBODIA. (UNDERLINED)

PHNOM PENH 1599 TO CANBERRA

WE HAD OCCASION 27 NOVEMBER TO CHECK WITH BOLLE.
WHILE HE CONFIRMED DAUGE WOULD NOT RETURN TO RESIDE IN PHNOM
PENH, HE WAS STILL PRETTY GUARDED IN HIS COMMENTS. HE
MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN POLICY, NO DOWN-
GRADING OF PHNOM PENH "SUCH AS THERE WOULD BE FOR EXAMPLE IF
WE APPOINTED A MORE SENIOR CHARGE" (WHICH IS OF COURSE WHAT THE
CAMBODIANS HAVE DONE HERE) AND THAT DAUGE "RISKED REMAINING
ACCREDITED AS AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA UNTIL HIS RETIREMENT IF
NOTHING ELSE HAPPENED BEFORE". BOLLE PLAYED DOWN
THE IDEA OF VISITS BY DAUGE AND IMPLIED THAT EVEN VISITS TO
PHNOM PENH WERE NOT CERTAIN. HE SAID THAT DAUGE WAS CONCERNING
HIMSELF ONLY WITH CAMBODIAN AFFAIRS AND THAT PART-TIME. HE
MADE THE POINT THAT DAUGE COULD PROBABLY BE OF MORE HELP TO
THE CAMBODIANS IN PARIS THAN IN PHNOM PENH.

2. A SIMPLE EXPLANATION COULD BE THAT BY TAKING THE POSITION THAT
THEY WILL NOT PRESENT CREDENTIALS TO CHENG HENG THE FRENCH HAVE
BOXED THEMSELVES IN AND SO TO AVOID EITHER MAKING DAUGE STAY ON
IN PHNOM PENH INDEFINITELY OR GOING SO FAR AS FORMALLY TO
WITHDRAW HIM THEY HAVE HIT ON THIS MID-WAY SOLUTION. BUT THERE
MAY WELL BE MORE TO IT THAN THIS. THE FORMAL POSITION IS NOW THAT
DAUGE'S CREDENTIALS ARE TO SIHANOUK BUT RECOGNIZED BY THE KHMER
REPUBLIC. THIS COULD MAKE HIM A PRETTY FLEXIBLE RESERVE PARTICULARLY
IF FROM NOW ON HE KEEPS HIS DISTANCE FROM PHNOM PENH WHILE
OSTENSIBLY WORKING IN PARIS IN THE REPUBLIC'S INTEREST. ALSO IT
WOULD BE LOGICAL ENOUGH TO USE HIS TALENTS ON WORKING ON SOME
ASPECT OF AN INDO-CHINA SOLUTION.

3. REFERENCE PARA (2) OF PHNOM PENH'S TELEGRAM. MANACH RETURNED
TO PEKING WITH THE CHINESE DELEGATION SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AND BOLLE
SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SINCE RETURNED TO PARIS.

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10A

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

2.

I. 121266

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA

A/SEC	A/DEPSEC(A)	A/DEPSEC(B)	PR	LA	FAS(A)	SA
FAS(PW)	PC EAME	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	FAS(DVP)	ICR
FAS(IO)	SAS(LGL)	CPI FAS(MS)				

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

(F)

(9)

25/1/4/37

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PMB1

AMENDED COPY

I.119626

FROM

TOD 24.11.71...1338 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

TOR 25.11.71...0558 LT

6445 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED LONDON 565, REPEATED CANBERRA 6445, PARIS 247.

FOR FRASER FROM LEY.

PARIS MEETING ON KHMER REPUBLIC.

BASED ON INFORMATION GATHERED BY MISSION THAT VISITED PHNOM
PENH NOVEMBER 4-15, FUND STAFF HAVE JUST ISSUED REPORT ON ECONOMIC
SITUATION OF KHMER REPUBLIC.

IN ABSENCE OF OBJECTION FROM EXECUTIVE BOARD BY CLOSE OF
BUSINESS FRIDAY, PROPOSAL TO MAKE REPORT AVAILABLE TO NOVEMBER 29
CONFERENCE IN PARIS ON EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND WILL BE APPROVED.

ONE COPY AIRMAILED TO YOU THIS MORNING AND ONE ALSO TO EMBASSY
PARIS AND TREASURY CANBERRA.

2. FURTHER TO EBS/71/287 AND BRAND'S 5826 TO CANBERRA, SHORT STAFF
PAPER RECEIVED LAST NIGHT INCLUDES TEXT OF CABLE FROM KHMER REPUBLIC
PROPOSING PROVISIONAL ADJUSTMENT UNDER ARTICLE 14, SECTION 8 OF
FUND'S HOLDINGS OF REILS.

CABLE STATES THAT +GOVERNMENT TRANSACTIONS TAKE PLACE AT UNITARY
RATE, PRESENTLY SET AT KR 140 PER ONE UNITED STATES DOLLAR+, AND
THAT +IN EVENT THAT EXCHANGE RATE WOULD CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY WE
INTEND TO PROPOSE THAT RATE AT WHICH FUND'S HOLDINGS OF REILS
ARE ACCOUNTED FOR BE ADJUSTED ACCORDINGLY+.

STAFF RECOMMENDS THAT PROPOSAL TO MAKE ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH 140 RATE BE APPROVED IN ABSENCE OF OBJECTION BY CLOSE OF
BUSINESS FRIDAY.

(* AMENDMENTS)

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

9A

- 2 -

I. 119 626

* TREASURER AND TREASURY (T/T)
FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
* MIN AND DEPT T AND I
* DEPT PM AND C
PM'S

ACTION: EP

A/SEC A/DEP SEC(A) A/DEP SEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW)
*PC EAME FAS(DEF) FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA
*SAS(LGL) LTB UNL FAS(MS)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)
25/1/4/37

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

VBR2

I.118185

FROM

TOD 19.11.1971...1945

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

TOR 20.11.1971...0916

5305 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 5305 REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP316 AND
WASHINGTON 515.

FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN CAMBODIA. (UNDERLINED)

PHNOM PENH'S 1578.

IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION ON 17 NOVEMBER WE HAD ASKED BOLLE WHETHER DAUGE WOULD SOON BE RETURNING TO PHNOM PENH. HE REPLIED THAT DAUGE'S PROTRACTED ABSENCE WAS DUE TO HIS HAVING LARGE LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS AND THAT THE QUESTION OF HIS RETURN WAS TO BE DISCUSSED SHORTLY. (OUR MEMO 1176). BOLLE WAS RATHER GUARDED IN HIS REPLY AND IT COULD BE THAT A CHANGE AS REPORTED IN PHNOM PENH'S TELEGRAM IS IN THE AIR. IF IT IS IT COULD CONCEIVABLY INCLUDE SOME SORT OF VISITING RESPONSIBILITY IN VIETNAM. HERE AGAIN HOWEVER, BOLLE SAID IN THE SAME CONVERSATION IN ANSWER TO AN ENQUIRY WE MADE AS TO WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF FRENCH-GVN RELATIONS THAT RELATIONS REMAINED IN THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN, WERE NEITHER BETTER NOR WORSE THAN BEFORE AND THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE ANY CHANGE (OUR MEMO 1177).

2. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WHEN A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY OCCURS.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM'S

ACTION: SA

A/SEC A/DEPSEC(A) A/DEPSEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW)
PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(IO) SAS(LGL)
CPI FAS(MS)

BANGKOK

SAIGON VIENTIANE

Mr. Melie

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MDS1

I.117727

FROM

TOD 19.11.71...0948 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

TOR 19.11.71...1400 LT

1578 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1578, REPEATED PARIS 10, WASHINGTON 208.

FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN CAMBODIA.

FRENCH AMBASSADOR DAUGE HAS BEEN ON LEAVE FROM PHNOM PENH SINCE 19 JULY. THIS PROLONGED ABSENCE HAS GIVEN RISE TO SPECULATION HERE THAT HE MIGHT NEITHER RETURN NOR BE REPLACED, LEAVING THE FRENCH EMBASSY UNDER A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, JUST AS THE CAMBODIAN EMBASSY IN PARIS IS UNDER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES. (THE FRENCH WILL NEITHER ADDRESS AMBASSADORS' CREDENTIALS TO, NOR RECEIVE THEM FROM, CHENG HENG AS HEAD OF STATE). WE NOW UNDERSTAND FROM FRENCH AND OTHERS HERE THAT, WHILE RETAINING HIS APPOINTMENT IN PHNOM PENH, DAUGE WILL NOT RETURN HERE TO LIVE BUT WILL ACT AS ROVING AMBASSADOR IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, VISITING PHNOM PENH AND OTHER COUNTRIES FROM TIME TO TIME FROM BASE IN PARIS. THE FRENCH EMBASSY HERE FOR MOST OF THE TIME WILL THUS BE HEADED BY A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS OF DAUGE'S RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE AND, IN PARTICULAR, HOW FAR THEY WILL EXTEND BEYOND INDO-CHINA. NOR IS IT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS REFLECT SOME DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH POLICY IN CAMBODIA OR INDO-CHINA GENERALLY. THEY NO DOUBT SUIT DAUGE PERSONALLY BETTER THAN A RETURN TO LIVE HERE WOULD. HE IS A RELATIVELY SENIOR AMBASSADOR IN THE FRENCH SERVICE AND HAS ALREADY BEEN HERE FOR OVER THREE YEARS.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J10
PM'S

ACTION: SA

A/SEC A/DEP SEC(A) A/DEP SEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW) PC EAME
FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(10) FAS(MS) SAS(LGL) CPI

BANGKOK SAIGON VIENTIANE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/4/37
(6)

VBR2

I.118185

FROM

TOD 19.11.1971...1945

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

TOR 20.11.1971...0916

5305 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 5305 REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP316 AND
WASHINGTON 515.

FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN CAMBODIA. (UNDERLINED)

PHNOM PENH'S 1578.

IN THE COURSE OF A CONVERSATION ON 17 NOVEMBER WE HAD ASKED
BOLLE WHETHER DAUGE WOULD SOON BE RETURNING TO PHNOM PENH.
HE REPLIED THAT DAUGE'S PROTRACTED ABSENCE WAS DUE TO HIS HAVING
LARGE LEAVE ENTITLEMENTS AND THAT THE QUESTION OF HIS RETURN
WAS TO BE DISCUSSED SHORTLY. (OUR MEMO 1176). BOLLE WAS RATHER
GUARDED IN HIS REPLY AND IT COULD BE THAT A CHANGE AS REPORTED
IN PHNOM PENH'S TELEGRAM IS IN THE AIR. IF IT IS IT COULD
CONCEIVABLY INCLUDE SOME SORT OF VISITING RESPONSIBILITY
IN VIETNAM. HERE AGAIN HOWEVER, BOLLE SAID IN THE SAME
CONVERSATION IN ANSWER TO AN ENQUIRY WE MADE AS TO WHETHER THERE
HAD BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF FRENCH-GVN RELATIONS
THAT RELATIONS REMAINED IN THE ESTABLISHED PATTERN, WERE NEITHER
BETTER NOR WORSE THAN BEFORE AND THAT HE DID NOT FORESEE ANY
CHANGE (OUR MEMO 1177).

2. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WHEN A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY OCCURS.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: SA

A/SEC A/DEPSEC(A) A/DEPSEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW)
PC EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(IO) SAS(LGL)
CPI FAS(MS)

BANGKOK

SAIGON VIENTIANE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LH4

I.118444

FROM

TOD 22.11.71...1815 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

TOR 22.11.71...2237 LT

1599 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1599, REPEATED PARIS 011, WASHINGTON 210.

FRENCH REPRESENTATION IN CAMBODIA.

OUR 1578 AND PARIS 5305 TO YOU.

IN CONVERSATION 22 NOVEMBER, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER LONG BORET CONFIRMED INFORMATION IN FIRST PARAGRAPH OF OUR 1578 ABOUT FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS FOR FRENCH REPRESENTATION HERE. HE SAID THAT FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD RECENTLY CONVEYED THIS INFORMATION TO HIM AND TO SIRIK MATKA.

2. LONG BORET COMMENTED THAT THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR CAMBODIA IN THAT AMBASSADOR DAUGE UNDERSTOOD THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA WELL AND WOULD BE A GOOD ADVOCATE FOR CAMBODIANS IN PARIS.

HE MENTIONED THAT FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD SAID THAT MANAC'H FROM PEKING WAS IN PARIS AT PRESENT AND THAT DISCUSSIONS WITHIN FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON CHINA AND INDO-CHINA WERE THE REASON FOR CURRENT EXTENSION OF DAUGE'S STAY THERE. (WE SHOULD ADD THAT FRENCH EMBASSY HERE DO NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHEN DAUGE MIGHT RETURN FOR HIS FIRST "VISIT" TO PHNOM PENH).

3. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTED THAT THESE NEW ARRANGEMENTS SEEMED TO REFLECT NO CHANGE IN FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT BUT RATHER TO BE DESIGNED AS PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE NEGOTIATION ON INDO-CHINA. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, LONG BORET SAID THAT THE CAMBODIANS HAD NO (REPEAT NO) INFORMATION THAT FRENCH EXPECTED AN EARLY NEGOTIATION ON INDO-CHINA. FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH, HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HEAD OF STATE (CHENG HENG) HAD RECENTLY MENTIONED TO HIM THAT "A FRENCH PERSONALITY" HAD TOLD CHENG HENG THAT FRENCH FAVOURED THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH TO INCLUDE PENN NOUTH, THE FUNK PRIME MINISTER. LONG BORET SAID THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHO THE PERSONALITY IN QUESTION WAS BUT SURMISED THAT THE INFORMATION CHENG HENG MENTIONED MIGHT HAVE COME THROUGH SON SANN IN PARIS. LONG BORET HAD ASKED FRENCH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ABOUT ACCURACY OF INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO THE FRENCH PERSONALITY AND HAD BEEN TOLD THAT IT DID NOT REFLECT FRENCH GOVERNMENT POLICY.

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SA

-2-

I.118444

IT IS PERHAPS RELEVANT TO ALL THIS THAT ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
ALSO MENTIONED TO ME RUMOURS CIRCULATING IN PHNOM PENH, ORIGINATING
APPARENTLY IN NEW YORK, THAT CHINESE MIGHT RAISE OBJECTIONS TO CRED-
ENTIALS OF CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT'S REPRESENTATIVE IN UNITED NATIONS.

FEAKES...

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: SA

A/SEC A/DEP SECS (A)(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW) PC
EAME FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) ICR FAS(IO) SAS(LGL)
CPI FAS(MS)

BANGKOK SAIGON VIENTIANE

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

(F) 25/1/4/37 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

DAR4

0.96841

TO

TOD 18.11.71...2021 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH...1317

REPEATED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS...5496

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON...5818

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO OECD
PARIS...286

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
TOKYO...2970

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON...14721

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
THE HAGUE...1193

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION
WELLINGTON...1814

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED PHNOM PENH 1317, REPEATED PARIS 5496, WASHINGTON 5818, OECD PARIS 286, TOKYO 2970, LONDON 14721, THE HAGUE 1193, WELLINGTON 1814.

ESF

YOUR TEL 1519

PLEASE INFORM KHMER AUTHORITIES THAT AUSTRALIA WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING IN PARIS ON 29 NOVEMBER TO CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
MIN AND DEPT PI
JIO
PMS

ACTION: AID

A/SEC A/DEPSEC(A)(B) PR LA FAS(A) NA SA FAS(PW) PC EAME FAS(DEF)
DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) EP UNIA SAS(LGL) FAS(MS) SEA

National Archives of Australia

NAA: A1838, 25/1/4/37 PART 2

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RR 6

FROM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

I.117042

TOD 17/11/71...1835 LT

TOR 18/11/71...0656 LT

5254. CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 5254 REPEATED PHNOM PENH OP313.

CAMBODIA : EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND.

BOLLE (MFA) TOLD US 17 NOVEMBER THAT FRANCE WAS UNLIKELY TO ATTEND THE IBRD MEETING IN PARIS SCHEDULED FOR THE END OF NOVEMBER. FRANCE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH TO CONCENTRATE ON IN ITS BILATERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. NINETY PERCENT OF THE DEBTS FOR WHICH CAMBODIA WAS SEEKING A MORATORIUM WERE TOWARDS FRANCE WHO WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO AGREE - HE EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS ON THIS BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. THIS WOULD ALREADY AMOUNT TO A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT BY FRANCE IN ADDITION TO THE 1970 LOAN AND OTHER BILATERAL AID TO CAMBODIA. HE SAID THAT THE CAMBODIANS UNDERSTOOD THE FRENCH POSITION.

2. LATER IN THE CONVERSATION IN ANOTHER CONTEXT BOLLE REFERRED TO THE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES OF ALL THE THREE NON-COMMUNIST INDO-CHINESE STATES IN A WAY WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH EXPECTED THE DIFFICULTIES TO INCREASE AND DID NOT WANT TO BE DRAWN INTO ANY OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENT.

FOREIGN MINISTER
DEPT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
JIO
PM'S

ACTION: AID

A/SEC	A/DEP	SEC(A)(B)	PR	LA	FAS(A)	NA	SA	SEA	FAS(PW)
PC	EAME	FAS(DEF)	DP	IC	FAS(DVP)	AID	ICR	FAS(IO)	
EP	UNIA	SAS(LGL)							

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25/1/4/37

FOLIO No.
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

ERJ1

I.97309

FROM

TOD 27.9.71...1253 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PHNOM PENH

TOR 27.9.71...1555 LT

1301 CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1301 REPEATED WASHINGTON 183

CAMBODIAN EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND.

THANKS YOUR 1055.

AMERICANS HAVE TOLD US THAT DURING THEIR RECENT BILATERAL AID DISCUSSIONS WITH JAPANESE (OUR 1274) WHILE EXPRESSING VIEW ALREADY REPORTED ABOUT ESF, JAPANESE WERE VERY LUKEWARM ABOUT INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP. AS YOU KNOW, (OUR 1067) AMERICANS THEMSELVES ARE LUKEWARM ABOUT IT AND, IN FACT, TRIED TO GET REFERENCE TO IT DELETED FROM DRAFT ESF AGREEMENT. ONE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT MAJOR AID DONOR HERE (FRANCE) IS UNLIKELY TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A GROUP.

A/FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2020/2/15/1)
TREASURER AND TREASURY
MIN AND DEPT T AND I
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
JIO
PMS

ACTION: AID

SEC DEPSEC(A) A/DEPSEC(B) PR LA FAS(A) SA FAS(PW) PC EAME
FAS(DEF) DP IC FAS(DVP) AID ICR FAS(IO) DP UNIA SAS(LGL) FAS(MS)
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BONN LONDON TOKYO WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

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